As Marx famously articulated,
it is a fundamental truth that a society must continuously reproduce the
conditions necessary for production alongside the act of production itself, or
it would not be sustainable even for a year. The essence of production lies in
the reproduction of these conditions, whether in a straightforward manner by
maintaining the existing conditions or by expanding them. For now, let's set
aside the nuances of this distinction. So, what does it mean to reproduce the
conditions of production?
This question delves into a
realm that is both deeply familiar and yet often overlooked. The seemingly
self-evident truths, rooted in the perspective solely of production or even in
practical productive activities themselves
are so ingrained in our everyday consciousness that it becomes
exceedingly difficult, if not nearly impossible, to shift our perspective to
that of reproduction. However, without this shift, everything remains abstract,
and even distorted, particularly when considering production and, even more so,
practical activities.
To simplify, let's assume that
every society arises from a dominant mode of production. In this context, the
process of production engages the available productive forces within specific
relations of production.
Consequently, for a society to
continue existing, it must simultaneously reproduce the conditions necessary
for its production while engaging in the act of production itself. This entails
the reproduction of:
The productive forces.
The existing relations of
production.
2
Reproduction of the means of
Production
It is now acknowledged,
including by bourgeois economists whose focus lies in national accounting or
modern macroeconomic theory, that Marx convincingly demonstrated in Capital
Volume 2 that production must allow for the reproduction of the material
conditions necessary for production itself—namely, the means of production.
The typical economist, much
like the typical capitalist, understands the importance of annually forecasting
the requirements for replacing what has been depleted or worn out in the
process of production: raw materials, fixed assets (such as buildings),
production equipment (machinery), and so forth. This perspective essentially
mirrors the viewpoint of the firm, which tends to regard commentary on its
financial accounting practices as sufficient.
However, the groundbreaking
insights of Quesnay, who initially posed this crucial issue, and Marx, who
provided a resolution, have illuminated that the reproduction of material production
conditions cannot be adequately grasped at the level of the individual firm.
This is because it doesn't manifest at that level within its actual conditions.
What occurs at the firm level is merely an effect, providing only a glimpse
into the necessity of reproduction while failing to reveal its underlying
conditions and mechanisms.
A moment of reflection
suffices to understand this: Consider Mr. X, a capitalist operating a spinning
mill producing woolen yarn. He must indeed "reproduce" his raw materials,
machinery, and so forth. However, he doesn't produce these elements for his own
use—other capitalists do. For instance, an Australian sheep farmer, Mr. Y, or a
heavy engineer manufacturing machine tools, Mr. Z, fulfill this role, and so on
ad infinitum. Mr. Y and Mr. Z, in turn, must reproduce the conditions of their
own production to enable the production of the goods essential for Mr. X's
reproduction of production conditions. This chain extends indefinitely,
ensuring that demand for means of production (for reproduction) can be met by
supply on both national and global markets.
To understand this intricate
mechanism, which resembles an "endless chain," one must adopt Marx's
comprehensive approach and delve into the study of capital circulation relations
between Department I (responsible for producing means of production) and
Department II (responsible for producing means of consumption), as well as the
realization of surplus value, as expounded in Capital Volumes 2 and 3.
While we won't delve into a
detailed analysis of this matter here, it's crucial to acknowledge the
imperative of reproducing material production conditions.
3
Reproduction of Labour-power
However, one crucial aspect we
haven't addressed yet is the reproduction of the productive forces,
specifically the reproduction of labor-power. This is distinct from the
reproduction of the means of production.
From our examination of firm
operations, particularly through the lens of financial accounting practices
that account for depreciation and investment, we've gained a rough
understanding of the material process of reproduction. However, we're now
entering a realm where observation within the firm is, if not entirely blind,
largely obscured. This is because the reproduction of labor-power predominantly
occurs outside the firm's boundaries.
How is the reproduction of
labor-power ensured? It's achieved by providing labor-power with the necessary
material means for its own reproduction—namely, through wages. While wages are
indeed included in the accounting of each enterprise, they are categorized as
'wage capital' and not explicitly recognized as a condition for the material
reproduction of labor-power.
However, in practice, wages
represent only the portion of the value produced by the expenditure of
labor-power that is essential for its reproduction. This includes covering the
costs of housing, food, clothing—essentially enabling the wage earner to return
to the workplace each day, along with supporting the upbringing and education
of children, who represent the future labor-power of the proletariat.
It's important to note that
this value necessary for the reproduction of labor-power isn't solely
determined by a 'biological' minimum wage but also by historical factors. Marx
observed that the specific needs of workers vary historically, influenced by
cultural and social factors.
Furthermore, this minimum wage
is not merely defined by the historical needs recognized by the capitalist
class but is rather shaped by the historical demands imposed by the proletarian
class struggle. This struggle encompasses efforts to resist the lengthening of
the working day and to combat reductions in wages.
However, ensuring the material
conditions for the reproduction of labor-power isn't enough to guarantee its
reproduction as labor-power. Labor-power must also possess the necessary
competencies to function within the complex system of the production process.
