Sunday, 11 February 2024

Gayatri C Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?"

 

The critique originating from the Western world often aims to uphold the dominant perspective of the West, referred to as the "West as Subject." The idea of pluralized 'subject-effects' may seem to challenge individual subjectivity but can actually serve to maintain the dominance of this Western perspective. Despite Europe's historical narrative being shaped by Western laws, political economy, and ideology, this hidden subject claims to have no specific geopolitical bias. Criticisms of the sovereign subject actually end up establishing a new subject position.

 

To support this argument, Spivak analyzes a text by Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze titled 'Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation'. This conversation is chosen because it bridges the gap between formal theoretical discourse and casual conversation, helps reveal underlying ideological influences.

 

Foucault and Deleuze emphasize key ideas from French poststructuralist theory: firstly, they argue that power, desire, and interest operate in diverse and complex networks, resisting easy categorization into a single narrative. Secondly, they stress the importance of intellectuals uncovering and understanding the perspectives of marginalized voices in society. However, they overlook the role of ideology and their own impact on intellectual and economic history.

 

The conversation between Foucault and Deleuze, despite critiquing the idea of a dominant subject, is framed within the context of two abstract and anonymous revolutionary subjects: 'A Maoist' and 'the workers' struggle'. However, intellectuals are named and distinguished, while Chinese Maoism isn't actually involved. The reference to Maoism serves more as a rhetorical device than reflecting any actual engagement with Asian political movements.

 

Similarly, Deleuze's mention of the workers' struggle appears superficial. He acknowledges the importance of confronting power but simplifies the complexities of labor struggles. This overlooks the global division of labor and the varied conditions faced by workers worldwide. The focus on the workers' struggle ignores issues such as the exploitation of labor in the Global South and the evolving nature of work in the modern economy.

 

By disregarding these complexities, poststructuralist political theory fails to address the challenges posed by global capitalism. It also overlooks the diverse economic structures and social dynamics present in different regions. These omissions are notable considering that poststructuralist thinkers often emphasize heterogeneity and the importance of understanding marginalized perspectives.

 

The conversation between Foucault and Deleuze frames revolutionary subjects in vague terms like 'A Maoist' and 'the workers' struggle', without considering the intricacies of global labor relations and social dynamics. This oversight is surprising given that poststructuralist thinkers typically advocate for embracing diversity and understanding marginalized voices.

 

workers' struggle is inherently linked to the desire to dismantle power structures. This viewpoint suggests that there's a fundamental urge within individuals to resist and challenge established authorities. Walter Benjamin, drawing on Marx's ideas, critiques Baudelaire's political stance, likening it to that of professional revolutionaries whose primary goal is to overthrow existing governments without much concern for broader theoretical enlightenment among the working class.

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Benjamin implies that Baudelaire's perspective aligns with these revolutionaries, emphasizing a focus on immediate rebellion rather than deeper understanding of class interests. Baudelaire's assertion that he only understands one aspect of politics – rebellion – echoes this sentiment.

 

Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari propose a different interpretation of desire compared to traditional psychoanalytic views. They argue that desire is not about lacking an object, but rather about the subject lacking desire itself, or a fixed identity. They view desire and its object as interconnected "machines," where desire is a process rather than a lack. This perspective challenges the notion of a fixed subject tied to desire and production.

 

However, even with this redefined understanding of desire, there remains a specific subjectivity tied to individual desires and the production of desire. When the connection between desire and the subject is disregarded or inverted, it often results in a generalized ideological subject, such as the legal subject of capitalist society. This subject is characterized by attributes like possessing strong passports or using stable currencies, rather than being rooted in individual desires or identities as "Other."

 

In simpler terms, the discussion revolves around the idea that workers' struggle stems from a desire to challenge authority. This view is critiqued using Marxist and literary perspectives. Additionally, there's a reinterpretation of desire as a process rather than a lack, challenging traditional understandings. However, even with this new perspective, individual subjectivity remains important in understanding desires and their production.

 

Deleuze and Guattari fail to fully consider how desire, power, and subjectivity are interconnected, which hampers their ability to develop a theory of interests. Their disregard for ideology, which is crucial for understanding interests, is consistent throughout their work. Foucault's focus on genealogical analysis prevents him from identifying pivotal figures like Marx and Freud within the broader intellectual history. This approach leads him to resist engaging with ideological critique directly.

 

Western theories about how ideology shapes social relations, as exemplified by Althusser, emphasize the reproduction of labor power through submission to ruling ideologies. Foucault's examination of power acknowledges its diverse institutional forms, akin to Deleuze and Guattari's discussions of alliances and systems of signs. However, Foucault doesn't fully recognize how ideology is materialized in institutions and knowledge production.

 

Deleuze and Guattari, like many others, seem to reject the concept of ideology as too simplistic, leading them to oversimplify the relationship between desire and interest. They align with bourgeois sociologists who replace ideology with notions of an unconscious or cultural influence. According to their perspective, desire is unified and never contrary to one's interests because interests align with desire's placement.

 

They propose that undifferentiated desire is the driving force, with power influencing its effects and manifestations. This perspective, combined with a focus on heterogeneity, introduces a new, unnamed subject influenced by desire. However, this view overlooks the complexities of ideological influence and the diversity of desires within society.

 

These philosophers diverge from the Left by rejecting the idea of constitutive contradiction. They reintroduce the notion of an undivided subject under the guise of desire within discussions of power. Foucault often blurs the lines between 'individual' and 'subject', a tendency that continues in his followers' interpretations. His metaphor of power as a point irradiating its surroundings is often misinterpreted, leading to a Eurocentric view of theory.

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Foucault also downplays the role of ideology in shaping social relations, instead valorizing the oppressed as authentic subjects. Deleuze echoes this sentiment by suggesting that reality is defined by what happens in practical settings like factories and schools, neglecting the need for counterhegemonic ideological work. This perspective inadvertently reinforces capitalist empiricism and maintains the international division of labor.

 

Despite valuing the experiences of the oppressed, both Deleuze and Foucault overlook the critical role of intellectuals within capitalist society. This contradiction is disguised by their rhetoric. For example, Deleuze likens theory to a set of tools unrelated to language, while also claiming that theory and practice are inseparable. This highlights the dual nature of theoretical production as both a mental and practical endeavor. However, their dismissal of representation in favor of action oversimplifies the complex relationship between theory and practice.

Deleuze's argument becomes problematic due to the conflation of two meanings of representation: representing in a political sense, and representing as re-presenting, as in art or philosophy. According to Deleuze, theory is seen as action, so the theorist doesn't represent the oppressed in the political sense of speaking for them. Instead, individuals are not seen as representative consciousnesses accurately reflecting reality. These two senses of representation, within political structures and in philosophical discussions, are related but fundamentally different.

 

By using an analogy that suggests otherwise, Deleuze unintentionally prioritizes the subject, creating a paradoxical subject-centric view. Since individuals are always a multiplicity of voices and actions, no intellectual or organization can truly represent those who are actively engaged in struggle.

 

The complexity of these issues lies in the subtle differences between similar words like consciousness and conscience, representation and re-presentation. This blurring of distinctions erases the critique of ideological subject formation within political and economic systems, as well as the active role of theoretical practice in transforming consciousness.

 

To maintain this critique and project, it's crucial to preserve the distinctions between representation within political structures and within philosophical discussions. This can be seen in a passage from Marx's "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," where he discusses class in a way that goes beyond Althusser's simpler distinction between class instinct and class position.

Marx's argument revolves around the idea that class definitions are based on differences from other classes. He emphasizes how millions of families, due to their economic conditions, lead lives that are distinct from and in conflict with those of other classes. This differential isolation forms the basis of a class, without relying on any inherent "class instinct." Marx highlights that class formation is primarily economic, and the economic interests involved are impersonal and systematic.

 

Marx doesn't seek to create a unified subject where desire and interest align. Instead, he presents models of a divided and disjointed subject, both economically and politically. For instance, he describes capital as a monstrous force, emphasizing its fragmented and dislocated nature. Similarly, in discussing the small peasant proprietor class, Marx shows how their collective consciousness is represented by individuals who may not truly act in their best interests. The term "representative" here doesn't just mean portraying, but also implies substitution or acting on behalf of others.

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This distinction between "darstellen" (portraying) and "vertreten" (representing with stronger connotations of substitution) is crucial. It reflects an older debate about the nature of representation and persuasion. By conflating these terms, particularly in the context of oppressed subjects speaking and acting for themselves, it leads to an oversimplified and utopian politics.

 

In Marx's words, the small peasant proprietors cannot represent themselves; instead, they must be represented. Their representatives often appear as both masters and authorities over them, exerting governmental power that ultimately subordinates society to itself. This underscores the disjunction between the consciousness and representation of the social subject, highlighting the complexities of class dynamics and political power.

 

This model of social dynamics not only critiques individual agency but also challenges the notion of collective agency. It highlights the inherent disconnection between the source of influence, the representative figure, and the resulting historical-political outcome. This disconnection illustrates that the unity of interests among the small peasant proprietors fails to foster a sense of community or political organization, thereby preventing them from forming a cohesive class.

 

The process of representation, whether understood as persuasion or portrayal, fills the gap between the descriptive definition of a class and its transformative potential. The intertwined nature of representation and portrayal, as seen in Marx's analysis, is essential for understanding how social dynamics operate. However, conflating these terms obscures their distinct roles.

 

Critics might argue that this interpretation overly complicates Marx's ideas, making them inaccessible to the common person entrenched in positivist thinking. However, it's essential to recognize that even contemporary philosophers sometimes fall into this trap.

 

Marx's perspective suggests that developing class consciousness from a descriptive class position is not merely a matter of individual awareness. Rather, it involves fostering a sense of community and political organization beyond familial bonds. Full class agency, if achievable, involves contesting and supplementing existing social structures, which are fundamentally shaped by economic conditions. Marx's approach acknowledges the complexities of individual and collective agency, emphasizing the discontinuity between projects of class consciousness and transformations of consciousness.

 

In contrast, contemporary ideas like libidinal economy and the emphasis on desire as the primary motivator often reinforce the concept of the sovereign subject, contradicting efforts to question its dominance.

 

Undoubtedly, Marxism's initial framework, rooted in a masculine perspective, tends to overlook the role of the family, even within specific class contexts. In today's global political landscape, the family's role in patriarchal structures is complex and contested. Simply replacing the family within this framework won't dismantle these structures. Similarly, including all women under a monolithic category of oppression doesn't address the diverse experiences and subjectivities within gender groups.

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Marx employs the concept of the patronymic within the idea of representation (Vertretung) to illustrate how small peasant proprietors struggle to assert their class interests. They lack a collective identity beyond familial ties, relying on historical traditions that often elevate paternal figures. The example of French peasants anticipating a savior named Napoleon demonstrates how societal norms enforce belief in paternal authority, despite its paradoxical nature under patriarchal laws.

 

This discussion of Marx's passage highlights the intricacies of political representation. In economic contexts, representation (Darstellung) refers to the philosophical concept of staging or signification, indirectly related to the divided subject. Marx's analysis of commodity exchange demonstrates how value, representing objectified labor, is distinct from human activity. Without a theory of exploitation, capitalist domination is viewed solely through the lens of power dynamics.

 

Deleuze suggests that Marxism's focus on interests, defining power through ruling class interests, overlooks the broader diffusion of power beyond structures of exploitation and state formation.

