In psychoanalytical theory, we operate under the
assumption that mental processes are primarily governed by the "pleasure
principle." This principle suggests that psychological processes tend to
originate from a state of discomfort or tension and seek paths that lead to a
reduction in this tension, typically resulting in the avoidance of pain or the
attainment of pleasure. When analyzing psychic processes within this framework,
we introduce an economic perspective, considering not only the topographical
and dynamic aspects but also the economic element. This comprehensive approach,
which considers pleasure and pain in relation to the quantity of excitation
present in the psychic life, is termed meta-psychological.
While our assertion of the pleasure principle is not
grounded in any specific philosophical system, we acknowledge the potential
value of philosophical or psychological theories that could provide insight
into the nature of pleasure and pain. However, the complexity of these
phenomena makes them challenging to understand fully. Thus, we approach them
with an open mind, recognizing the need for flexible hypotheses.
Our analysis suggests that pleasure corresponds to a
decrease in the quantity of excitation, while pain corresponds to an increase.
However, we do not propose a simple relationship between the intensity of
feelings and corresponding changes. Instead, the amount of diminution or
increase over time likely plays a crucial role.
The pleasure principle is closely linked to the principle
of constancy, which posits that the psychic apparatus strives to maintain the
quantity of excitation as low as possible or at least constant. Any factors
that increase excitation are perceived as contrary to the function of the
psyche and are experienced as painful. Thus, the principle of constancy is
inferred from the observations necessitating the assumption of the pleasure
principle.
However, it is important to note that the pleasure
principle does not always dictate the course of psychic processes. While there
is a strong tendency toward pleasure, other forces or conditions may oppose it,
leading to outcomes that do not align with the pleasure tendency. Despite this,
the pleasure principle remains a significant aspect of psychic life.
One common challenge to the pleasure principle is the
reality principle, which asserts the postponement of satisfaction and the
endurance of pain in the pursuit of long-term goals, particularly those related
to self-preservation. Additionally, conflicts within the psychic apparatus,
particularly during ego development, can lead to painful experiences due to the
repression of certain instincts.
Furthermore, external factors, such as perceived danger
or unsatisfied instincts, can also contribute to painful experiences. The
reaction to these factors may be guided by either the pleasure principle or the
reality principle, depending on the circumstances.
Over the course of twenty-five years of intensive work,
there has been a significant evolution in the immediate objectives of
psychoanalytic technique. Initially, the focus was on interpreting the
unconscious aspects of the patient's mind, synthesizing these components, and
conveying them at the appropriate time. Psychoanalysis was primarily viewed as
an interpretative art. However, it became evident that this approach alone did
not achieve therapeutic success. Subsequently, efforts turned towards prompting
the patient to corroborate these reconstructions through their own recollections.
This phase emphasized uncovering the patient's resistances, bringing them to
their attention, and using human influence, often through transference, to help
the patient relinquish these barriers.
Nevertheless, it became increasingly apparent that merely
bringing the unconscious into consciousness was not wholly achievable through
this method. Patients often couldn't recall all repressed material, potentially
missing its essential aspects, leading to doubts regarding the accuracy of the
presented conclusions. Instead, patients tended to re-experience repressed
content in their current lives rather than recalling it as part of their past.
This re-experience frequently involved fragments of infantile sexuality,
particularly related to the Oedipus complex, played out within the transference
relationship with the analyst. This phase marked a transition from the initial
neurosis to a new one termed the transference neurosis.
Understanding the "repetition compulsion," a
phenomenon prevalent in the psychoanalytic treatment of neurotics, requires
dispelling the notion of resistance emanating directly from the unconscious.
The unconscious, or repressed material, offers no resistance to therapeutic
efforts but seeks release either through conscious awareness or through real
actions. Resistance in therapy arises from higher levels of the psyche,
stemming from the ego, which originally enforced repression. Therefore, it is
more accurate to contrast the coherent ego with the repressed rather than the
conscious with the unconscious.