The development of productive forces and the specific unity characteristic of
these forces at any given time necessitate that labor-power be skilled
accordingly, tailored to meet the requirements of the socio-technical division
of labor and its various roles and positions.
In capitalist societies,
unlike those characterized by slavery or serfdom, the reproduction of
labor-power's skills increasingly occurs outside of the production process
itself. This is achieved primarily through the capitalist education system and
other institutions.
What do children learn in
school? While the specifics vary, they typically acquire fundamental skills
such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, along with other elements of
scientific or literary culture. These skills directly contribute to different
roles in production, with varying levels of instruction provided for manual
workers, technicians, engineers, and higher management. In essence, they
acquire the necessary 'know-how' required for their future roles in the
workforce.
In addition to acquiring
technical skills and knowledge, children at school also learn the norms of
behavior expected within the division of labor, tailored to the roles they are
destined to fulfill. This includes moral, civic, and professional standards,
which essentially translate into respect for the socio-technical division of
labor and, ultimately, adherence to the order established by class domination.
They are taught to speak in the appropriate manner, to interact with workers
correctly, and, for future capitalists and their associates, to issue commands
effectively. Essentially, they are trained to uphold the ruling ideology and,
for those in positions of exploitation and repression, to manipulate it adeptly
to maintain the domination of the ruling class.
To put it more precisely, the
reproduction of labor-power necessitates not only the transmission of skills
but also the perpetuation of submission to the established order—a reproduction
of adherence to the ruling ideology for workers and a reproduction of the
ability to manipulate this ideology effectively for exploiters and oppressors.
All individuals involved in production, exploitation, and repression, not to
mention the ideologists themselves, must be indoctrinated in this ideology to
carry out their roles diligently.
Thus, the reproduction of
labor-power hinges not just on the perpetuation of skills but also on the
perpetuation of ideological subjection or the adept practice of the ruling
ideology. It's important to recognize that ideological subjection is integral
to the reproduction of labor-power.
This acknowledgment unveils
the significant presence of a new reality: ideology.
Now, two comments follow from
this discussion:
Firstly, I've provided a brief
overview of the forms of reproducing productive forces—the means of production
and labor-power. However, I have yet to address the reproduction of production
relations, a crucial aspect of Marxist theory concerning the mode of
production. To overlook this would be both a theoretical oversight and a grave
political error, so I will delve into this topic. But before doing so, I must
embark on another lengthy digression to obtain the necessary means for this
discussion.
Secondly, in order to
undertake this detour, I must revisit an old question: What defines a society?
4
II BASE AND SUPERSTRU C TURE
On several occasions, I have emphasized the revolutionary aspect of the
Marxist conception of the 'social whole,' which is distinct from Hegel's notion
of 'totality.' As I've reiterated (echoing well-known tenets of historical
materialism), Marx envisioned the structure of every society as comprising
'levels' or 'instances' interconnected by a specific determinant: the economic
base (the 'unity' of productive forces and relations of production) and the
superstructure, which encompasses the politico-legal (law and the state) and
ideological realms (comprising various ideologies such as religious, ethical,
legal, and political ideologies).
Beyond its theoretical significance in distinguishing Marx from Hegel,
this representation holds a crucial theoretical advantage: it enables the
incorporation of what I've termed the respective indices of effectivity into
essential concepts. But what does this mean exactly?
Consider this representation of society as an edifice with a base
(infrastructure) supporting the superstructure's two 'floors.' This is a metaphor—a
spatial one, to be precise—wherein the base's determination in the last
instance by the economic base is emphasized. The metaphor serves to attribute
an index of effectivity to the base, famously known as the determination in the
last instance, which dictates the events in the upper 'floors' (of the
superstructure) based on economic conditions. Consequently, the 'floors' of the
superstructure possess varying indices of effectivity, determined by their
relation to the economic base.
These 'floors' are not determinants in the last instance but are
instead determined by the base's effectivity. While they may exhibit a relative
autonomy, they are ultimately shaped by the base. This recognition leads to the
acknowledgment of two key aspects within the Marxist tradition: the relative
autonomy of the superstructure and the reciprocal action of the superstructure
on the base.
The primary advantage of this Marxist topography lies in its revelation
of the crucial role of determination (or effectivity) and its insistence that
the base ultimately determines the entire edifice. However, the metaphorical
nature of this representation—its descriptive quality—poses a significant
limitation.
I now propose that it's both possible and necessary to approach things
differently, without rejecting the classical metaphor outright but rather by
moving beyond it to achieve a deeper understanding. By adopting the viewpoint
of reproduction, many questions implied by the edifice metaphor but left
unanswered can be illuminated.
My fundamental thesis is that these questions—particularly those
pertaining to the superstructure—can only be adequately addressed from the
perspective of reproduction. I will provide a brief analysis of law, the state,
and ideology from this viewpoint, revealing insights from both the realms of
practice and production and those of reproduction.