 

 

 

Spivak argues that radical practice should focus on understanding these dual representations rather than reintroducing the individual subject through overarching concepts like power and desire. Marx, by keeping class practice at a secondary level of abstraction, maintained a critique of the individual subject as an agent, aligning with Kantian and Hegelian perspectives. However, Marx's treatment of the family and language as natural constructs perpetuates an age-old deception.

 

Reducing Marx to a historical figure often serves to launch new interpretative theories. In discussions between Foucault and Deleuze, the rejection of representation and signifiers implies a denial of the sign-system, hindering the development of a comprehensive theory of ideology. Foucault's reluctance to acknowledge the discursive nature of institutions further complicates matters, undermining the potential for discourse analysis.

 

Edward W. Said's criticism of Foucault's treatment of power as a captivating yet mystifying concept is highly relevant here. Said argues that Foucault's focus on power obscures the roles of social classes, economics, and movements of insurgency and rebellion. I expand on Said's analysis by introducing the idea of the hidden subject of power and desire, symbolized by the apparent transparency of the intellectual.

 

Interestingly, Paul Bove criticizes Said for emphasizing the importance of the intellectual, claiming that Foucault's project challenges the dominant roles of both hegemonic and oppositional intellectuals. However, I contend that this supposed challenge is deceptive because it overlooks the institutional responsibilities of the critic.

 

The constructed subject, seemingly transparent through denials, aligns with the exploiters' side of the global labor division. Contemporary French intellectuals struggle to conceive the type of power and desire that would exist within the unnamed subject of the "Other" of Europe. Their perspectives are heavily influenced by debates surrounding the production of this "Other," either supporting or critiquing the construction of Europe as a subject.

Despite the potential reductionism of economic analysis, French intellectuals must not overlook the intricate economic dynamics that have shaped social structures. Ignoring this complexity risks perpetuating the ongoing construction of the "Other" as the shadow of the Self, ultimately reinforcing hegemonic power dynamics.

 

In light of the intellectual's potential complicity in this process, a viable political practice for intellectuals involves questioning the economic factor without erasing it entirely. Recognizing the economic dimension as an integral part of the social fabric, while also acknowledging its limitations, allows for a more nuanced understanding of power dynamics.

 

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One of the most prominent examples of epistemic violence is the systematic construction of the colonial subject as the "Other." This project involves erasing the subjectivity of the colonized while imposing a dominant narrative. Foucault highlights epistemic violence as a fundamental shift in understanding sanity during the late eighteenth century in Europe. However, what if this redefinition of sanity was just one part of a larger narrative that unfolded both in Europe and its colonies? Perhaps these two projects of epistemic transformation functioned as interconnected yet unrecognized components of a broader imperialistic agenda.

 

This perspective suggests that the prevailing narrative of imperialism should be seen as a form of "subjugated knowledge," which refers to knowledges deemed inadequate or inferior by those in power. It doesn't claim to present an absolute truth but aims to shed light on how certain explanations and narratives become normalized.

 

To illustrate this, let's briefly examine the British codification of Hindu Law. This process involved imposing a binary framework onto a complex legal system, erasing its polymorphous nature and reducing it to four distinct categories: sruti (the heard), smriti (the remembered), sastra (the learned-from-another), and vyavahara (the performed-in-exchange). However, these categories were not always continuous or coherent, leading to uncertainty among legal theorists and practitioners.

 

Spivaks personal connection to India informs her exploration of this topic, but it's important to recognize that this example is not representative of all countries or cultures considered the "Other" of Europe. Nonetheless, it serves as a valuable case study for understanding epistemic violence and its far-reaching implications.

 

By highlighting the complexities and contradictions within the codification of Hindu Law, we can better grasp the concept of epistemic violence and its impact on colonial subjects. This understanding adds depth to the subsequent discussion of widow sacrifice, offering insight into the enduring significance of these historical dynamics.

The story of Indian education, particularly influenced by Macaulay's directive in 1835, is intertwined with the colonial project of shaping the native populace to serve British interests. Macaulay advocated for the creation of a class of individuals who, while Indian in origin, would adopt English language, culture, and values. This educational system complemented the legal efforts to assert control over colonial subjects.

 

The establishment of institutions like the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Indian Institute at Oxford, along with the scholarly work of figures like Arthur Macdonnell and Arthur Berriedale Keith, played significant roles in shaping Sanskrit studies. While these scholars aimed to promote Sanskrit as part of colonial education, they inadvertently contributed to the marginalization of traditional Sanskrit culture within India.

 

A particular version of history emerged, suggesting that the Brahmins, like the British, sought to codify and standardize Hindu society. This narrative was perpetuated by both colonial and indigenous scholars, such as Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri, who contributed to projects like the "History of Bengal." However, there were contrasting views among English intellectuals, some of whom regarded Hinduism as a sophisticated civilization that stood against Western influence.

 

These historical accounts offer valuable insights into the civilization of India, particularly for nonspecialist French intellectuals seeking to understand the Other. However, the perspectives of postcolonial intellectuals like Shastri may not fully capture the experiences of the broader population, whose understanding of oppression and exploitation may differ based on their social and economic contexts. Therefore, it's essential to consider the broader map of exploitation when analyzing historical narratives and societal dynamics.

 

Let's now turn our attention to the marginalized groups—those on the fringes, often overlooked or silenced, such as the illiterate peasants, tribal communities, and the poorest urban dwellers. According to Foucault and Deleuze, in the context of the developed world where capitalism is pervasive, the oppressed have the potential to articulate their experiences and understand their situation, given the opportunity. This intersects with Marxist themes of solidarity through political alliances. However, we must ask: in regions outside the dominant capitalist centers, where imperialist laws and educational systems have historically shaped social structures, can these marginalized groups truly voice their concerns?

 

Antonio Gramsci's concept of the "subaltern classes" builds on the idea of class consciousness introduced in Marx's "The Eighteenth Brumaire." Gramsci focuses on the role of intellectuals in facilitating the subaltern's cultural and political engagement in the mainstream discourse. He emphasizes the need for this engagement to influence how history is narrated and understood. However, this narrative is complicated by the influence of imperialist interventions in defining legal and disciplinary frameworks, disrupting the organic development of subaltern groups.

 

The Subaltern Studies group, a collective of intellectuals within the field of history, grapple with the question of whether the subaltern can truly articulate their experiences. Drawing on Foucault's ideas and acknowledging his influence, they seek to reevaluate Indian colonial history by highlighting the series of peasant uprisings during colonial rule. This endeavor reflects the challenge posed by Edward Said regarding who has the authority or "permission to narrate" history.

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Ranajit Guha, a prominent figure in this group, criticizes traditional historiography for its elitist bias, arguing that it often overlooks the grassroots movements and attributes nationalist achievements solely to elites, whether British colonial rulers or Indian elites.

 

Some segments of the Indian elite merely serve as informants for first-world intellectuals seeking insight into the perspectives of the marginalized. However, it's essential to recognize that the colonized subaltern population is diverse and multifaceted.

 

Ranajit Guha discusses what he terms "the politics of the people," which operates both within and outside the framework of colonial rule. Guha acknowledges the complexities and nuances within this category, rejecting any simplistic or essentialist view. He outlines a dynamic stratification grid that accounts for the diverse social dynamics during colonialism.

 

Guha's framework includes a category he describes as the "antre," representing a space of situational indeterminacy between dominant groups and the subaltern. This category acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of social composition and the fluidity of power dynamics, especially among rural communities and lower strata of society.

 

While Guha's approach may seem taxonomic and essentialist on the surface, it's driven by the need to navigate the complexities imposed by colonial violence and epistemic inscriptions. The research agenda aims to investigate deviations from an idealized notion of the subaltern, which itself is defined in relation to the elite. This process involves grappling with the conditions of possibility and impossibility inherent in understanding subaltern voices, highlighting the challenges of representation and interpretation in postcolonial studies.

When discussing the actions of dominant indigenous groups at regional and local levels, scholars note that these groups may act in the interests of higher-ranking groups rather than their own. This observation aligns more closely with Marx's ideas than with Deleuze's perspective, as it emphasizes social interests over individual desires. Guha, like Marx, views interest in terms of social dynamics rather than personal motivations. He uses the concept of the "Name-of-the-Father" from Marx's work to illustrate that group actions are socially constructed, similar to how patronymics are inherited.

 

For the "true" subaltern group, whose identity is defined by its differences from dominant groups, there isn't a single, unified voice that can represent itself. Intellectuals should not refrain from representing these groups but face the challenge of understanding their consciousness and offering a compelling narrative that resonates with them. The goal is to rewrite the development of Indian national consciousness, which contrasts with simply uncovering mechanisms, as Foucault suggests. However, the transition from revealing mechanisms to giving voice to individuals poses difficulties, especially in avoiding reductionist analyses.

 

Ajit K. Chaudhury, a Marxist scholar from West Bengal, critiques Guha's approach to understanding subaltern consciousness. Chaudhury acknowledges the importance of understanding peasants' and workers' consciousness but suggests that it's often overshadowed by a positivist interpretation of Marxism. This critique highlights the need to balance understanding social relations with grasping the nuances of consciousness, which can vary across regions and contexts.

 

In some strands of Marxist thought, there's a belief in a pure and retrievable form of consciousness, which is then dismissed. This belief, shared by Foucault, Deleuze, and the Subaltern Studies group, often leads to criticisms of Marxism for being idealistic and even accused of racism and sexism. However, the Subaltern Studies group aims to develop this notion of consciousness on its own terms.

 

To better understand this, we can turn to ideology theory. Chaudhury's critique highlights the need to consider ideological production alongside consciousness and knowledge. Lenin associates consciousness with understanding the relationships between different social classes and groups, essential for grasping historical change.

 

Pierre Macherey offers a perspective on interpreting ideology, suggesting that what a work doesn't say is as important as what it does. This idea can be applied beyond literary analysis to understand the ideological underpinnings of imperialism. By examining what is refused or left unsaid, we can uncover the collective ideological stance embedded in imperial legal practices. This approach involves a multidisciplinary analysis aimed at identifying and measuring these omissions, which reveal deviations from an idealized norm.

When considering the consciousness of the subaltern, it's crucial to examine what remains unspoken or unsaid. In social texts, acts of insurgency represent expressions of this unspoken consciousness. However, determining the true recipient of such insurgencies is complex. Historians, who interpret these acts as sources of knowledge, are just one audience. They must resist imposing their own biases and consciousness onto these narratives, preventing them from becoming mere objects of study or models for imitation. The subaltern subject depicted in these texts serves as a contrast to the narrative norms imposed by dominant groups, highlighting the loss experienced by postcolonial intellectuals due to their privilege.

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In deconstructive and feminist criticism, the concept of the feminine has been similarly employed, often portraying women as inherently silent or indeterminate within patriarchal traditions. However, subaltern historiography faces methodological challenges that prevent it from adopting such approaches. Unlike the figure of woman, where the relationship with silence can be explored by women themselves, subaltern historiography must confront the complexities of race, class, and gender within the context of imperialism.

 

In the obscured history of the subaltern subject, the role of sexual difference is further marginalized. The issue isn't merely about female participation in insurgency or the division of labor based on gender, both of which are evident. Rather, the construction of gender within colonialist historiography perpetuates male dominance. If the subaltern has no voice or history within the context of colonial production, the subaltern as female is even more marginalized and silenced.

