Smith's "Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue and Happiness" (Book Note)

 In this insightful book, Nicholas Smith offers a fresh perspective on Plato's Socratic dialogues, particularly regarding the pursuit of happiness through virtue and knowledge. While Socrates emphasizes the connection between happiness (eudaimonia), virtue, and knowledge, his quest to define virtue is marked by repeated failures. This leaves readers in a dilemma: they are told that to attain happiness, they must cultivate virtue, yet receive little concrete guidance on how to do so. Some scholars even contend that Socrates suggests death as a preferable alternative to the pursuit of virtue. However, Smith presents a more optimistic interpretation, asserting that genuine progress toward virtue and happiness is within reach for all.

 

Smith's key argument revolves around redefining Socratic knowledge. He contends that considering Socratic knowledge as craft-like ("knowledge-how") rather than propositional ("knowledge-that") offers a more accurate understanding. Unlike propositional knowledge, which is binary, craft knowledge is gradable, allowing for varying degrees of proficiency. Viewing Socratic knowledge in this light allows for the possibility of incremental progress towards virtue and, subsequently, happiness.

 

This craft knowledge interpretation yields several interpretive benefits. It naturally aligns with Socrates' use of crafts as an analogy for virtue and resolves the apparent paradox of Socrates being both an exemplar of virtue and yet still ignorant. Additionally, it provides a coherent explanation for Socrates' exhortation to become as wise as possible. Nevertheless, it raises questions about the role of definitional knowledge, which seems more aligned with the propositional model. The Socratic method often involves questioning purported experts about the definition of a virtue. Smith argues that definitional knowledge isn't always central to Socratic discussions of craft knowledge. For instance, in the case of swimming, being able to articulate a definition doesn't seem critical to possessing the skill. However, Smith concedes that Socrates does suggest that a true master of virtue should be able to explain and teach it.

 

This interpretation prompts further considerations about the distinction between true belief and knowledge, as well as Socrates' assertion that knowledge is always true. These issues invite a deeper exploration of how Socratic craft knowledge interfaces with these foundational concepts.

 

Smith's book goes on to unpack the notion of moral improvability, offering a nuanced understanding of Socrates' claim to have taken up the true craft of politics. This involves not just aspiring to wisdom, but actively acquiring degrees of it. Additionally, Smith delves into the interplay between epistemology and moral psychology, illuminating how non-rational states influence belief formation. He explores how these states, rooted in fear, shame, anger, and others, shape ethical development, underscoring that all wrongdoing stems from ignorance. Further, Smith delves into Socratic ignorance and elenchos, elucidating how epistemic modesty and decision-making from the standpoint of ignorance play pivotal roles in ethical improvement.

Chapters 5 and 6 delve into the connection between craft knowledge and happiness. In Chapter 5, Smith explores the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. He argues that while virtue leads to doing well, it may not necessarily equate to happiness. Smith illustrates this point by referencing the case of "Sully" Sullenberger, the commercial pilot who executed a heroic emergency landing, saving all passengers. While Sully's actions were undoubtedly commendable, describing his condition as "happy" would be a stretch. This highlights the distinction between doing well and experiencing true happiness, prompting a reevaluation of our understanding of Socratic accounts.

 

Smith also addresses the notion of Socratic harm and human vulnerability. He contends that external factors can make individuals susceptible to moral corruption, such as through improper teaching or familial influences. This interpretation humanizes Socrates and underscores his recognition of the potential impact of external circumstances on ethical development.

 

In Chapter 6, Smith argues that virtue is a necessary component of happiness, but it need not be an all-or-nothing concept. This nuanced perspective aligns with the Socratic mission, emphasizing the possibility of genuine progress toward virtue and happiness.

 

The book concludes with a thoughtful reflection on the philosophical merits of Smith's interpretation. While acknowledging the importance of interpretative accuracy, Smith suggests that it should not overshadow the broader pursuit of philosophical truth. This afterword encourages scholars to engage in meaningful discussions about the relevance and applicability of Socratic philosophy to contemporary philosophical inquiries.