III THE STATE
The Marxist tradition is unequivocal on the nature of the state: as
outlined in the Communist Manifesto and the Eighteenth Brumaire (and reiterated
in subsequent classical texts, particularly Marx's writings on the Paris
Commune and Lenin's State and Revolution), the state is explicitly viewed as a
repressive apparatus. It serves as a 'machine' of repression that enables the
ruling classes—whether bourgeois or big landowners—to maintain their dominance
over the working class, facilitating the extraction of surplus-value, i.e.,
capitalist exploitation.
In essence, the state apparatus encompasses not only specialized
entities like the police, courts, and prisons but also the military, which
intervenes directly as a supplementary force in instances where the police are
overwhelmed. At its zenith sits the head of state, the government, and the
administration.
This Marxist-Leninist perspective hits upon a crucial point: the state,
primarily characterized as a force of repressive execution and intervention in
favor of the ruling classes in their struggle against the proletariat, embodies
its basic function.
However, even in presenting the nature of the state in this manner, the
analysis remains somewhat descriptive. I've previously discussed the concept of
'descriptive theory' to clarify that it represents an initial phase in theory
development. While it is an essential starting point, it requires advancement
beyond mere description.
Returning to our focus on the state, the descriptive theory provides a
solid foundation for understanding its essence. This descriptive phase is
correct in that it effectively correlates numerous observable facts—ranging
from historical events like the June 1848 massacres to more subtle forms of
domination—with the concept of the state as a class state embodied in the
repressive state apparatus.
Yet, the descriptive theory alone does not suffice for the development
of a comprehensive scientific theory of the state. While it offers a means of
identifying instances of oppression and relating them to the state, it can also
lead to a kind of static understanding—an acceptance of the apparent truth
without delving deeper into the mechanisms at play.
To progress beyond this descriptive phase and gain a more profound
understanding of the state's mechanisms, it's necessary to augment the
classical definition of the state as a state apparatus.
5
The essentials of the Marxist theory of the state
First and foremost, it's
crucial to clarify a fundamental point: the state, as manifested in its
apparatus, holds significance solely in its function of wielding state power.
The entirety of political class struggle revolves around the contestation of
state power—its acquisition, retention, and consolidation—by a particular class
or a coalition of classes. This distinction compels us to differentiate between
state power (the attainment or maintenance of state power) and the state
apparatus.
We've observed that the state
apparatus can endure, even amidst political upheavals like bourgeois
revolutions or coups d'état, without undergoing substantial alteration.
Political events may affect the possession of state power while leaving the
state apparatus largely intact. Even following a social revolution such as the
one in 1917, a significant portion of the state apparatus persisted after the
proletariat and the small peasantry seized state power—an observation
emphasized by Lenin.
This distinction between state
power and state apparatus is a fundamental aspect of the 'Marxist theory' of
the state, which has been explicitly present since Marx's writings such as The
Eighteenth Brumaire and Class Struggles in France. To summarize this theory:
The state is identified with
its repressive apparatus.
State power and state
apparatus are distinct entities.
The objective of class
struggle revolves around the attainment of state power, leading to the
utilization of the state apparatus by the ruling classes or their alliances to
further their class interests.
The proletariat must seize
state power to dismantle the existing bourgeois state apparatus and, initially,
replace it with a proletarian state apparatus. Subsequently, a radical process
ensues, aiming at the abolition of the state altogether.
While these principles are
integral to the Marxist theory of the state, I contend that they still possess
descriptive elements. Even with the proposed addition, this theory remains
somewhat descriptive. However, it now encompasses more intricate and
differential components whose functioning and impact necessitate further
theoretical development.
The Ideological State
Apparatuses
Thus, to augment the 'Marxist
theory' of the state, we need to introduce another dimension, a terrain that
the Marxist classics engaged with in their practical endeavors but did not
fully systematize into theoretical form. This dimension extends beyond the
distinction between state power and the state apparatus and involves a reality
that aligns with the (repressive) state apparatus but differs from it
significantly. I will refer to this reality by its conceptual term: the
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs).
What exactly are the
Ideological State Apparatuses? It's essential to distinguish them from the
(repressive) state apparatus. In Marxist theory, the state apparatus
encompasses entities like the government, administration, army, police, courts,
and prisons, collectively constituting what I'll henceforth term the Repressive
State Apparatus. The term "repressive" suggests that this apparatus
functions through coercion, albeit ultimately, as repression may take
non-physical forms such as administrative measures.
On the other hand, Ideological
State Apparatuses manifest as distinct and specialized institutions readily
observable by the immediate observer. Below is an empirical list of these ISAs,
subject to detailed examination, testing, correction, and reorganization:
Religious ISA (comprising
various churches and religious institutions)
Educational ISA (encompassing
both public and private schools)
Family ISA
Legal ISA
Political ISA (encompassing
political systems and parties)
Trade Union ISA
Communications ISA
(encompassing press, radio, television, etc.)