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The resistance originating from the conscious and
preconscious ego serves the pleasure principle, aiming to avoid the discomfort
that would accompany the release of repressed material. Psychoanalytic efforts
focus on appealing to the reality principle to allow entry for these painful
feelings. However, the repetition compulsion, driven by repressed elements,
presents a new and intriguing aspect. It revives past experiences that contain
no potential for pleasure, reflecting loss, failure, and painful affective
situations from early childhood. These experiences, marked by disappointment
and distress, are re-enacted in therapy despite their inherently unpleasant
nature, suggesting a powerful compulsion to repeat.
Psychoanalysis reveals that the phenomena observed in the
transference with neurotics can also be observed in the lives of normal
individuals. These patterns give the impression of a predetermined fate,
suggesting a daemonic trait in their destiny. Psychoanalysis views such life
histories as largely self-imposed and influenced by childhood experiences. The
compulsion expressed in these patterns is akin to the repetition-compulsion
seen in neurotics, even though these individuals may not display overt neurotic
symptoms.
For example, some people consistently experience the same
endings in their relationships or encounter recurring themes in their lives,
such as being betrayed by friends or experiencing ingratitude from those
they've helped. Others may repeatedly invest authority in others only to later
overthrow it and replace it with new authority figures. Similarly, some
individuals find that their romantic relationships follow the same phases and
ultimately end in a predictable manner.
While we might expect such repetitive patterns in cases
where individuals actively participate in shaping their experiences, it's more
striking when they seem to passively undergo these experiences without exerting
any influence. For instance, there's the story of a woman who married three successive
husbands, each of whom fell ill shortly after marriage, requiring her to nurse
them until their deaths.
These observations lead to the assumption of a
repetition-compulsion in psychic life, which operates beyond the pleasure
principle. This compulsion is evident in various phenomena, including the
dreams of trauma patients and the play behavior of children. While the origins
and functions of this repetition-compulsion are not fully understood, it
appears to be a primitive and instinctive force that influences human behavior.
Psychoanalytic speculation also delves into the nature of
consciousness and its relationship to psychic processes. Consciousness is
considered a specialized function of the psyche, distinct from other psychic
systems. It is associated with the perception of external stimuli and internal
feelings of pleasure and pain. The system responsible for consciousness, termed
W-Bw, is situated on the boundary between outer and inner experiences.
Consciousness involves the reception of external stimuli
and the formation of memory traces, which are permanent alterations in other
psychic systems. However, in the system Bw itself, excitation processes do not
leave lasting traces but instead result in the phenomenon of becoming conscious
and then vanish. This unique aspect of the Bw system suggests that
consciousness arises in response to stimuli from the outer world and is
intimately connected with its position in the psyche.
The living organism, conceived as a sensitive vesicle, is
equipped with a protective barrier against external stimuli. This barrier
allows only a fraction of external stimuli to penetrate while shielding the
deeper layers of the psyche from overwhelming stimulation. Sense organs serve
as specialized structures for receiving specific stimuli while providing
additional protection against excessive stimulation.
Traumatic experiences involve the breach of the barrier
against stimuli, leading to a flood of excitation into the psychic apparatus.
The pleasure principle is temporarily overridden as the psyche mobilizes its
energy to cope with the overwhelming stimulus. The process of binding this
excessive energy is crucial for restoring balance and preventing further
disruption to psychic functioning.
3
It can be tentatively suggested that ordinary traumatic
neurosis stems from a significant breach in the barrier against stimuli. This
perspective harkens back to the traditional notion of 'shock,' which emphasizes
the direct impact of external forces. However, this view contrasts with a more
contemporary understanding that attributes the etiological significance of
traumatic neurosis to psychological factors such as fear and perceived threat
to life. Yet, these divergent viewpoints are not necessarily irreconcilable.
In psychoanalytic theory, traumatic neurosis is viewed as
distinct from the simplistic 'shock' theory. Rather than focusing solely on
physical injury to nervous structures, psychoanalysis considers the breach of
the psychic barrier against stimuli and the subsequent challenges faced by the
individual. Fright remains relevant in this context, indicating a failure of
the apprehension mechanism to adequately prepare for incoming stimuli. This
lack of preparation, coupled with insufficient charging of receptive systems,
renders the individual unable to effectively process and regulate the influx of
excitation. Consequently, the consequences of breaching the protective barrier
become more pronounced.