 

The contemporary global division of labor represents a displacement of the field of territorial imperialism from the nineteenth century. In essence, one group, mainly from first-world countries, holds the position of investing capital, while another group, primarily from third-world countries, provides the labor force for these investments. This arrangement is aimed at sustaining the circulation and growth of industrial capital, and it involves the development of transportation, legal systems, and standardized education. However, it also results in the destruction of local industries, rearrangement of land distribution, and the transfer of raw materials to the colonizing countries.

 

Unlike in the past, the process of "development" today does not involve extensive legislation or the establishment of educational systems to the same degree. Instead, multinational capital growth and reduced administrative burdens characterize the current landscape. This hinders the growth of consumerism in the countries providing the labor force. The maintenance of the international division of labor ensures a steady supply of cheap labor in these countries.

 

The cost of labor is not inherently low or high. Factors such as weak labor laws, oppressive states often associated with development, and minimal worker requirements contribute to keeping labor costs low. To preserve this situation, urban workers in countries providing cheap labor must not be indoctrinated with consumerist ideology, which could lead to resistance against the system.

 

International subcontracting has further exacerbated the separation from consumerist ideology. This strategy involves developed country manufacturers outsourcing labor-intensive stages of production to third-world nations where labor is inexpensive. The finished goods are then re-imported to the developed country, bypassing the local market.

 

As a result, class mobility is stagnant in countries providing cheap labor. Some members of the local bourgeoisie may align themselves with forms of resistance seen in advanced capitalist countries, which reflects a trend observed in bourgeois historiography described by Ranajit Guha.

 

Belief in the feasibility of global alliance politics is common among women from dominant social groups interested in "international feminism" in the countries providing cheap labor. On the other hand, urban subproletariat women, who are the most distant from any potential alliances due to their socioeconomic status, face compounded challenges of denied consumerism and patriarchal oppression.

 

Outside the realm of the international division of labor, there are groups whose consciousness we cannot fully understand if we limit our perspective to our own place in society. These include subsistence farmers, unorganized peasant laborers, tribals, and communities with no formal employment. Engaging with these groups requires us to learn about ourselves rather than merely representing them.

 

Deleuze and Foucault overlook the epistemic violence of imperialism and the realities of the international division of labor in their discussions, which is problematic when they touch on third-world issues. Deleuze's focus on the old indigenous elite in former French colonies lacks depth and overlooks the broader context of global capitalism. This limited perspective perpetuates a benevolent appropriation of third-world struggles by first-world intellectuals, which is a common issue in contemporary human sciences discourse in the US.

Foucault critiques the idea of geographical discontinuity by invoking geopolitical divisions, particularly through the lens of the international division of labor. He distinguishes between exploitation, which involves the extraction and appropriation of resources (analyzed within a Marxist framework), and domination, which pertains to studies of power. Foucault suggests that domination offers greater potential for resistance through alliance politics. However, he overlooks the interconnectedness between exploitation and domination, particularly in the context of imperialism.

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Foucault argues that when one struggles against exploitation, alignment with the proletariat entails adopting its ideology and methods, leading to total immersion in the Marxist project. Conversely, resisting power allows individuals to engage in localized struggles based on their own circumstances and understanding, potentially complementing broader Marxist struggles. While this localized resistance is commendable, universalizing it risks privileging certain subjects and fostering a dangerous utopianism without a theory of ideology.

 

Despite Foucault's brilliance in analyzing power dynamics, he fails to fully consider the territorial reinscription of imperialism, thereby reinforcing Western biases. His omission of imperialism's role in securing power through the extraction of surplus value elsewhere highlights his oversight. Foucault's focus on the emergence of new mechanisms of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries neglects the crucial role of territorial imperialism in this process. These oversights contribute to the consolidation of Western-centric perspectives.

 

 

 

 

Due to a blind spot concerning the initial wave of 'geographical discontinuity,' Foucault overlooks its resurgence in the mid-twentieth century, attributing it solely to the collapse of Fascism and the decline of Stalinism. However, an alternative perspective, such as Mike Davis's, suggests that it was the global logic of counter-revolutionary violence that set the stage for the peaceful economic interdependence of Atlantic imperialism, particularly under American leadership.

 

This shift towards economic interdependence was facilitated by multinational military integration aimed at collective security against the USSR. This paved the way for the flourishing of commercial liberalism between 1958 and 1973. Within this context, the fixation on national scenes, resistance to economics, and emphasis on concepts like power and desire, which favor micro-level analysis, can be understood.

 

Davis further argues that the quasi-absolutist centralization of strategic military power by the United States allowed for flexible subordination of its principal allies, such as France and Britain, who maintained anti-communist rhetoric despite their diminished imperial status.

 

While cautioning against overly unitary notions like 'France,' it is essential to recognize similar tendencies within Foucault's concepts such as 'the workers' struggle' or 'resistance.' Such tendencies can be illuminated by Davis's narrative, which underscores the role of imperialism in shaping global power dynamics.

 

It appears that Foucault's insightful analysis of European imperialism paradoxically mirrors the phenomenon it seeks to critique, albeit on a smaller scale. His focus on spaces like clinics, asylums, prisons, and universities may obscure the broader narratives of imperialism, akin to screen-allegories that divert attention from larger historical forces.

 

In a similar vein, one could critique Deleuze and Guattari's motif of 'deterritorialization' for potentially overlooking imperialist dynamics. Foucault's acknowledgment of sanctioned ignorance, while understandable, underscores the challenge critics of imperialism face in navigating complex historical narratives.

 

III10

In the realm of US academic discourse, there exists a prevailing notion regarding the respective works of Foucault and Derrida: Foucault is seen as engaging with concrete historical events, politics, and social issues, whereas Derrida is often perceived as inaccessible, esoteric, and overly concerned with textual analysis. This sentiment is echoed by scholars like Terry Eagleton and Perry Anderson, who criticize Derrida for lacking historical engagement and political relevance.

 

Eagleton, for instance, praises Foucault's examination of discursive practices while disparaging Derrida for his supposed detachment from social realities. Anderson similarly contends that Derrida's work represents the culmination of a trend in French thought towards self-cancellation, devoid of commitment to exploring social realities.

 

This paper contends that while critiquing imperialism, a nostalgia for lost origins can hinder the exploration of social realities. Despite Anderson's insightful analysis, he overlooks the encroachment of the unacknowledged Subject of the West in Foucault's later works, attributing Foucault's stance to the disappearance of the knowing Subject rather than recognizing its disavowed presence. Furthermore, Said's characterization of Derrida's and Foucault's approaches as moving 'into the text' and 'in and out,' respectively, reflects a misapprehension of textuality.

 

It is argued that Foucault's appeal, often rooted in his concern for the politics of the oppressed, can inadvertently privilege the intellectual and concrete subject of oppression, thereby exacerbating existing power dynamics. Conversely, while Derrida's work may be challenging, his interrogation of classical philosophy retains long-term relevance, especially for those outside the First World. Derrida's focus on deconstruction serves as a means to prevent the ethnocentric Subject from imposing selective definitions on the Other, offering a program not for the Subject itself but for the benevolent Western intellectual.

 

An illustrative example is Derrida's chapter 'Of Grammatology as a Positive Science,' wherein he grapples with the potential of deconstruction to inform critical or political practice. Here, Derrida emphasizes the need to resist the imposition of ethnocentric perspectives and advocates for a more inclusive and nuanced understanding of cultural difference.

 

For those of us concerned with understanding the historical development of the 'subject' and critiquing the Eurocentric tendency to assimilate knowledge from the Third World, Derrida's recognition of specificity is crucial. Derrida acknowledges that he cannot address the foundational questions necessary to establish his argument, rejecting the idea that grammatology can transcend mere empiricism. Instead, he aligns 'grammatological' knowledge with the limitations of empirical investigation.

 

To illustrate these limitations, Derrida examines three prevalent biases in European views of writing during the seventeenth century, which reflect a crisis in European consciousness. These biases include the 'theological prejudice,' which posits that God wrote in a primitive script like Hebrew or Greek, and the 'Chinese prejudice,' which considers Chinese writing a perfect model for philosophical writing but seeks to supersede it with a more accessible script. Additionally, there's the 'hieroglyphist prejudice,' which views Egyptian script as too sublime to decipher.

 

These biases, rather than stemming from ethnocentric scorn, demonstrate a form of interested blindness, characterized by hyperbolic admiration. Derrida argues that even when ethnocentrism appears to be reversed, efforts are made to consolidate an internal perspective and derive domestic benefits. This pattern persists in contemporary times, suggesting that Eurocentric biases continue to shape perceptions despite ostensible attempts to overcome them.

Derrida acknowledges that he cannot address the foundational questions necessary to establish his argument, rejecting the idea that grammatology can transcend mere empiricism. Instead, he aligns 'grammatological' knowledge with the limitations of empirical investigation.

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Derrida explores the complexities of the European Subject's attempts to construct an identity by defining an Other. He discusses the interplay between writing, societal structures, and desires for power and capital accumulation. Derrida acknowledges his own struggle to preserve something ineffable and non-transcendental while critiquing the colonial subject's production. He emphasizes the need to critique the Eurocentric tendencies in constituting the Other and highlights the limitations of logocentrism and grammatology in this regard.

 

Derrida draws on Nietzschean, philosophical, and psychoanalytic ideas to critique European ethnocentrism but avoids prescribing specific political paths. He identifies the European tendency to marginalize the Other and sees this as a fundamental issue in both logocentric and grammatological endeavors. Postcolonial critics find value in acknowledging the blankness within texts, which represents the inaccessible aspects of thought and history, challenging imperialism's assimilative tendencies.

 

Derrida's emphasis is not on letting the Other speak but on appealing to a "quite-other" perspective, disrupting the self-consolidating tendencies of European identity construction. He suggests delving into the interior voice of the Other within oneself rather than simply assimilating or silencing it.

 

Derrida identifies the ethnocentrism present in European writing science during the late 17th and early 18th centuries as a reflection of a broader crisis in European consciousness. This ethnocentrism is seen as part of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, particularly through the emergence of capitalist imperialism. While Derrida's focus on psychoanalysis and the portrayal of women is significant within deconstruction, he doesn't delve deeply into the imperialist construction of the colonial subject. Despite this gap, his analysis of the mechanisms behind the formation of the Other remains valuable for analysis and intervention.

 

Rather than emphasizing the authenticity of the Other, Derrida's work allows for a deeper understanding of how the Other is constructed. Foucault's insights into discipline and institutionalization further contribute to this understanding, although he doesn't explicitly tie these concepts to imperialism. These analyses are particularly relevant for intellectuals concerned with Western decline. However, there's a risk that these frameworks may inadvertently allow investigating subjects (whether male or female professionals) to hide their complicity behind a façade of transparency.

 

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The question "Can the subaltern speak?" refers to whether marginalized and oppressed groups, particularly women of color, have a voice in society. It also raises concerns about how the elite can recognize and address the ongoing construction of subaltern identities.

 

In discussing the complexity of the subaltern woman's experience, it's important to consider how factors like race, class, and gender intersect. In contexts outside the first-world, racial distinctions may not carry the same weight due to the stratification caused by colonialism and capitalism. Despite efforts by both liberal and radical movements, addressing class consciousness rather than race consciousness is often discouraged.