Cultural ISA (encompassing
literature, arts, sports, etc.)
It's vital to emphasize that
the ISAs should not be confused with the (Repressive) State Apparatus. Several
distinctions elucidate this difference:
Firstly, while there exists a
single (Repressive) State Apparatus, there's a plurality of Ideological State
Apparatuses. The unity that underpins this plurality of ISAs as a collective
entity is not immediately apparent.
Secondly, whereas the
(Repressive) State Apparatus predominantly operates within the public domain, a
substantial portion of the Ideological State Apparatuses, despite their
apparent dispersal, belongs to the private domain. Entities like churches,
political parties, trade unions, families, certain schools, most newspapers,
and cultural enterprises fall under the private domain.
Let's delve deeper into the
distinction between Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) and the (Repressive)
State Apparatus. While the Repressive State Apparatus operates predominantly
through coercion, the ISAs function mainly through ideology, with secondary
involvement in repression.
Some may question the
classification of private institutions as ISAs, but this distinction is
essential. Gramsci highlighted that the public-private dichotomy is a construct
of bourgeois law, irrelevant to the state's domain, which transcends such
distinctions. Similarly, whether an institution is public or private matters
less than how it functions. Private entities can effectively serve as ISAs, as
demonstrated by a thorough analysis of any ISA.
Crucially, both state apparatuses
operate through a combination of violence and ideology. However, the
(Repressive) State Apparatus primarily relies on repression, while the ISAs
predominantly function through ideology, employing repression secondarily,
albeit in subtle and often concealed ways.
The unity among diverse ISAs
lies in their shared functioning through ideology, albeit beneath the ruling
ideology, which reflects the interests of the ruling class. Despite their
contradictions, ISAs ultimately serve to reproduce the ruling ideology. The
ruling class, which wields state power, also influences ISAs, ensuring the
dominance of its ideology.
Notably, ISAs are not only
objects but also sites of class struggle. Unlike the (Repressive) State
Apparatus, where the ruling class can exert direct control, ISAs face
resistance from exploited classes, challenging hegemonic ideologies and seeking
to assert their interests.
This discussion underscores
the importance of understanding the role and significance of ISAs. They play a
vital role in reproducing and contesting dominant ideologies, shaping social
norms, and perpetuating or challenging power structures. Their function, rooted
in ideology rather than coercion, is pivotal in maintaining class hegemony and
perpetuating social order.
6
ON THE REPRODUCTION OF THE R
ELATIONS OF PRODUCTION
Moving beyond the descriptive
language of the base-superstructure metaphor, we can assert that it is
primarily secured through the exercise of state power in the state apparatuses,
namely the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses.
This assertion can be
summarized with three key features:
Dual Functionality: All state
apparatuses operate through both repression and ideology. However, the
(Repressive) State Apparatus predominantly relies on repression, while the
Ideological State Apparatuses predominantly function through ideology.
Multiplicity and Autonomy:
Unlike the centralized and unified organization of the (Repressive) State
Apparatus, Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, and relatively
autonomous. They provide an objective field for expressing contradictions
arising from class struggle.
Unity through Ruling Ideology:
While the (Repressive) State Apparatus is unified under the leadership of the ruling
class, the unity of the Ideological State Apparatuses is usually maintained,
albeit in contradictory forms, through the ruling ideology.
Considering these features,
the reproduction of the relations of production can be understood through a
division of labor:
The Repressive State Apparatus
primarily ensures the political conditions for the reproduction of exploitative
relations of production through physical or administrative force. It not only
perpetuates its own existence but also secures the conditions for the
functioning of the Ideological State Apparatuses by enforcing political
constraints, censorship, and other forms of repression.
In reality, it is the
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) that primarily ensure the reproduction of
the relations of production, operating behind the protective shield provided by
the Repressive State Apparatus. The ruling ideology, upheld by the ruling class
holding state power, plays a central role in mediating a "harmony"
between the Repressive State Apparatus and the various Ideological State
Apparatuses.
Considering the diversity of
ISAs and their shared role in reproducing relations of production, we can
hypothesize the following:
In capitalist societies,
numerous ISAs are at work, including the educational, religious, family,
political, trade union, communications, and cultural apparatuses. However, in
pre-capitalist feudal societies, the number of ISAs was smaller and their
functions different. For instance, during the Middle Ages, the Church
consolidated various functions, later devolved onto separate ISAs in capitalist
societies. Alongside the Church, other ISAs such as the family, political, and
proto-trade union apparatuses played significant roles.
Historically, the dominant ISA
was the Church, which held religious, educational, and communicative functions.
The French Revolution aimed not only to transfer state power but also to
challenge the Church's dominant ideological role, leading to the establishment
of new ISAs like the educational apparatus.
Despite the bourgeoisie's
initial reliance on the political ISA, notably parliamentary democracy, for
ideological hegemony, the educational ISA gradually assumed dominance. This
shift was a result of violent political and ideological struggles aimed at replacing
the old dominant ISAs with new ones better suited for the reproduction of
capitalist relations of production.