Dreams experienced by individuals with traumatic neuroses
often revisit the traumatic event, but they do not serve the typical function
of wish-fulfillment. Instead, they may represent attempts to regain control
over stimuli by fostering apprehension, which was lacking during the traumatic
experience. These dreams shed light on a function of the psyche that operates
independently of the pleasure principle, suggesting an earlier origin than the
pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.
This recognition challenges the principle that dreams primarily
serve as wish-fulfillment mechanisms. While anxiety dreams and punishment
dreams fit into this category, dreams associated with traumatic neuroses do
not. They instead follow a repetition-compulsion, which seeks to recreate and
confront repressed experiences. This function of dreams predates the dominance
of the pleasure principle and highlights the complex interplay between
psychological mechanisms in processing traumatic events.
Moreover, it raises the question of whether these dreams,
driven by the need to bind traumatic impressions, can occur outside the context
of psychoanalysis. The affirmative answer suggests that these dreams are not
exclusive to therapy but are inherent to the psychical processes involved in
coping with trauma.
In considering war neuroses, beyond the mere timing of
their onset, it's plausible to view them as traumatic neuroses that are
exacerbated by underlying ego conflicts. This insight clarifies the observation
that severe physical injuries occurring simultaneously with the trauma reduce
the likelihood of neurosis, as it can be understood in light of psychoanalytic
research. Firstly, mechanical concussion is recognized as a source of sexual
excitation, and secondly, a concurrent bodily injury can influence the distribution
of libido.
Mechanical trauma may unleash a surge of sexual
excitation due to its disruptive nature, especially in the absence of adequate
psychological preparation. However, the bodily injury occurring concurrently
might mitigate this effect by absorbing excess excitation through narcissistic
over-charging of the injured area. This interplay illustrates the intricate
dynamics between physical trauma, sexual excitation, and the protective
mechanisms of the psyche.
Moreover, the absence of a protective barrier in the
sensitive cortical layer against internal stimuli suggests that transmissions
from within the body hold significant economic importance. These inner
excitations, stemming from instinctual forces, can lead to disturbances
comparable to traumatic neuroses. Understanding these instinctual forces is
crucial, as they represent innate tendencies towards the reinstatement of
earlier conditions, akin to organic elasticity or inertia in living organisms.
This perspective challenges conventional notions of
instinct, which are often associated with progress and development. Instead,
instincts appear to be fundamentally conservative, striving to return to a
former state rather than advancing towards new ones. This regression towards an
ancient starting point underscores the influence of external factors in shaping
organic development.
4
the goal of all life, according to this view, is to
return to an inanimate state, as everything living eventually succumbs to
internal causes and returns to the inorganic. The emergence of life from
lifeless matter and the subsequent evolution of consciousness may have been
driven by forces striving to attain equilibrium and return to a state of
non-life. This interpretation sheds light on the cyclical nature of life and
the profound influence of external forces on its trajectory.
The conclusions drawn thus far regarding instincts may
initially seem perplexing and contradictory to our preconceived notions. The
assertion that all instincts, except for the sexual ones, are geared towards
facilitating death stands in stark contrast to the widely accepted belief in
self-preservation instincts. However, upon closer examination, it becomes
evident that the self-preservative instincts, such as those driving power and
self-assertion, serve to prolong life only in a manner specific to the organism's
predetermined path towards death. This paradoxical behavior, where the organism
fiercely resists influences that could expedite its demise, is characteristic
of pure instinctual responses rather than intelligent decision-making.
Yet, we must pause to reconsider these conclusions. The
sexual instincts offer a different perspective, as they aim not for the
restoration of an earlier state but for the preservation and continuation of
life. Unlike the self-preservative instincts, which are focused on individual
survival, the sexual instincts operate on a broader scale, safeguarding life
itself and potentially prolonging it through reproduction.
This distinction highlights an oscillating rhythm in the
life of organisms: while some instincts drive towards a swift conclusion of
life's journey, others pull back at certain points, prolonging the duration of
the process. The sexual instincts, in particular, exhibit a conservative nature
by preserving life for a longer time and resisting external influences that
threaten its continuity.
However, these reflections prompt us to question whether
our assumptions are entirely valid. Is it indeed true that all life must
ultimately succumb to internal causes? The notion of a natural death, while
comforting, lacks empirical support and has been challenged by biologists.
