William M. Reddy, "The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions" (Book Note)

 

William Reddy's "The Navigation of Feeling" not only offers a fresh interpretation of the main trajectories in French history from 1700 to 1850 but also presents a theoretical dimension that extends beyond the confines of French history. Drawing inspiration from recent advancements in cognitive psychology and cultural anthropology, Reddy introduces a novel approach to the study of emotions. He envisions this approach not only as a means to enhance our understanding of historical phenomena but also as the basis for a new universalist "defense of human liberty".

 

In the course of his argument, Reddy transcends the boundaries of the social sciences, delving into the realm of philosophy. Here, he critiques post-structuralism and extends speech-act theory, offering a theoretical framework that encompasses both general principles and specific historical applications. The first part of the book employs broad terms, establishing a theoretical foundation. In the second half, titled "Emotions in History: France, 1700-1850," Reddy applies his theoretical framework to examine changes in "emotional regimes" in France, spanning from Louis XIV's reign to the July Monarchy. French history serves a dual purpose—supporting general arguments and providing a platform to showcase the application of Reddy's theory to concrete historical situations.

 

Reddy initiates his exploration by examining recent developments in the analysis of emotion within cognitive psychology. Scholars in this field have heralded a "revolution in the study of emotions," challenging the traditional dichotomy between thought and affect. Reddy argues that emotions can no longer be deemed inherently irrational merely because they do not conform to linear patterns of rational thought or exhibit the involuntary characteristics often associated with physiological arousal. Furthermore, emotional responses are no longer considered aspects of a biologically predetermined human nature; instead, they can be learned and unlearned, although such processes are not easily accomplished. Reddy emphasizes that individuals cannot arbitrarily fashion or refashion any emotion or set of emotions at will.

 

The concept that emotions are learned suggests a "constructivist" perspective, wherein emotional responses are viewed as culturally determined. William Reddy, who holds a joint appointment in history and cultural anthropology at Duke University, delves into this idea, highlighting its resonance among cultural anthropologists. However, Reddy critically examines the anthropologists' treatment of the social construction of emotional codes, asserting that much of this work lacks historical depth and political coherence. Reddy contends that if emotions are entirely determined by culture, it becomes challenging to recognize individuals as active agents shaping their lives, and historical change becomes elusive within such closed structures.

 

While acknowledging the contributions of cognitive psychology and cultural anthropology to understanding emotions, Reddy turns to philosophical theory to establish an approach that draws on both disciplines while addressing their perceived weaknesses. He aims to avoid Cartesian mind/body dualism present in some cognitive psychology approaches without fully embracing post-structuralist claims rejecting the concept of the autonomous individual. Reddy challenges post-structuralism by rejecting the notion that language is a "prison house" of arbitrarily designated signifiers and proposes the idea of translation. This concept allows for a more nuanced understanding, acknowledging that language may provide a more or less accurate version of reality, restoring a notion of individual agency.

 

With the concept of translation, Reddy proposes a working definition of emotions as essentially "translations" of "loosely linked thought material that tends to be activated simultaneously… and that is too large to be translated into action or utterance over a brief time horizon". Emotions, according to Reddy, represent the expression of a "disaggregated self", neither the coherent, rational ego of Cartesian theory nor the arbitrary illusion posited by post-structuralist theorists. Reddy then delves into speech-act theory, suggesting that statements about emotional states be labeled "emotives." These statements, he argues, have a "self-exploring or self-altering effect", indicating that expressing emotions through language may alter them. By making emotive statements, individuals act on themselves and the world, establishing the conditions for individual agency.

 

 

Having established his theoretical framework, William Reddy proceeds to elucidate the political implications of his argument. He defines individual freedom as the right to navigate one's emotions, attempting to chart one's own course. Emotional liberty, according to Reddy, involves the freedom to change goals in response to complex, ambivalent thought activations that challenge existing emotional management. This freedom doesn't entail making rational choices but allows for conversion experiences and life-course changes influenced by diverse and often incommensurable factors. Reddy categorizes different "emotional regimes" based on the extent to which individuals can exercise this emotional liberty. Strict regimes dictate emotional responses from external sources, fostering reassurance but hindering adaptation. Loose regimes offer flexibility but may complicate the definition of a coherent life course. Reddy contends that strict regimes present an incomplete and contradictory vision of human nature and possibilities, constituting a political failure that must be rejected. He asserts that his understanding of emotions and their relationship to the individual provides a universal standpoint that is neither ethnocentric nor reliant on an untenable notion of the rational, autonomous self. The primary goal of any social or political system, in Reddy's view, should be to minimize emotional suffering to the necessary minimum.

 

Reddy's approach to emotions shares commonalities with philosopher and classicist Martha Nussbaum, in her "Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions," argues for the cognitive content of emotions and sees political significance in this cognitive aspect. Nussbaum advocates for the guarantee of emotional development free from fear and anxiety as a societal capability. While both align with the liberal tradition of supporting individual rights, Reddy's political program is framed more negatively, focusing on reducing emotional suffering, whereas Nussbaum's is broader, encompassing protection for life, health, bodily integrity, and various human ideals.

