At the core of this book lies a compelling idea: to
explore the intellectual clash between two prominent thinkers based on their
public dispute regarding the methodology and objectives of Foucault's initial
work, "Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique"
(Paris, 1961). Notably, this book has only been published in English in an
abridged form as "Madness and Civilization" (Tavistock, 1967),
omitting crucial sections discussing Descartes' exclusion of madness at the
outset of his "Meditations." The disagreement between Derrida and
Foucault revolves partly around the interpretation of Descartes' text.
Derrida's critique of Foucault and the latter's response
have long been available, sparking considerable secondary literature. The
exchange between them remains subject to divided opinions, as both scholars
receive critiques: Foucault's claims regarding the modern European experience
of madness are shown to be somewhat exaggerated, while Derrida's textual
analysis also faces scrutiny for its limitations.
The central chapter of this book delves into the
arguments from both sides, offering a comprehensive overview of Derrida's
critique and Foucault's counterargument, alongside a brief examination of
relevant secondary literature. This discussion is enriched by preceding
chapters, where Boyne sets the stage by exploring the main themes of Foucault's
history of madness and tracing Descartes' arguments in the
"Meditations."
Although Foucault's remarks on Descartes comprise only a
small portion of "Histoire de la folie," they are crucial concerning
one of his central claims: that his study is not just a history of
institutional treatment of the insane but also a history of the Other in modern
Western reason. Foucault argues that Descartes excludes the possibility of
madness from his conception of the rational subject, akin to the societal
exclusion of the insane. Derrida contests this reading, suggesting that
Descartes' evil demon hypothesis encompasses a form of total madness without
undermining the certainty of the thinking subject.
While the conflicting interpretations are intriguing,
they should not overshadow Foucault's historical study. Foucault indeed employs
rhetoric portraying madness as the repressed underside of Western rationality,
potentially resurfacing in new historical contexts. Derrida critiques this
rhetoric, emphasizing its marginal relevance to the historical focus of
"Histoire de la folie." Boyne, however, takes Foucault's aspirations
further, portraying him as seeking a primitive understanding of madness or as a
modern-day Hegel striving to transcend dominant forms of reason, which some
might view as an exaggeration.
Boyne attempts to distill the complex intellectual clash
between Foucault and Derrida into a simplified opposition, portraying Foucault
as a naive yet utopian thinker and Derrida as one unable to conceive
alternatives to reason. This reduction oversimplifies their differences by
relying on a global concept of reason, disregarding nuanced distinctions such
as Heidegger's between reason and thought and ignoring Foucault's historical
treatment of proto-scientific discourses about insanity. Boyne's analysis lacks
depth in engaging with the substantive issues raised by the debate, as
indicated by his shallow understanding of Foucault's "archaeological"
method.
Moreover, Boyne's comparison of Derrida and Foucault's
subsequent works is flawed. He constructs a fictional intellectual history
suggesting that all of Foucault's later work responds to Derrida's critique of
"the madness book." This overlooks the possibility that Foucault
might have drawn inspiration from other sources like Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Boyne's attempt to find Derridean traces throughout Foucault's "Discipline
and Punish" is unconvincing, as it relies on forced interpretations rather
than robust analysis.
In the final chapter, Boyne explores the political
implications of Derrida and Foucault's work, assuming that their contributions
to "radical discourse" must imply a clear political position or
program of action. However, he struggles to find such a position in Foucault's
work, framing him as a pessimist resigned to the inevitability of power
dynamics and lacking a coherent vision for social change. Boyne's criticisms of
Foucault's supposed pessimism and lack of moral guidance overlook the
complexity of Foucault's ideas, reducing them to simplistic caricatures.
Boyne's treatment of the politics of deconstruction falls
short, as he reduces it to a simplistic maneuver of overturning hierarchies and
celebrating the secondary aspects. He selectively quotes Derrida's endorsement
of this view from "Positions" but ignores Derrida's subsequent
elaboration, which emphasizes the production of irreducible elements beyond the
original hierarchy. This oversight undermines Boyne's understanding of
deconstruction and its nuanced approach to dismantling binary oppositions.
However, Boyne's most astonishing claim is his attempt to
conclude his narrative by proposing a common ground between Foucault and
Derrida in Kant's categorical imperative. He suggests that their shared concern
for the rights of the other represents a remarkable turn around, given their
apparent animosity and skepticism towards Western philosophy. Yet, this
interpretation overlooks the fundamental divergence between their philosophies.
Foucault's exploration of ancient Greek sexual ethics
highlights the virtue of self-imposed ethical restraints, contrasting with the
notion of a universal law advocated by Kant. For Foucault, the value lies in
the diversity of ethical systems rather than adherence to a singular principle.
Similarly, Derrida's deconstruction challenges the idea of a fundamental or
unchallengable principle, emphasizing the fluidity and multiplicity of meaning.
To suggest that Foucault and Derrida's critical journeys
lead them back to Enlightenment values ignores the radical implications of
their work. Their critiques of presence, universality, and totalization
represent a departure from traditional philosophical certainties rather than a
return to them. Boyne's attempt to reconcile their divergent paths overlooks
the profound philosophical challenges posed by their ideas.
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