Kain's "Marx and Ethics" (Book Note)

 

Kain's Marx and Ethics offers a comprehensive analysis of Marx's evolving ethical framework, presenting it in three distinct periods of his life. Initially, from 1835 to 1844, especially in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx explores concepts akin to Aristotle's essence and self-realization, while also attempting to integrate them with a notion of universalization resembling Kant's categorical imperative. In the subsequent middle period (1845-1856), notably in works like the German Ideology (1845-46), Marx diverges from these Kantian and Aristotelian themes, rejecting the feasibility of ethics and instead formulating a doctrine of historical materialism and determinism. Finally, in his later writings (1857-1883), particularly in works like the Grundrisse and Capital, Marx endeavors to reconcile morality with historical materialism, envisioning a communist society where morality transcends.

 

Kain's analysis engages critically with three prominent schools of Marxist interpretation: those who view Marx primarily as a humanist advocating for a unified perspective, adherents to the later scientific Marx, and those who perceive inherent contradictions between Marx's ethical and scientific stances. While acknowledging the transition from early to middle Marx and recognizing certain inconsistencies, Kain contends that Marx ultimately achieves a synthesis of his humanist and scientific principles. Nevertheless, this argument invites debate regarding the efficacy of this synthesis, the appeal of Marx's humanism, and the utility of his scientific approach.

 

Chapters 1 and 2, which delve into the influences of Aristotle and Kant, present Kain's most compelling and enlightening arguments. Through this exploration, Kain elucidates several crucial concepts in early Marx's thought, including freedom as self-determination, the quest to bridge the gap between essence and existence, the importance of needs, the role of the proletariat as a revolutionary force guided by both self-interest and universal principles, the significance of community for human fulfillment, and the ethical underpinnings of Marx's revolutionary theory.

 

In Chapter 3, Kain delves into Marx's transition towards a doctrine of historical materialism as outlined in the German Ideology (1845-46), shedding light on Marx's controversial stance. Here, Marx challenges the notion of moral obligation as an ideological construct and dismisses the concept of freedom as self-determination. He asserts that the proletariat's transformation into a universal class will not be driven by philosophical ideals or a categorical imperative but rather by their class interests and the prevailing forces of production. Marx's assertion that "there is no right and no morality, but simply power" reflects his departure from traditional ethical frameworks.

 

However, Kain argues in Chapters 4 and 5 that Marx's mature perspective becomes most evident in the Grundrisse and Capital. Here, Marx moves away from the strict determinism of the German Ideology towards a position on morality that aligns with his historical materialism. He acknowledges the positive role of morality, asserting that it will endure and play a significant role in both present and future communist society. Contrary to his earlier stance, Marx now reinstates the concept of freedom as self-determination, particularly emphasizing worker control as a form of such freedom within a communal framework.

 

Kain underscores the importance of understanding Marx's new scientific method in grasping his ethical views in later writings. This method involves distinguishing between surface appearances and deeper realities, revealing that bourgeois notions of freedom, equality, and justice are superficial compared to the deeper principles inherent in communist society. Real freedom, according to Marx, entails worker control and proportionate equality within a cooperative and productive communist framework.

 

Despite Marx's recognition that moral insights alone are insufficient to catalyze societal transformation, Kain maintains that the advent of socialism will enable consciousness to predominate over material conditions. In this future society, socialist morality will wield tangible influence, shaping and transforming material conditions to a degree unattainable in capitalist society. Thus, while moral insights require societal and institutional changes to fully develop and flourish, they possess the potential to profoundly impact and mold future societal structures.

Kain posits that Marx envisioned a higher form of "Sittlichkeit" prevailing in communist society, which elucidates Marx's belief in the "transcendence of morality." This concept of Sittlichkeit refers to an established ethical order where rights are ingrained in communist customs and traditions, satisfying basic and elevated needs while harmonizing with a communal morality. This elevated Sittlichkeit is achievable in the advanced stage of communism, where constraints like fetishism and scarcity are overcome, and popular control over productive forces enables freedom to supersede determinism. Contrary to the early Marx, who dismissed rights as bourgeois and self-centered, Kain argues that the later Marx emerges as more of a humanist, as he incorporates rights into his vision by transcending them.

 

However, Kain's argument in Chapter 5, "The Transcendence of Morality," presents significant challenges and raises thought-provoking questions about Marx's stance. Is Marx's vision overly idealistic? Can one truly move beyond concepts like right and justice by transcending them? Is it rational to expect individuals to act justly without any guiding principles? Moreover, is it feasible to anticipate the emergence of an advanced form of Sittlichkeit in a communist society that has surmounted all obstacles to realization? Transitioning from practical considerations to moral ones, if a goal is unattainable, is it moral to behave as though it ought to be achieved? Could Marx's vision be deemed immoral due to its unrealistic and utopian nature? Kain himself appears to harbor reservations about transcending rights, suggesting caution given the experiences of communist societies in the twentieth century.

 

It seems imperative to subject this pivotal concept of Sittlichkeit to a thorough critique. Given Kain's extensive scholarship on Marx and his acute awareness of critical questions surrounding Marx's positions, he is well-positioned to undertake such an analysis. A comprehensive critique would not only shed light on the complexities of Marx's ideas but also afford Kain the opportunity to articulate his own stance on these contentious issues.