Observations of certain species with remarkably long lifespans suggest that
external factors play a significant role in determining the duration of life.
The theories put forth by biologists like August Weismann
offer intriguing parallels to our discussions on instincts. Weismann's
distinction between mortal soma and immortal germ-plasm aligns with our
differentiation between instincts geared towards death and those promoting
life's renewal. However, while Weismann's theory applies primarily to
multicellular organisms, it sheds light on the adaptive nature of death rather
than its inevitability.
The concept of natural death among higher organisms
doesn't significantly contribute to our understanding. If death is a relatively
recent development in the history of life, then the idea of death-instincts
dating back to the origins of life on Earth becomes less relevant. Whether
multicellular organisms perish due to internal causes like defects in
differentiation or metabolic imperfections doesn't add much to our inquiry.
Such a perspective aligns more closely with conventional human views on death
compared to the notion of death-instincts.
The debate surrounding Weismann's assertions hasn't
yielded decisive outcomes. Some thinkers, like Goette, attributed death
directly to the act of reproduction. Hartmann defined death not merely as the
appearance of a lifeless body but as the definitive end of individual
development, suggesting that even protozoa experience death coinciding with
reproduction, albeit in a disguised manner.
Interest then shifted to experimental tests of the
alleged immortality of unicellular organisms. Woodruff's culture of a ciliated
infusorium seemed to demonstrate immortality through continuous reproduction
for hundreds of generations. However, other researchers, such as Maupas and
Calkins, contradicted this, showing that infusoria eventually weaken and die
after numerous divisions unless exposed to certain invigorating stimuli.
From these investigations, two significant observations
emerge. First, when infusoria have the opportunity to conjugate, they remain
exempt from aging, suggesting a rejuvenating effect. Second, it's probable that
infusoria die from their own metabolic processes, particularly due to the
accumulation of waste products in their environment.
However, the relevance of studying natural death in
protozoa may be questionable, as their primitive organization might obscure
processes present in higher animals. Nevertheless, the resemblance between
Weismann's differentiation of soma and germ-plasm and the distinction between
life-instincts and death-instincts remains noteworthy.
Considering E. Hering's theory of vital processes
involving anabolic and katabolic directions, one might speculate whether these
correspond to life-instincts and death-instincts, respectively. This notion
inadvertently echoes Schopenhauer's philosophy, where death is seen as the
ultimate outcome of life, while the sexual instinct embodies the will to live.
A deeper exploration of the Libido theory reveals a
progression from a narrow focus on sexual instincts to a broader understanding
encompassing ego-libido and narcissistic tendencies. This evolution suggests
the possibility that all instincts may be fundamentally libidinous in nature.
However, the dualistic approach distinguishing between life-instincts and
death-instincts remains steadfast, contrasting with Jung's monistic
interpretation.
Despite challenges in analyzing the ego, there's a
recognition that libidinous impulses within the ego may be intertwined with
other, as yet undiscovered, ego-instincts. While analysis has primarily
revealed libidinous impulses, it doesn't necessarily negate the existence of
other instincts. Thus, the conclusion that only libidinous instincts exist is
not warranted.
In the current state of uncertainty surrounding the
theory of instinct, it would be unwise to dismiss any idea that holds the
potential to provide illumination. Our starting point has been the contrast
between the life instincts and death instincts. Object-love itself reveals a
second polarity, that of love (tenderness) and hate (aggression). What if we
could establish a connection between these two polarities, tracing one back to
the other? We have long recognized a sadistic component of the sexual instinct:
it can, as we know, become independent and dominate a person's entire sexual
orientation as a perversion. In certain organizational structures that I have
referred to as "pregenital," it emerges as a dominant partial
instinct. But how do we derive the sadistic impulse, which seeks to harm the
object, from the life-sustaining Eros? Could it be that this sadism is
essentially a death instinct that is displaced from the ego by the influence of
narcissistic libido, manifesting itself only in relation to the object? It then
serves the sexual function; during the oral stage of libido organization,
possessing the object amorously is equivalent to annihilating it; later, the
sadistic impulse separates and, eventually, during the genital primacy stage,
takes on the task of overpowering the sexual object to facilitate sexual
intercourse. One might even argue that the sadism expelled from the ego guides
the libidinal components of the sexual instinct, which then seek the object. In
cases where the original sadism remains unabated or uncombined, the well-known
ambivalence of love-hate in romantic relationships emerges.