Therefore, it can be argued
that in mature capitalist societies, the educational ideological apparatus
occupies the dominant position among ISAs, despite the common perception that
the political ISA holds this role.
In recent history, the
bourgeoisie has demonstrated its ability to adapt to various political
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) other than parliamentary democracy, such
as empires, constitutional monarchy, and presidential democracy. For example,
in France, different political regimes, including empires and constitutional
monarchies, have coexisted with bourgeois interests. Similarly, in England, a
compromise was reached between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, allowing
them to share state power for an extended period. In Germany, the imperial
Junkers facilitated the bourgeoisie's rise to power, even under the Nazi
regime.
However, behind the scenes of
political ISAs, the bourgeoisie has established the educational apparatus as
its dominant ISA. This apparatus has replaced the Church in its functions and
plays a crucial role in reproducing capitalist relations of production. Despite
the common perception that the political ISA holds dominance, the educational
apparatus is more influential.
The educational apparatus
ensures the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation through
various means:
Contributions to Reproduction:
All ISAs contribute to reproducing capitalist relations, each in its unique
way. The political apparatus subjects individuals to state ideology, while the
communications apparatus instills nationalism and chauvinism through mass
media. The religious apparatus reinforces moral values, and the family
apparatus reinforces social norms.
Dominant Score: The ruling
class's ideology dominates, integrating themes of humanism, nationalism, and
economism into society's fabric.
Dominant Role of the School:
Despite its silent nature, the school is the most influential ISA. It shapes
children's ideologies from a young age, providing them with the knowledge and
values necessary for their societal roles. Children receive education infused
with the ruling ideology, preparing them for various class roles, from workers
to capitalists, technicians to ideologists.
Class Role Indoctrination:
Each segment of the population receives an ideology suited to its class role.
Workers are instilled with a consciousness of exploitation, while agents of
exploitation and repression are trained to maintain the status quo.
Professional ideologists manipulate consciousnesses using moralistic and
nationalistic rhetoric.
In essence, the educational
apparatus serves as the primary vehicle for perpetuating capitalist relations
of production, molding individuals into compliant members of the social
hierarchy.
Certainly, many virtues and
vices, such as modesty, cynicism, or confidence, are taught in various social
institutions like the family, the Church, the military, literature, films, and
even sports arenas. However, none of these institutions have the same
widespread and obligatory audience as the educational system within capitalist
societies. With children spending eight hours a day, five or six days a week in
school, the educational apparatus becomes a powerful tool for the reproduction
of capitalist relations of production.
Through the educational
system, wrapped in the ideology of the ruling class, the relations between
exploiters and exploited are largely perpetuated. This mechanism is obscured by
the prevailing ideology of the school, which portrays it as a neutral and
ideology-free environment where teachers, entrusted with children by their
parents, guide them toward freedom and responsibility.
I must acknowledge the teachers
who, despite difficult circumstances, strive to resist the dominant ideology
and systems within which they operate. They are heroes in their own right.
However, many teachers either fail to recognize or actively contribute to the
perpetuation of the ideological representation of the school. Their dedication
inadvertently sustains the belief that the school is a natural and beneficial
institution, much like how the Church was perceived by previous generations.
Indeed, the school has
replaced the Church as the dominant Ideological State Apparatus, functioning in
tandem with the family. The current crisis affecting education systems
worldwide, often paralleled by crises within family structures, holds
significant political implications. The school, along with the family, plays a
crucial role in reproducing the relations of production within capitalist
societies, making it a prime target in the ongoing global class struggle.
7
V ON IDEOLOGY
The term "ideology"
was originally coined by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, and their associates, who
defined it as the study of ideas. However, when Marx adopted the term fifty
years later, he imbued it with a fundamentally different meaning, even in his
early writings. For Marx, ideology referred to the system of ideas and beliefs
that shape the consciousness of individuals or social groups. His engagement in
ideological and political struggles, evident in his early writings for the
Rheinische Zeitung, compelled him to delve deeper into this concept.
Yet, we encounter an
intriguing paradox here. Despite the natural inclination for Marx to develop a
theory of ideology, his seminal works seem to skirt around the issue. Although
The German Ideology, written after his 1844 Manuscripts, provides some insights
into ideology, it is not distinctly Marxist. Similarly, while Capital contains
references to various ideologies, particularly critiquing the ideas of the
vulgar economists, it does not present a comprehensive theory of ideology
itself, which relies heavily on a broader understanding of ideology.
With that said, I would like
to propose a preliminary and schematic outline of such a theory. These
propositions are not made lightly but require rigorous examination and analysis
to be confirmed or refined.
Ideology h as no h istory
I want to begin by elucidating
the fundamental rationale that underpins, or at least justifies, the endeavor
to formulate a theory of ideology in general, rather than a theory of specific
ideologies, which, regardless of their form (religious, ethical, legal,
political), invariably reflect class positions.
It is evident that any theory
of ideologies must encompass two essential dimensions, as previously suggested.