 

When considering the consciousness of subaltern women, it's crucial to avoid idealist notions and recognize the political implications of assuming or constructing their consciousness. While it's important to engage in feminist and anti-sexist work, there's a risk of perpetuating epistemic violence by imposing outsider perspectives.

 

Postcolonial intellectuals must unlearn the privilege associated with their own identities and engage in critical analysis using appropriate tools. Rather than simply replacing the figure of the colonizer with the colonized, they should challenge the silencing of subaltern women within anti-imperialist discourse. This process involves questioning assumptions and collaborating with marginalized voices rather than speaking for them.

 

 

In exploring the feminist project, it's important to consider how bourgeois-democratic revolutions have influenced women's social and political individualism. Many of us, especially in academia, have encountered the feminist project as described by Culler, emphasizing theoretical engagement. However, while making US feminism more theoretical is valuable, it doesn't fully address the silencing of subaltern women.

 

Calls for more theory often critique positivism, equating it with essentialism. However, figures like Hegel and Marx grappled with the idea of essences within their dialectical frameworks. Thus, the stark opposition between positivism/essentialism and theory may oversimplify the debate. It fails to acknowledge the nuanced relationship between essentialism and critiques of positivism and implies that positivism isn't a form of theory. This overlooks the biases of the investigator and doesn't consider methodological changes when discussing marginalized groups like subaltern women.

In my approach, I sympathize with aligning feminism with the critique of positivism and the de-emphasis of concrete objects. I am also open to learning from Western theorists but emphasize acknowledging their perspectives as they investigate subjects. As a literary critic, I strategically addressed the significant issue of women's consciousness as marginalized. I condensed the problem into a simple semiotic object. This parallels how Freud used women as scapegoats due to his desire to give hysterical women a voice. The ideological framework behind this desire also constructs the stereotype of the 'third-world woman'. As a postcolonial intellectual, I am influenced by this framework. Part of my work involves unpacking this ideological framework to understand its impact, even if it means examining silences. When faced with questions about whether the subaltern can speak, our efforts to empower them in history must be cautious of reproducing oppressive dynamics, akin to Freud's discourse. This leads me to formulate the sentence 'White men are saving brown women from brown men' as a problem to be analyzed, not a definitive conclusion. I do not equate Freud's individual-level analysis with societal behaviors, as some do with Deleuze and Foucault's conversation. I acknowledge the political implications of my emphasis on imperialist subject-production, revealing my own political stance. Additionally, I draw inspiration from Freud's methodological approach in analyzing sentences but do not imply a direct transfer of psychoanalytic techniques to literary criticism. The analogy between transference and literary criticism is metaphorical, not literal.

 

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I find Freud's approach intriguing, particularly how he traces repression through history to shape the final outcome of a sentence. Similarly, I propose applying this strategy to Marxist narratives to understand the ideological concealment of imperialist political economy, leading to sentences like the one I've constructed. This history has two roots: one in the British abolition of widow sacrifice in 1829, and the other in ancient Hindu texts like the Rg-Veda and Dharmasastra. This sentence is part of a series describing the dynamics between brown and white men, which can be seen as expressions of exaggerated admiration or remorse, as discussed by Derrida. The relationship between imperialist subjects and those subjected to imperialism is complex and ambiguous.

 

In the case of Hindu widow sacrifice, where widows would self-immolate on their husband's pyre, the British abolition of this practice has often been interpreted as "White men saving brown women from brown men." However, this narrative overlooks alternative perspectives, such as the claim that the women willingly chose this fate. These two sentences reinforce each other, but they lack the direct testimony of the women involved. Examining historical records, one finds a lack of voices from the women themselves, leaving room for interpretation and the need to piece together their experiences. Faced with these conflicting narratives, postcolonial women intellectuals question the underlying meanings and begin reconstructing a historical account.

 

 

To signify the birth of a just society amid societal chaos, we often highlight specific events that, while breaking the letter of the law, embody its underlying principles. The protection of women by men is one such event. An example is the legislation of Hindu Law in colonial India without the consent of Hindu individuals. This legislation aimed to address issues like sati (widow burning), which was later revived in independent India. The recurrence of such practices challenges the notion of a progressive society.

 

The safeguarding of women, particularly those in developing nations, becomes a symbol of establishing a just society, often requiring actions that surpass mere legal compliance. In some cases, these actions involve redefining traditional practices as crimes. For instance, the criminalization of sati in India marked a shift from private ritual to public concern.

 

Foucault's analysis of Western Europe's historical development is relevant here. He discusses how societal norms differentiate between ritual and crime, with the latter regulated by legal science. The transition of sati from private to public sphere correlates with changes in British colonial administration and the emergence of colonial subjects navigating shifting social norms.

 

The historical context of my sentence is intertwined with broader narratives of capitalist expansion and labor commodification. However, it risks being overshadowed by dominant discourses. Despite the abolition of sati being commendable, we must still question if understanding the origins of such sentences can lead to meaningful interventions in societal norms.

 

Imperialism often portrays itself as the protector of women from their own communities. But how do we examine the patriarchal strategy that seemingly offers women freedom of choice? This transition from discussing imperialism to Hinduism reveals that imperialism isn't just about racial prejudice—it's more complex.

 

To explore this, I'll briefly discuss the Dharmashastra (sustaining scriptures) and the Rig-Veda (ancient texts). These texts serve as the archaic basis in my comparison to Freud's concepts. My analysis, as a postcolonial woman, isn't exhaustive but aims to uncover how repression is constructed, shaping women's consciousness and desires.

 

Two aspects of the Dharmashastra interest me: the discussion on sanctioned suicides and funeral rites. These discussions create space for certain forms of suicide, like self-immolation by widows, which appear exceptions to the general rule against suicide. One category involves individuals with profound knowledge of truth, who understand the insubstantiality of their identities. Their act isn't considered self-killing but rather a dissolution of their identity. However, the rationale for godly self-sacrifice differs, being justified by ecological and cosmic needs rather than self-awareness.

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This philosophical framework doesn't fully account for self-immolating women. Instead, the text sanctions specific circumstances for their suicides, such as performing it at pilgrimage sites. Yet even this isn't sufficient for women to nullify the concept of suicide by destroying their identities. Only widows are allowed to self-immolate on their husband's pyre, reflecting gendered power dynamics within the ritual.

This form of suicide, which is not considered suicide, can be seen as both a representation of profound understanding and piety toward sacred places. In one interpretation, the widow's act dramatizes her realization of her own impermanence, with her deceased husband symbolizing the extinguished self. In another interpretation, the burning pyre becomes a symbolic representation of all sacred sites, where the widow's legal displacement from herself is symbolically consumed.

 

This complex ideology surrounding the displaced position of the female subject leads to a paradox of free choice. While male suicides are noted for their felicity, which ultimately negates their status as suicides, sanctioned self-immolation by widows is praised as an act of choice. This exceptional rule, which became widespread in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Bengal, was influenced by factors like population control and communal misogyny.

 

In Bengal, where widows had inheritance rights unlike other parts of India, the prevalence of widow immolation was often tied to family property disputes. Despite criticism of the practice, some saw it as a demonstration of women's courage and adherence to traditional values. This illustrates what Lyotard calls a "differend," where one discourse cannot fully translate into another, leading to conflicting interpretations of female agency.

 

As British perceptions of heathen rituals merge with ideas of criminality, different interpretations of female autonomy emerge. The discourse shifts from admiring courage to condemning crime, highlighting the complexities of cultural and ideological clashes.

 

The practice of widow self-immolation, known as sati, wasn't always a strict ritual requirement. However, if a widow chose to exceed the ritual's boundaries and refrain from self-immolation, it was considered a transgression for which a specific form of penance was prescribed. Interestingly, when a widow decided not to go through with the immolation, under the supervision of local British police officers, it was seen as a true expression of free choice.

 

The indigenous colonial elite had an ambiguous stance regarding sati. On one hand, there was a nationalistic romanticization of these self-sacrificing women for their perceived purity, strength, and love. This sentiment was echoed in works like Rabindranath Tagore's praise of Bengal's "self-renouncing paternal grandmothers" and Ananda Coomaraswamy's eulogy of sati as a demonstration of the unity of body and soul.

 

It's essential to clarify that I'm not advocating for the killing of widows. Instead, I'm highlighting the contested notions of freedom that shape the construction of female subjectivity. In the case of widow self-immolation, the act was reframed from being a ritual to being a crime. This reframing was significant because sati was ideologically perceived as a "reward," much like imperialism was seen as a "social mission."

Historically, during the mid to late eighteenth century, the British in India collaborated with learned Brahmans to determine the legality of sati according to their interpretation of Hindu law. However, this collaboration was often inconsistent, as seen in debates over the significance of dissuasion and conflicting interpretations of scripture. Despite the efforts to collaborate, when the British authorities eventually codified the law, they portrayed sati as a barbaric practice, contrary to the noble Hindu tradition, in order to justify its abolition.

 

The alternative ideology of sanctioning suicide in certain cases, rather than labeling it as a sin, was not widely understood.

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Perhaps the practice of sati, where a widow immolates herself on her husband's funeral pyre, could have been interpreted as akin to martyrdom or wartime sacrifice, with the husband symbolizing something transcendent like the state or sovereign. However, in reality, sati was categorized alongside acts like murder, infanticide, and elder abuse. This obscured the agency of women in making such choices.

During the Puranic era from around 400 AD, Brahmins debated the doctrinal legitimacy of sati and other sanctioned suicides at sacred sites. The practice's caste origins were sometimes questioned, but the general expectation for widows to observe celibacy (brahmacarya) was rarely challenged. Brahmacarya, which precedes marriage in Hindu social practice, is a stage of life where one abstains from sexual activity. However, while men could progress to renunciation (samnyasa) after their householder stage, women, according to Brahmanical norms, were excluded from this final stage of celibacy and asceticism. Widows were expected to revert to a static state, which led to institutional injustices and contributed to the asymmetrical construction of gender roles.

 

This asymmetry, which defines women primarily as the objects of their husbands, serves the interests of maintaining male dominance. Thus, the act of widow self-immolation (sati) was seen as an extreme manifestation of this general law rather than an exceptional circumstance. Heavenly rewards were even promised for sati, emphasizing the widow's devotion to her husband and her superiority over other women in terms of unique possession. This entrenched the idea of women as objects and reinforced gender inequality.

 

The profound irony lies in how the act of self-immolation, particularly in the context of widowhood (sati), is presented as a choice of free will, yet it ultimately reinforces the notion of women as inherently subordinate. The verse suggests that a woman's liberation from the cycle of rebirths is contingent upon her burning herself on her husband's funeral pyre. This apparent exercise of agency is paradoxically tied to surrendering individual will to a broader societal expectation.

 

Moreover, the language used in these contexts reinforces gendered stereotypes. The act of self-immolation is described using terms associated with spiritual enlightenment (atman) and salvation (muc), while the word for the physical body (strisarira) is used to denote what is sacrificed. This ideological narrative is further perpetuated by historical accounts that depict such acts of self-sacrifice as heroic, particularly in the face of conquest and sexual violence by invading forces.

