In "Language and Death," Giorgio Agamben
explores the intersection of philosophy and poetry by questioning whether
poetry allows a different experience of language than the “unspeakable
experience of Voice” that grounds philosophy. Reflecting on Plato’s view of
poetry as the "invention of the Muses," Agamben argues that both
philosophy and poetry strive toward the unspeakable, the foundational condition
of language, but both ultimately reveal this goal as unattainable. Rejecting a
straightforward prioritization of poetry over philosophy or vice versa, Agamben
concludes that true human language would be a synthesis where the prose of
philosophy and the verse of poetry intersect and disrupt each other: “perhaps
only a language in which the pure prose of philosophy would intervene at a
certain point to break apart the verse of the poetic word, and in which the
verse of poetry would intervene to bend the prose of philosophy into a ring,
would be the true human language” (LD, 78). This theme underpins Agamben’s
contributions to aesthetics, establishing a complex interplay of language,
representation, experience, and ethos aimed at transcending the distinctions
between philosophy and poetry.
Agamben’s first major contribution to contemporary
aesthetics is his acclaimed book "Stanzas," where he delves into a
multifaceted analysis of language and phantasm, engaging with modern
linguistics, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and philology. Dedicated to Martin
Heidegger, whom Agamben considers the last Western philosopher,
"Stanzas" also shows the influence of Aby Warburg. Agamben asserts
that Western culture’s acceptance of the distinction between philosophy and
poetry leads to a division where “philosophy has failed to elaborate a proper
language… and poetry has developed neither a method nor self-consciousness” (S,
xvii). The urgent task for thought, which Agamben names “criticism,” is to
rediscover “the unity of our own fragmented word.” Criticism is situated at the
juncture where language splits from itself—such as in the distinction between
signified and signifier—and aims to point toward a “unitary status for the
utterance,” where criticism “neither represents nor knows, but knows the
representation” (S, xvii). Thus, criticism opposes both philosophy and poetry
by seeking “the enjoyment of what cannot be possessed and the possession of
what cannot be enjoyed” (S, xvii).
To pursue this task, Agamben develops a model of
knowledge based on the relations of desire and appropriation identified by
Freud as melancholia and fetishism. He questions the “primordial situation” of
the distinction between the signifier and the signified, fundamental to Western
reflections on the sign. The study concludes with a discussion of Saussurean
linguistics, noting Saussure's recognition of the impossibility of a science of
language based on the signifier-signified distinction. Agamben argues that
isolating the sign as a positive unity from Saussure’s problematic position
“pushes the science of the sign back into metaphysics” (S, 155). This notion
links the unity of the sign with Western metaphysics, a connection confirmed by
Jacques Derrida’s grammatology, which attempts to overcome the metaphysics of
presence prevalent in Western philosophy from Plato onwards. However, Agamben
contends that Derrida fails to achieve his goal, as he misdiagnoses the
problem: metaphysics. Metaphysics, according to Agamben, is not merely the
interpretation of presence through the dichotomies of essence and appearance,
sensibility and intelligibility, but the conception that “original experience
be always already caught in a fold… that presence be always already caught in a
signification” (S, 156). Hence, logos is the fold that “gathers and divides all
things in the ‘putting together’ of presence” (S, 156). Overcoming metaphysics,
therefore, requires reducing the semiological algorithm to the barrier itself
rather than to one side or the other of the distinction, viewed as the
“topological game of putting things together and articulating” (S, 156).
In this context, Agamben’s subsequent work "The Idea
of Prose" gains significance. Published in Italian in 1985, this book
tackles the distinction between philosophy and poetry through a series of
fragments on various topics, including poetry, prose, language, politics,
justice, love, and shame. The text’s enigmatic nature and lack of consistent
argument make it challenging, but in light of Agamben’s earlier reflections, it
is clear that he is performing and undermining the difference between poetry
and philosophy by disrupting the strictures of logos. By employing literary
techniques like fables, riddles, aphorisms, and short stories, Agamben
demonstrates an exercise in criticism, returning thought to a prosaic
experience or awakening where representation itself is known.
"The Idea of Prose" illustrates Agamben's commitment
to breaking down the barriers between philosophy and poetry, aiming to show
that language and representation are not confined by traditional distinctions.
This work underscores his belief in the need for a unified approach to language
that transcends conventional categories, enabling a deeper understanding of
human experience.
Agamben’s exploration of the relationship between
philosophy and poetry, particularly in "Language and Death,"
"Stanzas," and "The Idea of Prose," reveals his commitment
to overcoming the limitations imposed by traditional metaphysical distinctions.
By emphasizing the self-referential nature of language and advocating for a
critical approach that unifies fragmented words, Agamben seeks to restore a
sense of authentic experience. His work challenges us to rethink the boundaries
of language, representation, and experience, ultimately aiming to transcend the
dichotomies that have shaped Western thought.
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