If this assumption holds true, then we have met the
challenge of demonstrating an example of a death instinct—albeit one that is
displaced. However, this conception is far from evident and may give rise to a
mystical impression. We risk being suspected of attempting to find a way out of
a deadlock at any cost. However, we can defend against this suspicion by pointing
out that this assumption is not entirely new; we previously made a similar one
when no deadlock was at hand. Clinical observations compelled us to view
masochism, the complementary aspect of sadism, as a recoil of sadism onto the
ego itself. A redirection of the instinct from the object to the ego is
essentially equivalent to a redirection from the ego to the object, which is
the new idea under consideration. Masochism, the redirection of the instinct
toward the self, would then represent a regression to an earlier phase.
However, it is important to note that our understanding of masochism requires
some revision; it may also be primary, contrary to what I previously argued.
5
Returning to the life-sustaining sexual instincts, we
have learned from the study of protozoa that the fusion of two individuals
without subsequent separation, much like copulation between two individuals who
then separate shortly after, has a rejuvenating effect. Their descendants show
no signs of degeneration and appear to have gained the ability to withstand the
harmful effects of their own metabolism for longer periods. This observation
may serve as a prototype for the effect of sexual intercourse as well. However,
how does the fusion of two slightly different cells bring about such a renewal
of life? Experiments substituting conjugation among protozoa with chemical or
mechanical stimuli allow us to answer this question with some certainty: it
occurs through the introduction of new stimulus masses. This aligns closely
with the hypothesis that an individual's life process leads, due to internal
causes, to the equalization of chemical tensions—i.e., to death—while union
with a different individual increases these tensions, introducing new vital
differences that must be lived out. This difference between the two individuals
must naturally have one or more optima. Our understanding that the dominant
tendency of psychic life, perhaps of nerve life altogether, is the struggle for
reduction, maintaining a constant level, or removal of inner stimulus
tension—the Nirvana principle—is one of our strongest reasons for believing in
the existence of death instincts.
However, our argument is still unsettled by the fact that,
in the case of the sexual instinct, we are unable to demonstrate the
characteristic of a repetition compulsion that initially led us to the concept
of death instincts. While the realm of embryonic developmental processes
presents many instances of such repetition phenomena, the essential feature of
processes driven by the sexual instinct is the fusion of two cells. Only
through this fusion is the immortality of living substance among higher life
forms ensured.
In other words, we must investigate the origin of sexual
reproduction and the source of sexual instincts in general—a daunting task that
even specialists have not yet solved. Let us, therefore, gather condensed
insights from various conflicting accounts and opinions that can be related to
our line of thought.
One perspective diminishes the allure of the propagation
problem by presenting it as part of the growth phenomenon (multiplication by
division, germination, budding). According to this view, the emergence of
sexual reproduction through sexually differentiated germ cells could be seen,
in accordance with a sober Darwinian perspective, as a means of preserving and
utilizing the advantage of amphimixis resulting from the chance mating of two
protozoa. 'Sex' would thus not be of ancient origin, and the powerful instincts
aimed at sexual union would merely repeat something that happened by chance and
later proved advantageous.
However, this viewpoint raises the same question that
arose regarding death: whether protozoa possess anything beyond what is
observable and whether we can assume that forces and processes that are only
noticeable in higher animals first emerged in more primitive ones. This
perspective on sexuality offers little assistance in this regard. An objection
to this perspective is that it presupposes the existence of life instincts
already operative in the simplest life forms; otherwise, conjugation, which
opposes the expiration of life and makes dying more difficult, would not have
been retained and developed but would have been avoided. Therefore, if we are
not to abandon the hypothesis of death instincts, we must associate them with
life instincts from the beginning. However, we must admit that we are dealing
with an equation with two unknowns.