 

Even though widow self-immolation (sati) may not be strictly equivalent to jauhar, a mass self-immolation practiced by Rajput women to avoid capture and dishonor by enemy forces, both serve to justify the possession of women's bodies by men. The glorification of such acts, passed down through generations, reinforces patriarchal norms and contributes to communal tensions.

 

In legal interpretations, widows were often seen as temporary holders of property, particularly when it came to enforcing self-immolation practices. This was supported by selective readings of ancient texts, such as a passage from the Rig-Veda that was misinterpreted to justify widow self-immolation. These interpretations, based on disputed readings and historical errors, further obscure the agency of women and contribute to the subordination of the female subject.

 

In examining the historical context surrounding widow self-immolation (sati), we encounter various interpretations and linguistic nuances that shed light on the societal perceptions and gender dynamics at play. Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, alongside P.V. Kane's work on Dharmasastra, provides insights into the legal and practical aspects of Hindu customs. However, these sources sometimes present conflicting views, contributing to what Freud termed "kettle logic," where contradictory arguments are used to justify a position.

 

 

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One particular verse from the Rig-Veda, often cited in discussions about widow self-immolation, highlights the complexity of interpretation. The word "yoni," which typically means "dwelling place," carries connotations of the genitalia, adding layers of meaning to the text. Raghunandana's modification of the verse further blurs the boundaries between sexual and religious symbolism, reinforcing the authority of the act of self-immolation.

 

The term "sati," derived from the word "sat," which conveys notions of truth, goodness, and righteousness, originally transcended gender-specific concepts and signified nobility. However, its feminine form came to represent the ideal of being a "good wife," particularly through the practice of widow self-immolation.

 

It's important to note that the term "sati" itself is a result of a linguistic error made by the British, similar to how "American Indian" reflects Columbus' misconception. The actual term in Indian languages refers to "the burning of the sati" or the virtuous wife, emphasizing the societal pressures and gender norms imposed on women.

 

Edward Thompson's book on suttee exemplifies the colonial perspective that portrayed the British as civilizers saving Indian women from oppressive customs. Thompson's translation of "sati" as "faithful" illustrates the imposition of Western values onto Hindu practices, further entrenching colonial attitudes. Through examples like General Charles Hervey's observations, colonial writers appropriated Hindu women's experiences to fit their own narratives of rescue and enlightenment.

Analyzing the misspelled names of satis, or women who practiced self-immolation, from various social groups in Bengal, where this practice was prevalent, reveals the dangers of misinterpreting proper names as sociological evidence. Attempting to reconstruct these names can lead to arrogance and stereotyping, as seen in Edward Thompson's condescending attitude towards Bengalis. Translating proper names into common nouns and using them as evidence can be misleading and lacks sociological accuracy.

 

This practice of mistranslation and misrepresentation has historical roots in colonial attitudes, exemplified by writers like Edward FitzGerald, who constructed Orientalist narratives through translations. Such practices perpetuate stereotypes and distort the realities of diverse cultures.

 

In discussing widow self-immolation, it's essential to recognize the complex interplay between patriarchy, imperialism, and the construction of gender roles. The figure of the woman becomes obscured amidst power dynamics, caught between tradition and modernization in a violent displacement.

 

These considerations challenge traditional understandings of repression and silence, particularly in the context of imperialism. The case of suttee demonstrates a violent aporia, or contradiction, between the subject and object status of women in colonial societies, highlighting the need for a nuanced understanding beyond simplistic dichotomies.

 

The name "Sati" is commonly used as a woman's proper name in India today. However, the irony of naming a female infant "a good wife" is apparent, especially considering that the primary meaning of the common noun "sati" is not the main consideration in the naming process. Instead, the name often refers back to the Sati of Hindu mythology, particularly Durga in her aspect as a devoted wife.

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In the mythological story, Sati arrives at her father's court uninvited, where her divine husband Siva is also absent. Her father insults Siva, causing Sati great distress and leading to her tragic death. Siva reacts with anger and carries Sati's corpse, causing Vishnu to dismember her body, which becomes the origin of sacred pilgrimage sites.

 

It's important to note that myths like these, including figures like the goddess Athena, contribute to the ideological self-debasement of women within certain cultural contexts. The myth of Sati, which reverses the typical narrative of the widow's self-immolation, reinforces patriarchal structures by depicting a transaction between male gods that results in the destruction of the female body and the sanctification of the earth.

 

However, interpreting such myths as proof of feminism in classical Hinduism or Indian culture as goddess-centered can be ideologically biased. Likewise, dismissing the significance of the name "Sati" beyond its association with widow self-immolation overlooks its deeper mythological and cultural roots.

 

Moving beyond myths and ideology, an example from history sheds light on the complexities of gender and resistance. Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, a young woman in Calcutta in 1926, committed suicide under mysterious circumstances. It was later discovered that she was involved in the armed struggle for Indian independence and had been entrusted with a political assassination. Unable to carry out the task, she took her own life, highlighting the complexities and pressures faced by women involved in resistance movements.

Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri's decision to end her life was a deliberate act aimed at challenging societal norms surrounding female suicide. She strategically waited for menstruation to begin, knowing that her death would then be attributed to illegitimate passion. By doing so, she aimed to disrupt the narrative of widow self-immolation by displacing the typical motive of passionate love for a single man. This act, though seen as absurd in its immediate context, can be interpreted as a subtle form of resistance, akin to a subaltern rewriting of the traditional narrative of sati-suicide.

 

Bhuvaneswari's suicide represents a nuanced intervention into the dominant discourse, contrasting with the popular imagery of the fierce goddess Durga. While the dissenting perspectives of male leaders in the independence movement are well-documented, the voices of subaltern women like Bhuvaneswari often go unheard or unacknowledged.

 

My knowledge of Bhuvaneswari's life and death comes from family connections. Despite initial resistance from some relatives, who questioned the significance of her story compared to her sisters' more conventional lives, further investigation revealed the complexities underlying her actions, including the possibility of illicit love.

 

In analyzing Bhuvaneswari's story, Spivak draws upon Jacques Derrida's approach to deconstruction, which emphasizes the need to challenge and rewrite dominant narratives. Unlike Foucault and Deleuze, whose focus on political issues may overshadow more subtle forms of resistance, Derrida's methodology offers a more nuanced understanding of power dynamics and the role of language in shaping social norms.

 

Ultimately, the experiences of subaltern women like Bhuvaneswari highlight the limitations of simplistic representations of feminism and the importance of recognizing the diverse ways in which women navigate and resist patriarchal structures.

 

The subaltern, or marginalized individuals, often struggle to have their voices heard. Simply listing women as a token gesture in global discussions does not address the complexities of their experiences. While representation is still important, it's not enough to simply include women without considering the depth of their perspectives.

 

Female intellectuals have a specific responsibility to engage with issues authentically and critically. They must avoid superficial gestures and instead delve into the nuances of gender dynamics. It's crucial for them to embrace their role with humility and integrity, rather than simply paying lip service to gender equality.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Viktor Shklovsky's "Art as Technique" (Summary)

 

 

"Art involves the process of thinking through visual representations. Poetry, in particular, embodies this form of thought by employing imagery, which allows for a more efficient mental process and a sense of ease in comprehension. The notion that art relies fundamentally on imagery has led to various interpretations of artistic works, extending even to music, architecture, and lyric poetry. Many still hold the belief that poetry primarily involves thinking in images. However, contrary to this expectation, the imagery in poetry remains relatively consistent across time, culture, and individual poets. It seems that these images are not unique to any one poet but rather belong universally. Understanding a particular era reveals that the images employed by a poet are often borrowed from others rather than being original creations. Poetic works are distinguished based on the innovative techniques poets employ and how they manipulate language rather than the uniqueness of their imagery. Poets are more concerned with organizing existing images than generating new ones. Thus, the ability to recall and arrange imagery is paramount for poets, overshadowing the importance of creative invention."

Imagistic thought doesn't encompass all aspects of art, including verbal art like poetry. Changes in imagery aren't crucial for poetry's development. Sometimes, something might be seen as poetic even if it wasn't intended to be. This shows that our perception plays a significant role in attributing artistry to a work.

 

In a narrow sense, "works of art" refer to pieces created with techniques aimed at being clearly artistic. Imagery serves two purposes: as a practical way of thinking, categorizing objects, and as a poetic tool to enhance impressions.

 

For instance, if I want to get a child's attention when they're making a mess with butter, I might say, "Hey, butterfingers!" This is a prosaic figure of speech. But if the child drops my glasses while playing, and I say the same thing, it becomes a poetic figure of speech. Poetic imagery intensifies impressions but isn't more effective than other poetic techniques like parallelism, comparison, or repetition.

 

Unlike the standard imagery found in stories or songs, poetic imagery is just one element of poetic language. In contrast, prose imagery is about abstract ideas.

 

Ideas about conserving energy and the laws of creativity are often applied to practical language but are also extended to poetic language. However, this extension doesn't properly differentiate between the rules governing practical and poetic language.

 

To understand the laws of expenditure and economy in poetic language, we need to focus on the specific rules of poetic language rather than drawing parallels with prose. When we examine general laws of perception, we notice that habitual actions become automatic over time. This habituation explains why we often leave phrases unfinished or words partially expressed in everyday speech.

 

In rapid speech, complete words are often reduced to initial sounds, almost like symbols. This method of thought, akin to algebra, allows us to perceive objects as shapes with vague outlines rather than in their entirety. This mode of perception is efficient but leads to a loss of detail and essence over time.

 

This process of "algebrization" or over-automatization of objects minimizes the effort required for perception. Objects are simplified to their most essential features or even function according to predetermined formulas, diminishing their presence in cognition.

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Habitualization, or the unconscious repetition of actions, consumes various aspects of life, including work, relationships, and even the fear of war. Art, on the other hand, serves to reawaken our sensation of life by presenting things as they are perceived rather than as they are known.

 

Art achieves this by making objects unfamiliar and forms challenging, thereby prolonging the process of perception. Art is a means of experiencing the artfulness of an object, with the object itself being less important. The purpose of art lies in enriching our perception and prolonging the aesthetic experience.

 

Once we become accustomed to seeing an object repeatedly, we tend to overlook it, failing to perceive it with fresh insight. Art disrupts this automatism by making familiar things appear unfamiliar. One method of achieving this, exemplified by Leo Tolstoy, involves describing familiar objects or events as if encountering them for the first time.

 

Tolstoy achieves this sense of unfamiliarity by avoiding conventional names for parts of objects and instead using terms associated with other objects. For instance, in his story "Shame," he describes the act of flogging without directly naming it, prompting the reader to see it in a new light. By questioning the conventional methods of causing pain, Tolstoy forces readers to confront the brutality of the act.

 

This technique of defamiliarization is recurrent in Tolstoy's work. In "Kholstomer," for instance, the narrator is a horse, providing a perspective that makes familiar concepts, like private property, seem strange. The horse struggles to comprehend human concepts such as ownership, reflecting on the meaning of phrases like "my horse" and "my land."

 

Through these examples, Tolstoy challenges readers to reconsider their perceptions of familiar ideas and objects, encouraging deeper reflection on the nature of human behavior and society.

In the passage, Tolstoy illustrates through his writing how humans and animals perceive ownership differently. He uses the example of a horse reflecting on human notions of ownership, highlighting how people often claim things as their own without truly interacting with them. The horse observes that humans strive for possessions, including people, without necessarily valuing their well-being. The horse concludes that while humans may possess language, animals, like itself, are guided by actions rather than words.

