Revolutionary Violence

 

The question of whether revolutionary violence is justified demands a thorough exploration of the interwoven themes of revolution, state legitimacy, and their relationship with violence. This essay will articulate its stance on revolution and address the justifiability of revolutionary violence. The argument will be grounded in the assertion that revolutions, by their very nature, cannot be non-violent. The discussion will delve into the definitions of violence, linking them to revolution, state violence, and their impact on citizens. Throughout, references will be made to the perspectives of Zizek, Fanon, and Marcuse, whose examinations of structural violence, the necessity of violent uprisings for the oppressed, and repressive tolerance form the foundation of the argument.

 

Attempting to justify or argue against revolutionary violence is arbitrary. Such debates constitute a misunderstanding of the essence and definition of revolution itself, as revolutions inherently involve violence. There is ongoing discourse about the nature and definition of revolutions, with scholars like Gilbert Achcar and Asif Bayat characterizing it as "the rapid and radical transformation of a state driven by popular movements from below," and Isaak Kramnick emphasizing its vision as "a world restructured and regenerated in all its aspects." Slavoj Zizek, on the other hand, sees revolutionary duty in the "assertion of the unconditional, 'ruthless' revolutionary will" aimed at seizing power and dismantling the existing totality. This essay adopts Zizek's definition, viewing revolution as an absolute upheaval of socio-political and economic orders within a society.

 

Since revolutions seek to bring about a complete upheaval, a ruthless will, and a regeneration of society in all aspects, they are inherently violent. Unlike attempts to make incremental changes within an existing system, revolutions aim to overthrow the entire societal framework, replacing old structures with new ones. Consequently, figures like Robespierre and Lenin, with their goal of creating something entirely new, are perceived as more violent than rulers like Saddam Hussein, who sought to maintain the status quo through force. Zizek, drawing on Walter Benjamin, characterizes revolutions as a form of Divine Violence—pure power over all life for the sake of the living—an expression of the drive for excess life that strikes against the "bare life" regulated by law, as described by Herbert Marcuse in his critique of blind tolerance within the capitalist system.

 

Some examples of successful and legitimate revolutions include the French Revolution and the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Examining the French Revolution reveals its legitimacy as it led to the upheaval of an old monarchic system from the grassroots, replacing it with a democratic structure. While some argue that the French Revolution began as a call for economic reform rather than radical change, the transformative outcome, where the commoners became leaders, solidifies its status as a legitimate revolution. This view is supported by the ongoing acknowledgment of the right of the French public to protest and reform their government, exemplified by President Macron.

 

Contrastingly, the Egyptian revolution of 2011 during the Arab Spring is an example of a non-revolution. Despite the initial uprising and the ousting of President Mubarak, Egypt failed to bring about a comprehensive restructuring of its society in various aspects. Described as a 'refolution'—a revolution aiming for reforms within existing regimes—Egypt lacked a clear ideology or future goal beyond removing Mubarak. The absence of partisanship or a vision for the country's leadership and structure prevented any substantial change, rendering it a failed revolution.

 

The confusion surrounding the term "revolution" arises from its loose usage, encompassing any political change or unrest. This misperception leads to questions about the necessity of violence when examples of successful non-violent revolutions exist. The key lies in understanding what qualifies as a revolution, emphasizing the restructuring and regeneration of a state in all aspects.

 

To address the possibility of non-violent revolution, the definition of violence must be explored. Drawing on Zizek's analysis, violence takes two forms: personal (subjective) and structural (objective). Personal violence is directed towards individuals and is often physical or psychological, while structural violence is inherent in a system, sustaining relations of domination and exploitation. This includes the more subtle forms of coercion within a system. Zizek highlights the systemic violence of capitalism, where the fate of populations can be decided by the speculative dance of capital, perpetuating relations of dominance and exploitation.

 Understanding these forms of violence allows us to question how revolution, defined as the complete restructuring of a state, can be achieved non-violently. Zizek's analysis exposes the sinister nature of systemic violence in capitalism, where seemingly benevolent acts, such as charity and philanthropy, may mask economic exploitation. True revolution requires confronting and dismantling these systemic structures that perpetuate violence, rather than engaging in superficial reforms that maintain the status quo.

 

Herbert Marcuse's essay on 'Repressive Tolerance' provides a unique exploration of subjective violence, as elucidated by Zizek, by examining the tolerance within society that allows violence to flourish. Marcuse argues that this tolerance strengthens the tyranny of violence, transforming into compulsory behavior towards established policies while withdrawing it from any opposition, including political and revolutionary opposition. This systemic tolerance perpetuates violence and suppresses alternatives, resulting in the moronization of children and the mature delinquency of an entire civilization.

 

One of Marcuse's significant assertions is that within a repressive society, progressive movements risk turning into their opposite if they accept the established rules. The exercise of political rights, in this context, serves to strengthen the administration by merely testifying to the existence of democratic liberties. This insight explains the failure of Egypt's 'refolution' and supports the argument that real change necessitates a revolution, which, as demonstrated, cannot be nonviolent.

 

Understanding that revolutions cannot be nonviolent and that attempts at nonviolent "revolutions" are merely progressions within the same violent system, the focus shifts to exploring the legitimacy of revolutionary violence. Zizek's analysis has already established society's inherent violence, particularly against the lower working class. Thus, arguing whether revolutions are justified leads to the realization that, in an inherently violent system, revolution is the response to the repressiveness of a tolerant society. To argue against revolutions would be to justify the existing violence of the system. Society is already repressive, and upholding the system perpetuates violence. Overcoming systemic violence, as described by Zizek and Marcuse, requires real revolution—not peaceful protests, refolutions, or progressive legislation but the divine, blind violence of revolution.

 

In conclusion, a clear understanding and definition of revolutionary ideas are essential for making normative statements about them. Acknowledging the existing violent systems shaping individual lives and societies is crucial to understanding how to overcome them. If revolution is the only means of overcoming these systems, then revolutions must be legitimized. Fear of violence in revolutions dissipates when one is aware of the extent of violence in the system. This essay has sought to examine what a genuine revolution entails and explain why revolutions cannot be nonviolent, establishing that revolutionary violence is always legitimate. It underscores that delegitimizing revolutionary violence is a way of undermining revolution, an erroneous judgment within a violent system.