Yet another hypothesis, albeit fantastic, suggests an
explanation—albeit mythological—for the origin of sexual instincts. This
theory, articulated by Plato in his Symposium through the character
Aristophanes, not only addresses the origin of the sexual instinct but also its
most significant variations concerning the object. It posits that human nature
was originally different from what it is now and that there were three sexes
instead of the current two: male, female, and a third sex that shared equally
in the first two. Each human being longed for their own other half, and when
they found it, they embraced and sought to become one again.
Should we entertain this poet-philosopher's clue and dare
to assume that living substance was torn into small particles at the time of
its animation, which have since striven for reunion through sexual instincts?
Could it be that these instincts, which continue the chemical affinity of
inanimate matter, gradually overcome all obstacles to their striving through an
environment filled with life-threatening stimuli and are compelled by it to
form a protective layer? And could these dispersed fragments of living
substance ultimately achieve a multicellular organization and then concentrate
the instinct for reunion into germ cells?
At this point, it is appropriate to conclude. However,
it's crucial to reflect critically. I might be asked whether I am convinced of
the ideas presented here and, if so, to what extent. My response would be that
I am neither fully convinced nor seeking to convince others. To be precise, I
do not know to what extent I believe in them. It seems to me that the affective
aspect of "conv
In exploring the attempt to reinstate an earlier
condition as a universal characteristic of instincts, it becomes clear that
many processes in psychic life operate independently of the pleasure principle.
This characteristic extends to every partial instinct and involves a regression
to a specific point in development. However, not everything that has not yet
come under the influence of the pleasure principle necessarily opposes it, and
the relationship between instinctive repetition processes and the domination of
the pleasure principle remains unresolved.
We understand that one of the primary functions of the
psychic apparatus is to "bind" instinctual excitations, replacing the
dominating "primary process" with the "secondary process,"
and converting their freely mobile energy charge into a predominantly quiescent
(tonic) state. During this transformation, little attention is paid to the
development of "pain," but the pleasure principle remains intact. On
the contrary, the transformation occurs in service of the pleasure principle;
binding acts as preparation, introducing and securing its dominance.
It is crucial to distinguish between function and tendency
more sharply than before. The pleasure principle is then seen as a tendency
that serves a specific function—rendering the psychic apparatus free from
excitation or maintaining excitation at a constant or minimal level. We cannot
definitively conclude either of these conceptions, but we recognize that the
function defined in this way aligns with the most universal tendency of all
living matter: to return to the peace of the inorganic world.
We all know from experience that the greatest pleasure,
such as that derived from the sexual act, is associated with the temporary
alleviation of a heightened state of excitation. However, the
"binding" of instinctual excitation serves as a preparatory function
that directs the excitation towards its ultimate discharge-related pleasure.
In connection with this, we must consider whether
sensations of pleasure and "pain" can arise from both bound and
unbound excitation processes. It is evident that unbound, primary processes
give rise to much more intense sensations in both directions than bound,
secondary processes. These primary processes are also the earliest to emerge in
mental life, leading us to conclude that if the pleasure principle were not
already in action in relation to them, it would not establish itself in later
processes. Thus, we arrive at the somewhat complex result that the search for
pleasure manifests with greater intensity at the beginning of psychic life but
with more restrictions, accepting repeated breaches. As one matures, the
dominance of the pleasure principle becomes more assured, though it is still
subject to limitations like all other instincts.
Moreover, the sensations of pleasure, pain, and tension
convey inner perceptions to us. The life instincts are more closely associated
with our inner perception, as they disrupt peace and bring about states of
tension whose resolution is experienced as pleasure. In contrast, the death
instincts seem to fulfill their function quietly.
The pleasure principle appears to directly serve the
death instincts, also guarding against external stimuli perceived as dangers by
both types of instincts, particularly focusing on inner increases in
stimulation aimed at complicating the task of living. This raises numerous
unanswered questions that require patience and readiness to explore further
means and opportunities for investigation. We must also be prepared to abandon
our current path if it fails to yield fruitful results. Only those who expect
science to provide a substitute for their relinquished beliefs may take offense
if the investigator develops or revises their views.
In conclusion, we may find solace in the words of a poet
regarding the slow progress of scientific knowledge: "Whither we cannot
fly, we must go limping. The Scripture saith that limping is no sin."
