The debate over formalism in aesthetics revolves around
the idea that aesthetic properties are determined by certain non-aesthetic
properties. Different versions of formalism primarily differ in their
identification of which non-aesthetic properties are relevant. For the purposes
of this discussion, we will focus on formal characterizations of artworks,
particularly in visual art, as introduced by Nick Zangwill.
Nick Zangwill differentiates between arrangements of
lines, shapes, and colors (including properties like shininess and glossiness)
as formal properties, contrasting them with non-formal properties, which are
influenced by the artwork’s production history or context. Zangwill captures
this divide by stating that formal properties are those determined solely by
sensory or physical properties, as long as these properties are not relational
to other things or times. This definition aligns with the intuitive idea that
formal properties are directly perceivable.
Zangwill acknowledges that some philosophers argue that
aesthetic properties are dispositions to provoke responses in human beings. To
accommodate this, he uses the term "narrow" to include sensory
properties, non-relational physical properties, and dispositions that might be
part-constitutive of aesthetic properties. Conversely, "broad" covers
extrinsic properties like the history of a work's production. Thus, formal
properties are determined entirely by narrow non-aesthetic properties, while
non-formal aesthetic properties are partly determined by broad non-aesthetic
properties.
In this framework, Zangwill identifies Extreme Formalism
as the view that all aesthetic properties of an artwork are formal and narrowly
determined. Anti-Formalism holds that no aesthetic properties are formal,
instead being broadly determined by both history of production and narrow
non-aesthetic properties. Zangwill’s own position, Moderate Formalism, contends
that some aesthetic properties are formal, while others are not. This stance
allows Zangwill to counter arguments put forward by anti-formalists.
Kendall Walton’s influential position argues that to make
any aesthetic judgment about an artwork, one must see it under an
art-historical category. This counters attempts to focus solely on the works
themselves without considering extraneous factors. Walton uses "intuition
pumps" to support his proposal, suggesting that aesthetic properties
depend on how artworks are categorized historically.
Zangwill, defending Moderate Formalism, argues that
Walton's thesis is only partially accurate. He asserts that a significant class
of artworks possess purely formal aesthetic properties that emerge from the
configuration of colors and shapes alone. This narrower determination contrasts
with Walton’s claim that the history of production partly determines aesthetic
properties by dictating the category under which the work is perceived.
Zangwill challenges Walton’s assertion that most works and their values are
category-dependent, aiming to vindicate the idea that aesthetic concepts can
exclude facts about an artwork’s origin.
Walton’s argument about representational properties
highlights a marble bust resembling a Roman emperor, which we interpret as
representing a man with specific features. Walton asks why we don’t see it as
representing a motionless, uniformly colored man severed at the chest. His
distinction between standard, contra-standard, and variable properties explains
this: the bust’s uniform color and motionlessness are standard properties for
busts, influencing our perception.
Zangwill concedes that representational properties, which
are partly determined by the history of production, contribute to some
aesthetic properties being non-formal. This is acceptable within Moderate
Formalism, as many artworks are not representational and are unaffected by this
consideration. Thus, while Walton’s argument holds for a subset of artworks, it
does not undermine the broader Moderate Formalism.
Walton extends his argument, claiming that an artwork’s
art-historical category is aesthetically relevant because it affects how one
perceives the work. His well-known example involves a society without painting
but producing works called guernicas, similar to Picasso’s "Guernica"
but in bas-relief. In this society, Picasso’s "Guernica" would be a
flat guernica, perceived differently than in our society, illustrating that
aesthetic properties depend on the categories under which we perceive artworks.
Zangwill challenges Walton’s account by questioning the
psychological process behind category-dependent judgments. He argues that we
can make aesthetic judgments about whole categories or compare items across
categories without subconsciously operating within a more embracing category.
According to Zangwill, phenomenological reflection does not support the view
that aesthetic judgments are inherently category-dependent.
Zangwill proposes an alternative: when we say something
is “elegant for a C” or “an elegant C,” we are communicating degrees of
aesthetic qualities more conveniently. This pragmatism does not mean that
category-dependent judgments are essential. Instead, category-neutral aesthetic
judgments are fundamental, enabling comparisons. Thus, Zangwill maintains that
Walton has not disproven the possibility of category-neutral judgments.
Zangwill concludes that we can resist being swayed by
Walton’s intuition pumps. Even if two aesthetically indistinguishable objects
are categorized differently, this does not necessarily change their aesthetic
properties. We can acknowledge that referencing art-historical categories is
convenient for classification without conceding that it is essential for
understanding aesthetic value. This perspective supports Moderate Formalism,
affirming that while some aesthetic properties are influenced by historical context,
others remain purely formal and independent of such considerations.
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