Søren Kierkegaard’s "The Concept of Anxiety"

 

, first published in 1844 under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, is a profound exploration of the human condition, addressing the nature, origin, and significance of anxiety within a theological and philosophical framework. The work stands at the intersection of psychology, existential philosophy, and Christian theology, and it anticipates many of the themes that would later be developed in existentialist thought. Kierkegaard situates anxiety at the heart of human freedom and sin, treating it not merely as a pathological condition but as an essential aspect of human existence. He distinguishes anxiety from fear, explaining that while fear has a definite object—something concrete and external—anxiety is objectless, a state of openness to possibility that arises from the very nature of freedom. For Kierkegaard, anxiety is intimately tied to the human capacity for choice, for the ability to step beyond the given into new possibilities, including the possibility of sin.

The book begins by examining the biblical narrative of Adam’s fall in Genesis. Kierkegaard interprets the moment before Adam’s disobedience as a state of innocence, yet an innocence that contains within it the potential for transgression. In this prelapsarian state, Adam is not yet guilty, but he is capable of becoming guilty. Anxiety arises from this possibility—it is the dizziness of freedom, the unsettling awareness that one can choose otherwise. This state of anxiety is not evil in itself; rather, it is a necessary precondition for moral agency. Without the possibility of doing wrong, there could be no meaningful concept of freedom. In this sense, anxiety is both a burden and a gift, a sign of humanity’s unique position between necessity and possibility.

Kierkegaard is critical of deterministic accounts of human behavior that eliminate the role of freedom. He resists purely psychological or naturalistic explanations of anxiety that would reduce it to a product of physiological or environmental factors. Instead, he situates anxiety in a theological anthropology that understands humans as created in the image of God, endowed with the capacity for self-determination. This freedom is not absolute autonomy but exists in relation to God, and anxiety is the experiential tension that arises from this relational freedom. In Adam’s case, the divine prohibition—God’s command not to eat from the tree—creates the awareness of possibility, the recognition that one could defy God’s will. It is not the knowledge of good and evil itself that creates anxiety, but the possibility of choosing in defiance of God’s command.

Kierkegaard explores the developmental aspects of anxiety, describing it as a universal phenomenon present in every human life. Childhood, he suggests, is marked by a kind of innocence similar to Adam’s, but as the child becomes self-aware, the possibilities of freedom emerge, and with them, anxiety. This developmental account anticipates later psychological theories, but Kierkegaard insists on its spiritual dimension. Anxiety is not simply a stage to be overcome; it is an enduring feature of existence, accompanying every genuine act of choice. Even when individuals try to suppress or avoid anxiety, it persists because it is rooted in the very structure of freedom.

One of the central themes in The Concept of Anxiety is the relationship between anxiety and sin. Kierkegaard distinguishes between hereditary sin and individual sin, framing the former as a condition into which every human being is born and the latter as the actualization of that condition through free choice. Anxiety, in this context, is the medium through which hereditary sin becomes personal. This is not to say that anxiety causes sin, but that it is the atmosphere in which the possibility of sin becomes real. The transition from innocence to guilt is not mechanically determined but occurs through a qualitative leap, a moment of decision in which the individual steps into a new state of being. Kierkegaard resists the idea that this leap can be explained by causal laws; it is, by nature, a free act.

In his analysis, Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the “leap” as central to understanding human freedom. The leap is an existential transition that cannot be reduced to gradual development or rational deduction; it is a moment of transformation that is both free and decisive. Anxiety plays a pivotal role in this leap because it reveals the openness of the future and the weight of responsibility in shaping it. The leap can be toward sin or toward faith, and in either case, anxiety accompanies the decision. In Christian terms, faith is itself a leap—a movement beyond reason and necessity into trust in God—and this leap too is suffused with anxiety, for it requires surrendering to the uncertainty of divine grace.

Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety is not wholly negative. While it can lead to despair and alienation, it can also be a means of self-discovery and spiritual growth. Anxiety reveals to the individual the reality of freedom and the seriousness of existence. In this sense, it can prompt an individual to confront the deeper questions of life, to seek meaning beyond the superficial distractions that often mask the truth of the human condition. Kierkegaard even suggests that the person who has learned to face anxiety without fleeing from it has gained a kind of wisdom, for they have come to terms with the limits and possibilities of their own freedom.

The work is also a critique of certain philosophical and theological tendencies of Kierkegaard’s time. He challenges speculative philosophy, particularly Hegelianism, for its tendency to subsume individual existence under abstract systems. Kierkegaard insists on the irreducible individuality of human life, on the concrete person who must live, choose, and bear responsibility. He is equally critical of moralism that treats ethics as a matter of conforming to external rules without grappling with the inner reality of freedom and anxiety. For Kierkegaard, authentic moral and spiritual life requires confronting anxiety head-on, recognizing it as the sign of our freedom and the possibility of transformation.

Kierkegaard’s reflections on anxiety also touch on the notion of redemption. If anxiety is linked to the possibility of sin, it is also linked to the possibility of salvation. In Christian theology, redemption does not abolish freedom but transforms it, aligning it with God’s will. Kierkegaard suggests that through faith, anxiety is not eliminated but transfigured; it becomes the awe-filled awareness of standing before God, the recognition of one’s dependence on divine grace. This is not a simplistic resolution of anxiety but a deepening of it into a form that sustains rather than destroys the self.

The style of The Concept of Anxiety is characteristically Kierkegaardian: indirect, dialectical, and rich in metaphor. Writing under a pseudonym allows him to approach the subject with a certain detachment, exploring multiple perspectives and resisting definitive closure. The book is not a manual for overcoming anxiety in a therapeutic sense but a meditation on its meaning within the drama of human existence. Kierkegaard’s approach combines philosophical rigor with theological depth, making it a work that continues to resonate both in religious contexts and in secular existential thought.