 

Though Reddy and Nussbaum share a liberal perspective, differences emerge. Reddy's political claims appear more modest, perhaps influenced by anthropological critiques of Western notions of human rights, while Nussbaum, drawing mainly from the Western tradition, asserts a greater confidence in the universality of natural-rights. Reddy goes beyond Nussbaum in integrating the study of emotions into a social-science framework and presents an original extension of speech-act theory through his analysis of "emotive" statements.

 

However, it remains uncertain whether Reddy's argument can successfully sway committed cultural relativists. Like certain groups, such as medieval penitents, who derive spiritual value from physical pain, there might be cultures where emotional suffering is not perceived as the greatest evil. Reddy's proposition to measure the extent of emotional suffering inflicted by a particular regime raises challenges. For instance, in Unni Wikan's study of the emotional regime in Bali, where maintaining a cheerful demeanor is emphasized to such an extent that grief for the loss of a loved one cannot be expressed, questions arise about whether the Balinese suffer from extreme emotional repression or if their avoidance of grief protects them from pain experienced by Westerners. Reddy acknowledges regimes that combine "coercion and liberty", suggesting that some may be satisfying to the majority living under them. The challenge lies in delineating between acceptable and unacceptable degrees of emotional constraint. Reddy maintains that he is not presenting Western liberal responses as a model, describing the Western tradition as a "promising, although variegated, failure of world-historical proportions". However, his proposed solution still appears closely tied, for better or worse, to Western individualism assumptions.

 

In the second half of "The Navigation of Feeling," Reddy employs his constructed theoretical framework to analyze the emotional regimes in France from 1700 to 1850. This period is considered pivotal for the study of emotions, as, for a brief period, emotions were deemed as important as reason in politics, and this idea was subsequently rejected and erased from memory after 1794. Reddy uses this historical context to apply his theoretical insights.

 

Reddy's narrative of French history, while somewhat familiar, offers a unique perspective by translating the standard account through the lens of emotional regimes rather than political or intellectual ones. During Louis 14's reign, absolutism imposed a court etiquette code as a means of social control, influencing emotional management. In response, individuals sought a private emotional refuge where sentiments could be expressed freely. Reddy traces how the cult of sentiment, rooted in sentimentalism, developed dangerous tendencies as the century progressed. The French Revolution, typically viewed as an example of the excesses of abstract reason, is reinterpreted by Reddy as a demonstration of sentimentalism's extremes. The effort to transform France into an emotional refuge turned into the emotional suffering of the Terror, driven by coercive pressure to exhibit politically correct emotions. Reddy argues that the Jacobin regime's demand for perpetual emotional sincerity led to a fatal weakness, making all individuals feel like traitors. This, he claims, is a point that neither class analysis nor cultural interpretation alone can provide grounds for.

While not entirely novel, the concept of "emotional regimes" offers a valuable lens for examining historical societies and their impact on individual and collective experiences. Reddy's work, both theoretically and historically, contributes significantly to ongoing debates about establishing criteria for the good life that transcend cultural and dualistic assumptions about mind and body.

 

Under Napoleon, public sincerity ceased to be a valued virtue, with individuals exchanging public conformity to the Emperor's dictates for greater freedom in their private lives. Nineteenth-century liberals not only rejected the idea of basing the political order on sentiment but also revised eighteenth-century history to depict Enlightenment predecessors as consistent rationalists. Reddy observes a shift where the inner life of emotions was no longer seen as a source of "natural" impulses shaping institutions. Instead, sentiment was relegated to a private realm of personal reflection, artistic endeavor, and interior, non-civic spaces.

 

Reddy's narrative draws heavily on secondary literature and writings of prominent intellectuals. In the final chapter, he examines civil court cases from 1815-1848 to explore how lawyers and clients utilized the language of emotions. While post-revolutionary society allowed greater ease of emotional navigation, it came at the price of pervasive malaise and a sense of shame about the new bourgeois society. Despite its shortcomings, Reddy contends that this regime was more flexible and survivable than the sentimentalists' attempt.

 

However, Reddy's narrative prompts questions. His account, closely mirroring Jürgen Habermas's narrative about the rise of the public sphere, raises concerns about its teleological framework. Reddy interprets the French Revolution and subsequent emotional regimes as inevitable consequences of eighteenth-century attitudes toward emotions. This view aligns with the revisionist school's perspective, notably François Furet, seeing the Terror as inherent in the Revolution's libertarian rhetoric. Reddy's sympathies lie with the liberal regimes of the early nineteenth century, despite their limits on political participation and rigidly masculinist institutions.

 

An alternative interpretation challenges this teleological framework, questioning the inevitability of the Terror and recognizing different emotional consequences of eighteenth-century sentimentalism and the Revolution. It suggests that emotional freedom was first posed by the eighteenth-century sentimentalists, despite their problematic concept of the naturalness of emotions. The interpretation acknowledges that political traditions were not the sole focus and considers the role of religion, which Reddy's account neglects. It also highlights the positive significance of the Revolution for emotional liberty, citing Article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the liberal divorce law of 1792.