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Even when the horse is killed in the story, Tolstoy maintains his technique of defamiliarization, describing the burial process in a detached manner. This technique, which emphasizes seeing familiar actions with fresh eyes, persists even when its initial purpose is no longer relevant.

 

Tolstoy employs this method not only in narrative descriptions but also in his depiction of battles, drawing rooms, and theaters in "War and Peace." By describing these familiar settings as if they were new and unfamiliar, Tolstoy prompts readers to reconsider their perceptions and engage with the scenes in a different light.

 

Tolstoy's technique of defamiliarization, which involves presenting familiar concepts in an unfamiliar way, is evident throughout his works. In his later writings, Tolstoy challenges religious dogmas and rituals by describing them as strange and unfamiliar, which unsettles those who view them as sacred.

 

This technique is not unique to Tolstoy; it is found in various forms of artistic expression. Defamiliarization aims to create a unique perception of objects or ideas rather than merely conveying their meaning. For instance, phrases like "the pestle and the mortar" or "Old Nick and the infernal regions" serve to defamiliarize familiar concepts, as do constructions in psychological parallelism.

Poetic speech, with its distinctive phonetic and lexical structure, also employs defamiliarization to impede automatic perception and create a new vision of the object. Poetic language often appears foreign or archaic, employing difficult or roughened forms that require slower and more deliberate perception. This deliberate slowing down of perception enhances the poetic effect and allows for a deeper engagement with the text.DD

 

Pushkin, for example, used everyday language in a way that was unexpected and challenging for his contemporaries, who were accustomed to a more elegant style. Pushkin's deliberate use of common language served to prolong attention and create a unique poetic experience.

a notable shift is occurring in Russian literary language. Originally foreign to Russia, literary language has now become integrated with everyday speech, while literature is increasingly incorporating dialects and barbarisms intentionally. This shift is exemplified by authors who purposefully use provincial language.

 

Furthermore, there's a trend led by Maxim Gorky towards adopting a new literary colloquialism, departing from the old literary language. This change reflects a broader shift where ordinary speech and literary language are trading places.

 

Additionally, there's a movement, spearheaded by Khlebnikov, towards creating a new poetic language. In light of these developments, poetry can be defined as refined and intricate speech, contrasting with the simplicity and economy of prose.

 

Despite these changes, some argue for the idea of economy of artistic energy as a defining characteristic of poetic language, particularly in relation to rhythm. However, this notion overlooks the distinction between poetic and prosaic language.

 

Rhythm serves different functions in prose and poetry. In prose or work songs, rhythm helps automatize tasks, making them easier to perform. In contrast, poetic rhythm is intentionally disordered, resisting systematic categorization. Attempts to systematize poetic rhythm ultimately fail, as the disordering cannot be predicted.

Tuesday, 6 February 2024

"Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora" (Book Note)

 

In recent years, diaspora studies have gained prominence in anthropology and sociology, becoming a focal point due to the ongoing processes of migration and globalization. Diasporic populations offer researchers a relatively new field to explore, generating fresh empirical data and providing a lens through which major theoretical issues like nationalism, ethnicity, and identity can be addressed. This trend is evident in the volume under review, which focuses on the diverse 'South Asian' diaspora, spanning locations from Trinidad to the UK and representing a variety of experiences and cultural contexts.

 

The introduction by Peter van der Veer suggests that South Asian diasporas have given rise to distinct 'politics of space' through two key articulations: that of nation and migration, emphasizing spatial boundaries, and that of nation and religion within various South Asian nationalisms, leading to the 'ethnicisation of religion.' For instance, John Kelly's essay on Fiji illustrates how religious identity plays a central role in forming both an indigenous 'Fijian nation' (historically Christian) and an 'Indian nation' (Hindu). The study shows how divisions based on ethnicity, race, or language can transform into fervent religious identities, deployed in political struggles over state or economic control. It also sheds light on the global dissemination of modernized Hindu sects among diasporic populations through organizations like ISKCON and the Sai Baba mission.

 

Similarly, Steven Vertovec compares the ethnicization of religion among Hindus in Trinidad and Britain, examining the institutionalization of Hinduism among Trinidadian Indians and its ties to political mobilization during decolonization. Aisha Khan's contribution focuses on struggles over representation and identity within the divided Muslim community in Trinidad, emphasizing the shift from discourse about cultural origins to one about Islamic authenticity and purity.

 

A distinct perspective is presented by Madhavi Kale's article on the construction of 'Indian culture' in colonial British Caribbean. The essay highlights that state characterizations of Indian indentured labor were not only influential in colonial governance but also contributed to later constructions of the Indian community. This piece emphasizes the importance of situating academic discourses on cultural continuity within their political-historical contexts.

 

As van der Veer suggests, the opposition between nation and migration, involving the crossing of national boundaries, serves an ideological function by anchoring the concept of a nation in physical space. Verne Dusenbery's essay on Sikh nationalism delves into the theme of territoriality, questioning why the construction of a Sikh homeland was necessary for the existence of the Sikh diaspora. Dusenbery explores how individuals identified as diverse 'Punjabis' outside India were transformed into 'Sikhs,' emphasizing religious identity over regional identity. This shift naturalized their connection to a homeland, portraying Sikhs as an 'ethno-territorial community' bound by ties to their supposed homeland, a potent means of identity formation. Interestingly, the interest in Khalistan among diasporic Sikhs was more about positioning themselves within the discourse of multiculturalism in Canada, which recognized only 'national' cultures, rather than an actual desire to return to the homeland.

 

Other essays in the collection explore identity formation within diasporic communities. Slyomovic's essay on the Muslim World Day Parade in New York City focuses on performance and contestation related to public displays of culture. Westwood's essay on South Asian masculinities in Britain illustrates local negotiations between different 'diasporic' groups. Khandelwal's contribution provides demographic and historical information on the formation of the Indian community in Queens, New York. Parminder Bhachu's essay traces the cultural evolution of dowry practices among Punjabi Sikhs in the UK, linking choices of dowry items to shifting class locations and illustrating how consumption styles reflect cultural transformation within a multi-ethnic society.

 

However, some doubts arise. Firstly, the concept of a 'South Asian diaspora' is questioned, considering whether it is a convenient construct that may obscure more than it reveals. The definition of diaspora becomes complex when the nation itself is a nineteenth-century construct, and the term is applied to communities that migrated before the concept of Indian nationality existed. Secondly, the focus on the 'politics of space' prompts doubts about whether these essays reflect a Foucaultian politics of space or people vying for spaces in an increasingly place-less world. The concern is that discussions about space, place, nation, and ethnicity might divert attention from the concrete individuals who shape and compete for these places and identities through their social practices. Nevertheless, the collection of high-quality essays provides valuable material for reflecting on these critical issues.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"On Jameson: From Postmodernism to Globalism" (Book Note)

 

On Jameson: From Postmodernism to Globalism  presents a remarkably consistent collection, featuring noteworthy contributions by various scholars, including Caroline Lesjak on Jameson’s method, Roland Boer on metacommentary, Vitaly Chernetsky on Jameson’s post-Soviet reception, Ian Buchanan and Imre Szeman on the concept of national allegory, Caren Irr on Jameson’s American dialectic, and Philip Wegner on the function of style in Jameson.

 

However, it seems that the editors might have aspired to a more ambitious goal: to make a generational statement not merely about Jameson as a figure but about the conceptual apparatus he meticulously developed throughout his extensive career.

 

The most persuasive approach to achieve this would be to advance the conceptual apparatus, exploring new directions and applying it to fresh material. In other words, the focus should be on writing more "from Jameson" than "on Jameson," thus remaining true to the essence of Jameson's work by extrapolating it beyond the man himself. Yet, the majority of the authors in this volume, except for Robert Seguin's distinctly Jamesonian contribution and a somewhat unsteady piece by Michael Rothberg, choose to orbit around Jameson's figure. While the overall quality of these essays is high, their collective presentation might unintentionally convey a sense of assembling a "defense of Jameson."

 

Notably, some of the finest essays in the collection, such as Ian Buchanan’s "National Allegory Today" and Imre Szeman’s "Who’s Afraid of National Allegory," both previously published elsewhere, explicitly adopt a defensive stance. While these defenses are well-argued and, in some instances, justified, their amalgamation in this volume, alongside other evaluative essays, risks suggesting that Jameson primarily requires defenders—a notion that diverges significantly from the actual case.

 

If the objective is to preserve the brilliant core of Jameson's work, particularly his infamous essay "Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," it might be more productive to build upon its fundamental insights rather than expending considerable energy in defending its every aspect. Contributions like those by Szeman and Buchanan, which are cogent and correct in their arguments, were cause for silent cheers when originally presented as journal articles. However, their overall impact in this collection, alongside several other evaluative essays, inadvertently implies a perceived need for defenders of Jameson, a perspective that may not accurately reflect the broader context.

 

 

While not all essays in the collection unconditionally champion Jameson, the critical ones inevitably become part of a larger pro/con dialogue. Roland Boer contributes one of the more intriguing critical pieces, presenting a compelling and elegant argument. Boer contends that Jameson's method operates in two distinct directions. First, it serves as a "translation mechanism" for navigating various critical discourses, treating each as a language with its own efficiencies but without inherent superiority. Second, within this array of discourses, Marxism is positioned as superior and the ultimate horizon, transcending all others. Boer identifies a contradiction, suggesting that Jameson cannot simultaneously engage in the neoliberal marketplace of ideas and advocate for a paleomarxist master narrative. However, Boer's interpretation overlooks Jameson's metaphorical framing of the critical space as a battleground—a "Homeric battlefield." Here, each discourse seeks to subsume the others, a process akin to negation in dialectics. The assertion of Marxism as an untranscendable horizon is not a logical proposition but an expression of will, where metacommentary serves as a tool or weapon. In this context, metacommentary incorporates the desire embedded in the analysis as part of the object of analysis, echoing Hegelian dynamics.

 

In another critical essay, Evan Watkins argues that Jameson's method doesn't yield a usable framework for others; it marks a brilliant dead end. Disagreeing with Watkins, the response posits that refuting such a claim, particularly damaging for a critic deeply invested in history, requires more than engaging in the realm of ideas. Jameson doesn't need defenders against this assertion; instead, what he requires are intellectual heirs and, using a different metaphor, comrades in arms. Fortunately, Jameson has a network of supporters and fellow thinkers worldwide, including contributors within the volume. However, this might not be readily apparent from the perspectives presented in the book.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dipesh Chakrabarty's "The Climate of History: Four Theses" (Summary

 

The Climate of History: Four Theses

The ongoing global crisis of climate change, also known as global warming, evokes diverse responses from individuals, groups, and governments. These responses range from denial and indifference to active engagement and activism. Alan Weisman's popular book, "The World without Us," proposes a thought experiment to help us grasp the urgency of our present situation. He asks us to imagine a world where human extinction has occurred, prompting us to consider the impact of our existence on the planet.

 

Weisman's experiment illustrates a challenge to our historical sensibility, disrupting the usual connection between past, present, and future. The discipline of history assumes a continuity in human experience across these temporal dimensions. However, the contemporary sense of the present, heightened by concerns about the future, creates a paradox. We need to project ourselves into a future "without us" to comprehend it, leading to a contradiction in our historical understanding.