Firstly, such a theory must be grounded in the history of social formations,
including the modes of production operative within them, as well as the class
struggles that unfold within these formations. In this regard, it becomes
apparent that ideologies, defined within the dual framework mentioned earlier
(regional and class), are historically contingent phenomena, their ultimate
determination lying outside the realm of ideology alone, albeit intricately
intertwined with it.
Conversely, while I propose
the project of a theory of ideology in general, and assert its foundational
role in theories of ideologies, this assertion implies a seemingly paradoxical
proposition: ideology has no history.
This formulation, articulated
explicitly in The German Ideology, marks a departure from a positivist and
historicist perspective. In Marx's conception, ideology is depicted as an
illusion, a mere dream devoid of substance. Its reality is extrinsic to it,
akin to the theoretical status of dreams in pre-Freudian psychology.
Marx presents ideology as a
constructed fabrication, a hollow semblance fashioned from the detritus of
daily life, lacking intrinsic historical agency. Thus, the assertion that
ideology has no history in The German Ideology is a negative assertion,
signifying both the emptiness of ideology as a dream-like construct and its
lack of inherent historical trajectory.
However, the thesis I advocate
diverges markedly from the positivist stance of The German Ideology. I contend
that while ideologies possess their own historical trajectory, albeit
ultimately determined by the class struggle, ideology in general is devoid of
historical specificity, but in a positive sense.
This positivist interpretation
suggests that ideology exhibits a structural and functional constancy that
renders it a non-historical reality—an omni-historical reality—permeating the
fabric of history in an immutable form. This view aligns with Marx's
characterization of history as the history of class struggles, emphasizing the
continuity of ideology across different historical epochs marked by class
societies.
To draw a theoretical
parallel, I liken this proposition—ideology has no history—to Freud's assertion
regarding the eternal nature of the unconscious. In Freudian terms, the
unconscious is portrayed as an enduring, trans-historical entity, immutable in
form throughout history. Similarly, ideology, conceived as eternal in this
sense, persists unchanged across the sweep of history.
8
In light of these
considerations, I posit that a theory of ideology in general, akin to Freud's
theory of the unconscious, is theoretically warranted. For simplicity's sake, I
employ the term "ideology" to denote ideology in general, which I
have argued possesses an eternal, immutable character throughout the history of
class societies. For now, I confine my analysis to class societies and their
historical trajectory.
Ideology is a 'representation
' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence
To delve into my central
thesis regarding the structure and operation of ideology, it's essential to
present two theses—one negative and the other positive. The first thesis
pertains to the object "represented" in the imaginary form of
ideology, while the second thesis addresses the materiality of ideology.
THESIS I: Ideology represents
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence.
Commonly, we refer to
religious ideology, ethical ideology, legal ideology, political ideology, and
the like as "world outlooks." Even if we do not genuinely subscribe
to these ideologies as truths (such as believing in God, Duty, Justice, etc.),
we acknowledge them as largely imaginary—meaning they do not correspond to
reality.
However, despite their lack of
correspondence to reality, ideologies do allude to reality and can be
interpreted to reveal the truth behind their imaginary representations
(ideology = illusion/allusion).
Interpretations of ideologies
vary, with some viewing them as constructs forged by priests or despots to
manipulate and control individuals. Others, like Feuerbach and Marx, attribute
the imaginary nature of ideologies to the alienating conditions of existence
within society.
Regardless of the
interpretation, all agree on one point: ideologies reflect the real conditions
of existence of individuals, albeit in distorted and imaginary ways. However, I
posit that ideologies primarily represent not the real conditions of existence
themselves but rather the relationship of individuals to those conditions—a
crucial distinction.
In Marxist terms, ideologies
do not reflect the actual relations of production but rather the imaginary
relationship of individuals to these relations. Thus, the question shifts from
the cause of the imaginary distortion to why individuals perceive their
relation to social relations in an imaginary manner and what characterizes this
imaginariness.
This reframing of the question
undermines simplistic explanations involving cliques or alienation, opening up
a deeper exploration of the nature of ideology. However, I'll refrain from
delving further into this topic for now.
THESIS II: Ideology possesses
a material existence.
Previously, I hinted at this
thesis by suggesting that the 'ideas' or 'representations' constituting
ideology do not exist in an ideal or spiritual realm but rather have a material
existence. While this assertion lacks formal proof, I ask the reader to
entertain it favorably, given the principles of materialism. Demonstrating this
thesis would require extensive argumentation.
The hypothetical proposition
of the material existence of 'ideas' or other 'representations' proves useful
in analyzing ideology more deeply. Specifically, it aids in understanding that
ideologies always manifest within apparatuses and their practices, underscoring
their material existence.
Although the material
existence of ideology within apparatuses differs from that of tangible objects
like stones or rifles, it remains rooted in physical matter. Moving forward,
let's examine the individuals living within ideology—immersed in a specific
representation of the world distorted by their imaginary relation to their
conditions of existence, ultimately tied to relations of production and class.
