Juliet Mitchell's "Psychoanalysis and Feminism," (Book Note)

 

In Juliet Mitchell's "Psychoanalysis and Feminism," she embarks on a bold endeavor to synthesize Freudian theory with feminist thought, challenging contemporary feminist analyses of Freud while developing a Marx-Freud synthesis. Mitchell, known for her groundbreaking work in Women's Estate, demonstrates her ability to navigate both Marxist and Freudian frameworks, unafraid to challenge orthodox premises in her analysis of women's situations.

 

Mitchell meticulously presents Freud's theories alongside those of his critics, elucidating how these critics often overlook the importance of the unconscious and internalized kinship patterns in understanding patriarchy's psychological reality. She argues that grasping Freudian theory is crucial for comprehending the psychological underpinnings of patriarchy, alongside the economic realities of capitalism.

 

In her exploration, Mitchell offers a comprehensive examination of Freud's major theoretical works, as well as those of critics like Wilhelm Reich and R. D. Laing. Notably, she critically evaluates the works of six prominent feminists, including Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan, Germaine Greer, Shulamith Firestone, and Kate Millett. By delving into their contributions, Mitchell provides a nuanced perspective on the intersection of psychoanalysis and feminism.

 

Mitchell's synthesis culminates in a Marx-Freud framework that situates feminist issues within a robust theoretical context. She advocates for a critical engagement with Freudian theory, cautioning against interpreting Freud's descriptive analysis as moral prescriptions. Mitchell dispels common misrepresentations of Freud, emphasizing the historical context of his theories and clarifying his concepts of instinct, masculinity, and femininity.

 

While Mitchell is uncritical of Freud's theory itself, she critically examines the interpretations of Freudian theorists, rejecting attempts to reduce psychoanalytic concepts to sociological explanations. For instance, she defends Freud's concept of penis envy, arguing against efforts to diminish its significance. Mitchell highlights Freud's role as a scientist whose theories can inform analysis, contrasting them with post-Freudian theories, which she views as ideologies describing subjective reality.

 

In Juliet Mitchell's analysis, she contrasts Karen Horney's interpretation of Freud's concept of penis envy with that of Helene Deutsch, highlighting their divergent perspectives on femininity and masculinity. Mitchell asserts that while Freud intended penis envy as a neutral concept, Horney mistakenly treated it as a reproach, attributing women's feelings of inferiority to male chauvinism rather than any inherent biological factors. Deutsch similarly misunderstands Freud, equating femininity with the female and masculinity with the male, thereby reinforcing the notion of women's natural inferiority.

 

According to Mitchell, both Horney and Deutsch exhibit a form of biologism in their theories: Deutsch by emphasizing women's natural inferiority, and Horney by searching for women's "true nature." Mitchell suggests that Horney's insistence on uncovering women's essential nature undermines her assertions about women's social subordination, as it perpetuates patriarchal representations of femininity. Mitchell critiques Horney's quest for a womanhood untouched by patriarchal culture, arguing that it inadvertently reinforces patriarchal thought by essentializing femininity.

 

However, Mitchell's critique of Horney's perspective raises questions about her interpretation. While Mitchell accuses Horney of biologism, she overlooks the possibility that Horney's search for women's "true nature" could be a quest for a form of womanhood liberated from patriarchal constraints. Contrary to Mitchell's portrayal, Horney's intention may align with challenging patriarchal norms rather than reinforcing them.

 

Furthermore, Mitchell's focus on attributing misinterpretations of Freud solely to post-Freudians overlooks the complexities of feminist engagement with psychoanalytic theory. By placing blame on post-Freudians, Mitchell absolves Freud of potential criticisms, presenting him as a neutral figure while characterizing his critics as guilty of misinterpretation. This oversimplified view fails to acknowledge the nuanced interpretations within feminist scholarship and disregards the potential for Freud's theories to perpetuate patriarchal ideologies.

 

Continuing her analysis, Mitchell examines the theories of left psychologists Wilhelm Reich and R. D. Laing, acknowledging their lack of analytical value but emphasizing their descriptive accuracy. While their theories may function as ideologies reflecting subjective reality, Mitchell suggests that critically analyzing them poses challenges due to their subjective nature.

Mitchell's examination of Wilhelm Reich's theories provides insight into the historical context and evolution of Reich's ideas, emphasizing the interconnectedness of his work with broader social, political, and economic changes. Mitchell contends that despite Reich's political shifts from communism to liberalism during the Cold War, his theories should be viewed as a continuum rather than as discrete phases. While I may not entirely agree with this perspective, Mitchell presents her thesis convincingly, leaving the reader to draw their own conclusions.

 

Mitchell offers a thorough summary of Reich's work, with occasional moments of sarcasm that add flavor to her analysis. However, she refrains from applying the same critical lens to Sigmund Freud's theories, a missed opportunity that leaves the reader wishing for a more balanced examination. For instance, when discussing Reich's questioning of Freud's concepts, Mitchell's criticism falls on Reich rather than Freud, suggesting that Reich undermines psychoanalytic work. This asymmetrical treatment diminishes the depth of Mitchell's analysis and leaves Freud's theories largely unchallenged.

 

Mitchell contrasts Freud with Reich, demonstrating how Freud's concepts become oversimplified in Reich's hands. Fantasies are transformed into concrete events, and unconscious processes are overlooked, leading to a reductionist interpretation. Mitchell's critique of Reich's character analysis showcases her analytical prowess, but she fails to maintain this level of analysis throughout her examination. Instead, her critique often devolves into dismissal or name-calling, undermining the complexity of Reich's theories.