 

This confusion arises from our current perception of the present, particularly in relation to anxieties about humanity's limits. Weisman's experiment reveals how this sense of the present can be destructive to our overall historical awareness. The essay suggests a need to reconsider our historical practices in light of the challenges posed by climate change.

 

The climate change debate offers valuable insights for those engaged in discussions about history. The growing recognition that environmental risks result from the accumulation of greenhouse gases challenges traditional ideas about human history. Scientific findings on climate change not only question established notions of humanity but also challenge analytical strategies used by historians, especially in response to postcolonial and postimperial contexts.

 

In the concluding part of the essay, the author plans to revisit Weisman's experiment, emphasizing its relevance to contemporary historical discussions. Overall, the scientific insights into climate change force a reevaluation of historical concepts, including those related to the birth of the modern world, and prompt a critical reflection on postcolonial and postimperial historical approaches.

 

In the following discussion, I present insights on the current crisis from a historian's perspective. Before delving into the topic, it's important to acknowledge my connection to the literature on climate change. As a practicing historian deeply interested in the nature of history as a form of knowledge, my understanding of global warming is largely derived from scientific findings shared with the general public.

 

Scientific investigations into global warming trace back to the 1890s, notably with the work of Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius. However, public discussions on global warming gained prominence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the discourse on globalization among social scientists and humanists. Despite this temporal parallel, these discussions developed independently. While globalization quickly captured the attention of humanists and social scientists, global warming did not become a significant public concern until the 2000s.

 

The delayed recognition can be attributed to various factors, including government reluctance influenced by special interests and political concerns. Even as early as 1988, warnings from figures like James Hansen, the director of NASA's Goddard Institute of Space Studies, went unheeded. It wasn't until the 2000s, with increasingly dire predictions and visible signs of the crisis, that global warming gained political and economic attention. Events such as droughts in Australia, frequent cyclones and wildfires, crop failures worldwide, melting glaciers, polar ice cap deterioration, rising sea acidity, and damage to the food chain became impossible to ignore. Concerns also grew about the rapid destruction of other species and the global impact of a human population expected to exceed nine billion by 2050.

 

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In recent years, as the crisis intensified, I realized that my extensive readings in theories of globalization, Marxist capital analysis, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism did not adequately prepare me to comprehend this global situation. Despite their usefulness in studying globalization, these theories fell short in helping me make sense of the planetary challenges humanity faces today.

 

The shift in the mood of globalization analysis is evident when comparing Giovanni Arrighi's earlier work, "The Long Twentieth Century" (1994), with his later "Adam Smith in Beijing" (2007). The former, a meditation on the internal chaos of capitalist economies, concludes with thoughts on capitalism's role in the world's escalating violence. In contrast, the latter emphasizes ecological limits to capitalism, reflecting Arrighi's evolving concern over thirteen years. This evolution prompts the question of how to integrate our understanding of globalization and global warming, considering their interconnected processes.

 

Despite not being a scientist, I make a fundamental assumption about climate change science—I trust that the broad outlines of the science are accurate. I rely on the views expressed in authoritative reports like the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Stern Review, and recent publications by scientists and scholars explaining global warming. Unless there is a significant shift in scientific consensus, I accept the anthropogenic theories of climate change as largely truthful.

 

My position is supported by observations such as those presented by Naomi Oreskes, a historian of science at the University of California, San Diego. She examined 928 papers on global warming published in specialized peer-reviewed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003 and found that none disputed the consensus among scientists regarding human-induced climate change. While there may be disagreements about the extent and direction of change, virtually all professional climate scientists agree on the reality of human-induced climate change, with ongoing debates on the specifics.

 

In my readings, I haven't found any compelling reasons to remain skeptical about global warming. The scientific consensus, particularly regarding the human influence on the current climate crisis, forms the basis of my discussion here.

 

To provide clarity and focus, I present my ideas in the form of four theses. The subsequent three theses stem from the first one. I start with the proposition that explanations attributing climate change to human activities challenge and essentially dissolve the traditional distinction between natural history and human history. This leads to a broader question: How does the climate change crisis impact our understanding of universal human experiences while simultaneously challenging our ability to comprehend it historically?

 

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Thesis 1: Anthropogenic Explanations of Climate Change Spell the Collapse of the Age-old Humanist Distinction between Natural History and Human History

 

Philosophers and historians have often consciously separated human history, or the narrative of human affairs, from natural history. This tendency, as described by R. G. Collingwood, has deep historical roots. One starting point is the Viconian-Hobbesian idea suggesting that humans could have proper knowledge only of civil and political institutions because they create them, while nature remains God's work and fundamentally inscrutable to humanity. This understanding contributed to Marx's famous statement that "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please."

 

Vico's ideas, though not always as distinctly separating natural and human sciences as later readings suggested, influenced the nineteenth and twentieth-century historian's common sense. Collingwood, influenced by Croce, played a significant role in perpetuating this distinction, evident in his impact on E. H. Carr's influential work "What Is History?" Collingwood's arguments developed along Viconian lines, emphasizing that nature lacks an "inside," and events in nature are mere happenings, not the acts of intentional agents. As Collingwood put it, "all history properly so called is the history of human affairs."

 

Collingwood's perspective suggested that historians should focus on actions with human thought behind them, making a distinction between historical and non-historical human actions. Activities determined by basic human instincts were considered non-historical, while those influenced by thought, convention, and morality were deemed historical. Collingwood argued that the historian should be concerned with social customs created by human thought, framing natural instincts in ways approved by convention and morality. This separation led Collingwood to conclude that studying the history of the social construction of the body was relevant, but not the history of the body itself. By delineating the human into the natural and the social or cultural, Collingwood saw no necessity to reconcile the two aspects.

 

In discussing Croce's 1893 essay "History Subsumed under the Concept of Art," Collingwood pointed out that Croce, by rejecting the German idea that history was a science, distanced himself from naturalism. Croce embraced the idea that history was fundamentally different from nature. Drawing on the works of Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré, Croce argued that the concepts of natural sciences are human constructs created for human purposes. According to Croce, when we observe nature, we find reflections of ourselves, and our understanding of the natural world is shaped by our human perspective.

 

Croce's idealism suggested that material objects, like rocks, only exist within human thought. They neither exist nor do not exist independently of human concerns and language. Both Croce and Collingwood integrated human history and nature into purposive human action, considering what exists beyond this human framework as not having meaningful existence.

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In the twentieth century, other sociological or materialist arguments existed alongside the Viconian one, justifying the separation of human and natural history. An example is Stalin's publication in 1938, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism," where he asserted that geographical environment influences societal development but is not the determining factor. Stalin argued that changes in human society occur at a much faster rate than changes in the geographical environment.

This separation of human and natural history persisted, with historians assuming that man's relationship to his environment changed so slowly that it was almost timeless. Even Fernand Braudel, in his rebellion against this stance, acknowledged that the environment was often treated as a passive backdrop to historical narratives. While Braudel introduced a more dynamic role for the environment, the underlying assumption was similar to Stalin's—that the history of man's relationship to the environment progressed at a slow and almost timeless pace.

 

In today's understanding of climate change, climatologists emphasize the idea of tipping points, where the climate and overall environment can rapidly transform, posing a significant threat to human beings. This concept challenges the earlier assumption that the history of human-environment relationships unfolds at a slow and timeless pace.

 

While Braudel began to challenge the binary division of natural and human history, the rise of environmental history in the late twentieth century widened this breach. Environmental historians, to some extent, moved towards creating natural histories of humans. However, a crucial distinction lies in the understanding of human beings in these histories compared to the agency proposed by scientists studying climate change.

 

Environmental history, when not entirely cultural, social, or economic, viewed humans primarily as biological agents. Scholars like Alfred Crosby argued that humans are biological entities before being categorized as members of specific cultures or economic systems. Recent works, such as Daniel Lord Smail's "On Deep History and the Brain," explore connections between evolutionary and neurosciences with human histories. Smail's focus is on the history of human biology, not on recent ideas about humans acquiring geological agency.

 

The current discourse on climate change introduces a novel perspective. Climate scientists challenge the long-standing distinction between natural and human histories by asserting that humans have evolved into geological agents. This means that humans, once considered solely biological agents, now wield a geological force capable of altering fundamental Earth processes.

 

Naomi Oreskes emphasizes that denying global warming is, in essence, denying that humans have become geological agents, influencing the basic physical processes of the Earth. Unlike the perspective of environmental history, which often envisioned humans as prisoners of climate, the current discourse sees humans as the makers of the planet's conditions.

 

Calling humans geological agents implies a significant scaling up of our understanding of humanity. While humans have always been biological agents, the attribution of geological agency comes into play only historically and collectively. This occurs when human population numbers and technologies reach a scale large enough to impact the planet on a geological scale. This transformation into geological agents is a recent development, intensifying since the Industrial Revolution and particularly in the second half of the twentieth century.

 

This shift challenges a fundamental assumption in Western political thought—the idea that humans interact with nature. Instead, the claim now is that humans are forces of nature in a geological sense, marking a departure from traditional Western perspectives on the relationship between human and natural histories.

 

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Thesis 2: The Idea of the Anthropocene, the New Geological Epoch When Humans Exist as a Geological Force, Severely Qualifies Humanist Histories of Modernity/Globalization

 

One of the fundamental questions underlying human histories from 1750 to the present era of globalization is how to reconcile human cultural and historical diversity with human freedom. Gadamer highlighted that diversity itself was considered a symbol of freedom in the historian's imagination of the historical process. Freedom, over this period, has encompassed various meanings, ranging from notions of human and citizens' rights to those of decolonization and self-rule.

 

Examining the works of philosophers like Kant, Hegel, Marx, and the historical events such as the struggle against slavery, revolutions, and civil rights movements, freedom emerges as a central theme in written accounts of human history spanning the past 250 years. However, the meaning of freedom has varied among different thinkers and contexts.

 

What has been notably absent in discussions of freedom since the Enlightenment is an awareness of the geological agency that humans have been acquiring simultaneously with and through processes linked to their pursuit of freedom. Philosophers focused on human escape from injustice, oppression, inequality, or uniformity imposed by other humans or human-made systems, while geological time and the chronology of human histories remained unrelated.

 

The period from 1750 to the present is marked by a significant shift from renewable fuels to the widespread use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and gas. The foundations of modern freedoms are closely tied to the extensive use of fossil fuels, making most of our freedoms energy-intensive.

 

The same historical period, associated with the development of civilization's institutions, also coincides with the Holocene, the geological epoch in which we currently reside. However, the concept of the Anthropocene has been proposed by scientists, suggesting a new geological era where humans act as the primary determinant of the planet's environment. This proposal, introduced by chemist Paul J. Crutzen and marine science specialist Eugene F. Stoermer in 2000, suggests that human impacts on the Earth's atmosphere justify recognizing a distinct epoch named the Anthropocene. Crutzen further explained in 2002 that the Anthropocene could be considered to have started in the late 18th century, coinciding with the Industrial Revolution and the significant increase in carbon dioxide and methane concentrations due to human activities. This period also aligns with James Watt's design of the steam engine in 1784.

 

Certainly, Crutzen stating the Anthropocene's existence doesn't officially designate it as an accepted geological period, as periodization in geology is a complex and debated process. The term Holocene, denoting the post-glacial epoch of the past ten to twelve thousand years, faced similar challenges before its acceptance in 1885 after fifty years of debate.