Consider an individual who
believes in concepts like God, Duty, or Justice. This belief stems from the
ideas within the individual's consciousness, shaping their behavior and
practical attitudes. For instance, a believer in God may attend church, pray,
confess, and perform penance, while someone adhering to Duty may exhibit
corresponding behaviors as dictated by their ideological beliefs.
Through this framework, we see
that the ideological representation acknowledges that individuals, guided by
their consciousness and beliefs, align their actions with their ideas. Failure
to do so is deemed 'wicked,' suggesting a disconnect between professed beliefs
and actual behavior. This discrepancy implies either inconsistency, cynicism,
or perversion in the individual's adherence to ideology.
In every instance, the
ideology of ideology acknowledges, despite its distorted nature, that the
'ideas' of a human subject manifest in their actions or should manifest in
their actions. If this alignment is lacking, the ideology assigns the
individual other ideas corresponding to their performed actions, even if those
actions are perverse. This ideology speaks of actions, whereas I will refer to
actions embedded within practices. These practices are governed by rituals
within the material existence of an ideological apparatus, whether it's a small
religious gathering, a funeral, a sports match, a school day, or a political
party meeting.
Pascal's provocative
statement—"Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will
believe"—inverts the conventional order of things, challenging individuals
to engage in actions that may lead to belief. This provocative inversion, akin
to Christ's disruptive message, brings forth not peace but strife and scandal.
Pascal's bold approach underscores the tangible reality behind beliefs.
Leaving Pascal to his
theological debates, I'll adopt a more directly Marxist vocabulary for our exploration
of these concepts. Thus, when considering a single individual, the material
existence of their beliefs lies in their actions within practices governed by
rituals dictated by the material ideological apparatus. These actions are
influenced by the ideas derived from that apparatus. Although these actions may
vary in their materiality—from physical gestures to verbal discourse—their
essence lies in their manifestation within material practices.
This rearrangement of concepts
results in the disappearance of the term 'ideas' as purely ideal or spiritual
entities. Instead, emphasis shifts to the subject, consciousness, belief, and
actions. The critical term here is the subject. From this understanding, two
interconnected theses emerge:
There is no practice without
ideology.
There is no ideology without
the subject, and ideology serves the subjects.
With these foundational
principles in mind, I can now present my central thesis.
9
Ideology interpellates
individuals as subjects
This thesis is a matter of
explicitly stating my previous proposition: there is no ideology except by the
subject and for subjects. This means that ideology only exists for concrete
subjects, and its purpose is enabled by the subject, specifically by the
category of the subject and its functioning.
The category of the subject,
though it may appear under various names throughout history, such as the soul
in Plato or God, is the fundamental category of all ideology. It constitutes
all ideology, regardless of its regional or class-based determinations or
historical context, since ideology is timeless.
I argue that the category of
the subject is constitutive of all ideology because ideology functions to
constitute concrete individuals as subjects. In this dual constitution lies the
essence of all ideology, which manifests as the functioning of ideology in the
material forms of its existence.
To understand this further,
it's crucial to realize that both the writer and the reader are themselves
subjects and therefore ideological subjects. We live naturally in ideology, as
it forms the basis of our consciousness and beliefs.
As St. Paul eloquently stated,
it is in the 'Logos', or ideology, that we 'live, move, and have our being'.
Thus, the category of the subject is an inherent 'obviousness' for you and me,
as we naturally recognize ourselves as subjects. This recognition is an
ideological effect, as ideology imposes obviousnesses upon us, leading to our
natural acceptance and affirmation of them.
An example of this ideological
recognition is when we identify ourselves or others in everyday interactions,
such as answering 'It's me' when asked who is at the door. These rituals of
recognition reaffirm our individuality and subjectivity.
However, recognizing ourselves
as subjects and engaging in these rituals of recognition only provides us with
consciousness of our ideological practices. It does not give us scientific
knowledge of the mechanism behind this recognition. It is this knowledge that
we must strive to attain, breaking free from ideology to begin a scientific
discourse on ideology.
To illustrate why the category
of the 'subject' is constitutive of ideology, which only exists by constituting
concrete subjects as subjects, I will utilize a specific mode of exposition:
one that is concrete enough to be recognized yet abstract enough to be thought
and understood as knowledge.
Firstly, I propose that all
ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects
through the functioning of the category of the subject. This suggests a
distinction between concrete individuals and concrete subjects, although at
this level, concrete subjects only exist as supported by concrete individuals.
Ideology 'acts' or 'functions'
in a manner that 'recruits' subjects from individuals or transforms individuals
into subjects through a process of interpellation or hailing. This process can
be imagined akin to everyday police hailing: 'Hey, you there!'
In this scenario, when an
individual is hailed, they turn around, thus becoming a subject by recognizing
that the hail was addressed to them. This recognition occurs seamlessly,
indicating the immediate and inherent connection between ideology and the
individual's subjectivity.