 

One recurring tendency in Mitchell's critique is to dismiss aspects of Reich's theory as diverging from psychoanalysis and therefore inadequate or incorrect. For example, Mitchell suggests that Reich's treatment of the Oedipus complex departs from psychoanalytic theory, leading to reductions and simplifications. However, Mitchell fails to provide a nuanced evaluation of Reich's departure from Freudian principles, relying instead on blanket statements that diminish the significance of Reich's contributions.

 

Additionally, Mitchell resorts to labeling Reich's work as ideological rather than scientific, contrasting it unfavorably with Freud's supposedly value-free theories. While Mitchell highlights Reich's emphasis on political sentiments, she overlooks the theoretical insights embedded within his analysis of the bourgeois family's role in perpetuating capitalism. By reducing Reich's analysis to mere sociology, Mitchell misses an opportunity to engage with the complexities of his theories and their implications for understanding social dynamics.

 

In delving into R. D. Laing's theories, Mitchell tends to resort to criticism that often borders on name-calling rather than providing a nuanced analysis. She characterizes Laing as more of a sociologist than a theorist, dismissing his ideas as "reflective ideologies" filled with value judgments. This critique suggests a bias toward Freudian theory, implying that any departure from it renders a theory inadequate in Mitchell's eyes. Her adherence to Freudian principles seems almost dogmatic, a surprising stance for someone associated with leftist perspectives.

 

Mitchell challenges Laing's redefinition of the unconscious, arguing that his conceptualization strips it of its distinctive nature and scientific value. She contends that Laing's emphasis on the unconscious as merely uncommunicated experiences undermines its significance as a concept and object of scientific inquiry. However, Mitchell's criticism appears rooted in her fidelity to Freudian theory rather than a genuine engagement with Laing's ideas. She fails to provide a compelling argument for why Laing's approach renders the unconscious conceptually meaningless.

 

Moreover, Mitchell's assessment of Laing's departure from Freudian theory lacks consistency. While she initially criticizes Laing for diverging from Freud's concepts, she later acknowledges the possibility of alternative interpretations. However, her subsequent analysis still reflects a Freudian framework, with little effort to understand or engage with Laing's perspective on its own terms. Mitchell's tendency to assert Freudian theory as the default standard undermines the depth of her critique and limits her ability to appreciate alternative viewpoints.

 

Despite these shortcomings, Mitchell offers valuable insights into Laing's work, particularly in elucidating the appeal of his ideas, especially to adolescents grappling with issues of identity and familial relationships. She adeptly highlights the circular reasoning inherent in Laing's approach, particularly regarding his emphasis on psychosis as a response to familial dynamics. By questioning the validity of labeling individuals as "psychotic" and challenging the notion of madness as a false description, Mitchell prompts readers to reconsider traditional psychiatric classifications and their implications.

In grappling with the conservative misapplications of psychoanalysis, Mitchell initially suggests that it might be distortions of Freud's work rather than Freud himself that lead to such abuses. However, she somewhat cursorily explores the possibility that Freud's own theories could be inherently prone to ideological misinterpretation. This idea, relegated to a footnote, hints at a critical avenue that Mitchell fails to fully pursue in her analysis.

 

In her examination of feminist critiques of Freud, Mitchell tends to dismiss them as inheriting a distorted Freud rather than engaging directly with Freud's original texts. She attributes Simone de Beauvoir's criticisms to her existentialist philosophy and Marxist influences, implying that de Beauvoir's preconceived values shape her interpretation of Freud. However, Mitchell's critique of de Beauvoir's philosophical approach seems inconsistent, as she both faults de Beauvoir for her presuppositions and acknowledges the inevitability of such biases in any analysis.

 

Mitchell's criticism of de Beauvoir's rejection of psychoanalysis revolves around de Beauvoir's emphasis on human agency and the individual's relation to the world, contrasting it with Freud's focus on internal psychic dynamics. Mitchell suggests that de Beauvoir's rejection of psychoanalysis stems from philosophical notions rather than empirical evidence. However, Mitchell's classification of psychoanalysis as a science and existentialism as philosophy lacks clear justification, raising questions about the criteria used to distinguish between the two.

 

Ultimately, Mitchell's central thesis emerges: Freudian psychoanalysis is presented as a scientific endeavor free from ideological implications, while post-Freudian and feminist critiques are dismissed as reflective ideologies. However, Mitchell's assertion of psychoanalysis as a science remains unsubstantiated, relying solely on Freud's own classification without addressing the epistemological foundations of psychoanalytic theory.

Mitchell criticizes Friedan for what she perceives as a historicist approach, suggesting that Friedan attempts to demonstrate the historical limitations of Freudian theory rather than proving it entirely obsolete. Mitchell argues that Friedan's method merely involves indicating how historical circumstances affect the development and validity of theory, a method she claims was pioneered by Marx and Engels. However, Mitchell's own understanding of science and its relation to historical context appears inconsistent.

 

While Mitchell asserts that there is no meaningful distinction between natural and social sciences and defines science simply as knowledge, she fails to acknowledge the nuanced debate surrounding the influence of subjective reality on scientific inquiry. She initially implies that if a scientist's work is affected by their environment, it is not true science, only to contradict herself by acknowledging Freud's cultural influences. This inconsistency highlights a broader tension between positivist and dialectical materialist approaches within Marxist thought.

 

Mitchell's synthesis of Freudian and Marxist theories leads her to conclude that the longevity of women's oppression stems from deeply ingrained cultural and social structures, particularly the patriarchal organization of kinship and the nuclear family. She suggests that while these structures were historically necessary for the development of civilization, they have become obsolete in advanced capitalism. However, Mitchell leaves key questions unanswered regarding the nature of the contradiction between patriarchy and capitalist ideology, as well as the role of the nuclear family in perpetuating patriarchal norms.