 

Concerning the Anthropocene, scientists, including the Geological Society of London's Stratigraphy Commission, have accepted Crutzen's definition and dating, suggesting it as a new geological epoch for formal consideration. This acceptance is gradually extending to social scientists.

 

The period from 1750 to the present prompts questions: Is it an era of freedom or the Anthropocene? Does the Anthropocene critique narratives of freedom? Is human geological agency the cost of pursuing freedom? In some ways, yes, as human decisions have inadvertently led to becoming geological agents. However, the relationship between Enlightenment ideals of freedom and the merging of human and geological timelines is complex.

 

While the Anthropocene results from human choices, the way forward requires reason and global, collective efforts for sustainability, according to Crutzen and Stoermer. This underscores the need for Enlightenment values in the Anthropocene era. However, optimism about the role of reason is qualified by the predominant shape freedom takes in societies: politics. Politics, especially in a world marked by mass populations and inequalities, cannot rely on reason alone. Urban population growth, increasing food and energy crises, and uncertain global conditions pose challenges with unclear solutions.

 

 

It's not surprising that the climate change crisis brings about anxieties, particularly about future scenarios that are challenging to envision. Scientists expressing hope in reason guiding us out of the current predicament reflects a tension Bruno Latour discusses in his "Politics of Nature" between the idealized myth of Science and the practical politics within scientific endeavors. Edward O. Wilson, lacking a political perspective, can only express his practical optimism with a mix of hope and anxiety, stating, "Perhaps we will act in time."

 

However, the scientific understanding of global warming inherently generates political imperatives. Tim Flannery's book highlights the ominous possibility of an "Orwellian nightmare" in a section titled "2084: The Carbon Dictatorship." Mark Maslin, in concluding his book, presents a pessimistic view, suggesting that relying solely on global politics may not effectively address global warming. He warns against potentially problematic technofixes and notes the challenge of long-term planning in societies driven by short-term political considerations. Maslin emphasizes the need to prepare for the worst and adapt. These perspectives, along with observations from Mike Davis about an impending "planet of slums," cast a shadow over the concept of human freedom in the Anthropocene era.

 

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Thesis 3: The Geological Hypothesis Regarding the Anthropocene Requires Us to Put Global Histories of Capital in Conversation with the Species History of Humans

 

Analytic frameworks that criticize capitalist globalization haven't become obsolete in the era of climate change. On the contrary, climate change might intensify global inequalities if the interests of the poor are ignored. While critiques of capitalism remain relevant, they aren't enough to comprehend human history considering the climate crisis and the emergence of the Anthropocene. The challenge is to intertwine the geological now of the Anthropocene with human history.

 

Scholars distinguish between recorded history (the last ten thousand years, especially the past four thousand with written records) and deep history, encompassing genetic and cultural changes over hundreds of thousands of years. Understanding the crisis of climate change necessitates recognizing the consequences of global warming in the context of human history as part of the broader history of life on Earth.

 

Terms like "species" used by scholars such as Wilson and Crutzen in discussing human life don't typically appear in standard histories or analyses of globalization. Species thinking is connected to deep history and is crucial for visualizing human well-being in the context of climate change. To address the crisis effectively, it's essential to reconcile different intellectual perspectives, including planetary and global considerations, deep and recorded histories, and species thinking with critiques of capitalism.

 

This perspective challenges the prevailing view in historians' thinking on globalization and world history, which emphasizes multiple modernities and a fragmented humanity. Scientists advocating the Anthropocene argue that humans, as a specific species, have become a geological force. This requires creating a dialogue between these contrasting positions.

 

It's understandable that historians might be concerned about the term "species" sounding biological, as it raises worries about a more deterministic worldview, potential essentialism, and the historical misuse of biology. However, scholars like Smail argue against essentialism, emphasizing that species, according to Darwin, are not fixed entities with inherent essences.

 

Different academic disciplines position their practitioners differently in terms of how they perceive the human being. While medicine or biology might reduce humans to specific understandings, humanist historians may overlook that their historical protagonists—individuals—are also reductions. The crisis of climate change challenges scholars to transcend disciplinary biases, emphasizing the multi-dimensional nature of the crisis.

 

Observing the role of the "species" category among scholars, including economists, reveals its significance in understanding the climate crisis. Economists like Jeffrey Sachs use the idea of species as central to their arguments, acknowledging the role of the Anthropocene. The concept of species plays a pivotal role, analogous to the Marxist notion of the multitude or masses, in envisioning a collective self-recognition and unity among humans. For Edward Wilson, recognizing ourselves as a species becomes crucial for achieving self-understanding and addressing the challenges posed by climate change.

Critics on the Left might raise doubts about using the idea of "species" in the context of climate change, arguing that anthropogenic factors contributing to global warming are tied to the broader story of capitalism's development in the West and its imperial domination globally. The question is, why include all of humanity using terms like species or mankind when the blame for the crisis lies primarily with the rich nations and classes?

 

While some scientists suggest dating the Anthropocene from the time of agriculture, it's crucial to understand that falling into the Anthropocene was neither ancient nor inevitable. The transition from wood to coal and then to petroleum and gas had historical contingency, demonstrated by scholars like Kenneth Pomeranz. Historical accidents and coincidences played a role in the development of capitalist societies, and human population growth since World War II has been substantial.

 

If industrial civilization led us into this crisis, why use the category of species, which belongs to a much longer history? The narrative of capitalism, with its critique, might seem sufficient as a framework for understanding climate change. However, the crisis has exposed conditions for human life that go beyond the logics of capitalist, nationalist, or socialist identities. These conditions connect to the history of life on Earth, interrelations between different life forms, and the potential dangers of mass extinction. Without considering this broader history of life, the crisis of climate change lacks human "meaning" because it is not a crisis for the inorganic planet.

 

In simpler terms, the industrial way of life has led us into a situation where we must recognize certain boundary conditions essential for the existence of institutions central to our idea of modernity. Take the agricultural revolution as an example. It was not just a result of human inventiveness but was made possible by changes in the atmosphere, climate stability, and planet warming. Parameters like the Earth's temperature zone, crucial for human existence, are independent of specific socioeconomic or technological choices. While celebrating rights and freedoms, we cannot afford to destabilize these parametric conditions that have allowed humans to become the dominant species on Earth, even if unintended consequences now make us geological agents disturbing these essential conditions for our own existence.

 

This doesn't negate the historical responsibility of wealthier Western nations in emitting greenhouse gases. Mentioning "species thinking" doesn't oppose the politics of "common but differentiated responsibility" pursued by developing countries like China and India when it comes to reducing emissions. Whether blame is placed retrospectively on the West for past emissions or prospectively on emerging economies like China is tied to the histories of capitalism and modernization. However, the discovery that humans have become a geological agent points to a shared catastrophe affecting all.

 

Crutzen and Stoermer describe this catastrophe caused by human expansion: population growth, depletion of fossil fuels, release of pollutants, and alteration of ecosystems. Understanding this catastrophe requires interdisciplinary conversations and an exploration of both recorded and deep histories, similar to explaining the agricultural revolution through geology, archaeology, and history.

 

While scientists like Wilson and Crutzen may be politically naive, they articulate Enlightenment ideals, emphasizing reason as a guide for collective choices. Although not explicitly anti-capitalist, they acknowledge the need for a wiser use of resources. Their focus on knowledge of humans as a species, interdependent with other species in the history of life, highlights actions detrimental to our existence, regardless of political choices. Global warming cannot be comprehended without considering their propositions.

 

Simultaneously, the story of capital and the contingent history leading to the Anthropocene cannot be dismissed by embracing the idea of species. Combining these perspectives challenges the traditional notion of historical understanding. Addressing the crisis of climate change necessitates thinking across both capital and species history, bridging the seemingly incompatible chronologies. This amalgamation, however, fundamentally stretches the conventional concept of historical understanding.

 

Thesis 4: The Cross-Hatching of Species History and the History of Capital Is a Process of Probing the Limits of Historical Understanding

 

Understanding history, as per the Diltheyan tradition, involves critical thinking that draws on generic ideas about human experience. Dilthey viewed the individual's private experience as the starting point for a broader understanding, filling it with the richness of historical experiences through a living transposition. Historical consciousness, in this view, is a form of self-knowledge gained through critical reflections on personal and others' historical experiences.

 

Humanist histories of capitalism rely on the assumption that there is something called the experience of capitalism. For example, E. P. Thompson's exploration of working-class experience of capitalist labor presupposes this assumption. Humanist histories create meaning by appealing to our ability not just to reconstruct but, as Collingwood suggested, to reenact past experiences in our minds.

 

However, when Wilson suggests achieving self-understanding as a species for our collective future, it doesn't align with the historical understanding that connects past and future experiences through the assumption of continuity in human experience. The statement raises questions about who the "we" is, as humans never directly experience themselves as a species. While we can intellectually comprehend the concept of the human species, we don't have a phenomenology of being a species. The discussion about the climate change crisis can elicit emotions and knowledge about collective human pasts and futures, but it operates at the limits of historical understanding. Specific effects of the crisis are experienced, but not the phenomenon as a whole.

 

This situation prompts a question: should we assert, as Geyer and Bright suggest, that "humanity no longer comes into being through 'thought'" or agree with Foucault's notion that "the human being no longer has any history"? Geyer and Bright, adopting a Foucaultian perspective, argue that world history's task is to reveal the structures of power, supported by information, that compress humanity into a singular humankind.

The critique that views humanity as an effect of power has been valuable for postcolonial scholarship and its hermeneutics of suspicion, particularly in analyzing national and global structures of domination. However, this perspective seems insufficient when addressing the global warming crisis.

 

Firstly, vague images of humanity and alternative conceptions persist in our understanding of the current crisis. This is evident in titles like Weisman's "The World Without Us" and his attempt to depict the experience of New York after human absence.

 

Secondly, the distinction between human and natural history has eroded. While we may not perceive ourselves as geological agents, it appears we have become one at the species level. Understanding this crisis that affects us all requires knowledge that surpasses historical understanding. While climate change, influenced by global capital, may intensify the inequalities inherent in capitalist rule, reducing the entire crisis to a capitalist narrative is insufficient.

 

Unlike in capitalist crises, there are no guaranteed escape routes for the rich and privileged in the face of climate change (as seen in events like droughts in Australia and fires in affluent Californian neighborhoods). The anxiety induced by global warming is comparable to the fear of a global nuclear war, but with a crucial difference. Nuclear war would have been a deliberate decision by those in power, whereas climate change is an unintended consequence of human actions. Scientific analysis reveals the effects of our actions as a species.

 

The concept of "species" might serve as a placeholder for an emerging, new universal history of humans prompted by the imminent danger of climate change. However, this universal is distinct – it doesn't arise dialectically from historical movements or as a product of the crisis of capital. Geyer and Bright rightly reject these notions of the universal. Climate change raises questions about a collective human identity, an "us," pointing to a universal that eludes our ability to experience the world directly. It resembles a universal born from a shared awareness of catastrophe – a "negative universal history." This calls for a global approach to politics without the illusion of a global identity, as it cannot encompass particularities like a Hegelian universal would.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Michel Foucault, "Discipline and Punish" || Chapter Summary ||

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