What seems to take place
outside ideology, such as in the street, actually occurs within ideology. The
practical workings of ideology often lead individuals to believe they are
outside ideology, but in reality, they are entrenched within it. Ideology never
identifies itself as such; it's only through scientific knowledge that one can
recognize their immersion in ideology.
Thus, ideology continually
interpellates individuals as subjects. As ideology is eternal, I must abandon
the temporal framework and assert that ideology has always-already
interpellated individuals as subjects. Consequently, individuals are
always-already subjects.
10
This may seem paradoxical, but
it's the undeniable reality. Even before birth, individuals are appointed as
subjects within familial ideological configurations. For example, an unborn
child is already expected to bear its father's name, signifying its identity
and irreplaceability before birth.
This familial ideological
structure pre-appoints the child as a subject, shaping its future role as a
sexual subject based on societal norms and expectations. This ideological
constraint is reflected in Freud's exploration of pre-genital and genital
stages of sexuality, which are deeply ingrained in the unconscious.
Moving forward, I will explore
how the 'actors' in this scene of interpellation and their roles are reflected
in the structure of all ideology.
An example: the Christian
religious ideology
The formal structure of all
ideology remains constant, so I will focus on a single example - religious
ideology, which can be extended to other forms such as ethical, legal,
political, and aesthetic ideologies.
Consider Christian religious
ideology. In a fictional discourse, it might express:
"I address you, Peter, a
human individual, to proclaim that God exists and you are accountable to Him.
God speaks through my voice, affirming your identity as Peter, created by God
for eternity but born in the year of Our Lord 1920. Your place in the world and
your actions determine your salvation, granting you membership in the Glorious
Body of Christ."
This discourse, though
familiar, is surprising in its implications. Religious ideology aims to
transform individuals into subjects by interpellating them - calling them by
their names and designating roles and destinies for them based on their
obedience to divine commands.
However, what's remarkable is
that this process depends on the existence of a Unique, Absolute Other Subject:
God. This capital "Subject" interpellates individuals as subjects in
His name, as evident in religious scriptures where God addresses Moses, who
acknowledges his subjectivity and obeys God's commandments.
God defines Himself as the
Subject par excellence, who interpellates individuals like Moses, making them
subjects subjected to Him. In theological reflection, humans are seen as
mirrors or reflections of God, made in His image. God needs subjects, just as
subjects need God, forming a reciprocal relationship where even in their
debauchery, subjects fulfill God's need for them.
God duplicates Himself by
sending His Son to Earth, as a subject forsaken by Him but also as the Subject,
both man and God, to pave the way for final Redemption - the Resurrection of
Christ. This duplication underscores the necessity for the Subject to become a
subject, and vice versa, to tangibly demonstrate to individuals that they are
subjects subjected to the Subject, with the ultimate goal of re-entering the
Lord's Bosom on Judgment Day.
Deciphering this necessity, we
find that all ideology operates within a mirror-structure, interpellating
individuals as subjects in the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject. This
mirror duplication is central to ideology, ensuring its functioning. The
Absolute Subject occupies the unique Center and interpellates individuals
around it, subjecting them to the Subject while providing them the guarantee
that they are recognized and saved.
In summary, the
mirror-structure of ideology ensures the interpellation of individuals as
subjects, their subjection to the Subject, mutual recognition, and absolute
guarantee. Caught in this system, subjects work by themselves, obedient to
various authorities dictated by ideology. The ambiguity of the term
"subject" reflects the effect of this system: individuals are
interpellated as free subjects to freely accept their subjection, thus working
by themselves to reproduce the relations of production and maintain the
socio-technical division of labor.
While the preceding theses
shed light on certain aspects of the superstructure's functioning and its
intervention in the base, they inevitably leave several important issues
unresolved, which merit acknowledgment:
The problem of the total
process of reproducing the relations of production.
The role of Ideological State
Apparatuses (ISAs) in this process is crucial, yet viewing their contribution
alone remains abstract. The actual realization of reproduction occurs within
the processes of production and circulation, where mechanisms train workers,
assign posts, etc. However, in a class society, production relations entail
exploitation and antagonistic class relations. Therefore, reproduction cannot
be a mere technical operation; it's a class undertaking realized through class
struggle.
The class nature of ideologies
in a social formation.
While the mechanism of
ideology can be abstractly articulated, it must be contextualized within real
ideological formations. Ideologies manifest in institutions, rituals, and
practices, contributing to the ruling class's reproduction of power. However,
ideologies are not realized in a vacuum; they stem from class struggle and the
conditions, experiences, and practices of antagonistic classes.
Understanding the class
struggle within ISAs is vital, but it's just one aspect of a broader struggle.
ISAs represent where ruling ideologies are realized and challenged, but
ideologies originate from the social classes engaged in the struggle.
Therefore, ideologies are not born within ISAs but emerge from the conditions
and experiences of conflicting classes. Thus, only from the perspective of
classes and their struggle can the origins and dynamics of ideologies in a
social formation be fully comprehended.
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