Foucault's "Politics and the Study of Discourse" (Summary)

 

Foucault discusses the concept of pluralism in understanding different fields of study, such as medicine, mathematics, economics, etc. He argues that these fields are not singular entities but rather complex and diverse. The author proposes three criteria for understanding these fields:

 

·         Criteria of Formation: Rather than focusing on the unity or structure of a field, what makes it unique is a set of rules governing its objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options.

 

·         Criteria of Transformation or Threshold: To understand how a field evolves, we need to identify the conditions under which it emerged, how it changed internally, and when new rules came into effect.

 

·         Criteria of Correlation: Each field exists within a network of relations with other disciplines and societal contexts, and its autonomy can be understood by analyzing these relationships.

 

These criteria help move away from a totalizing view of history and instead focus on the diversity and relationships among different scientific fields. They also help understand the unique historical trajectories and transformation of each field.

 

Foucault is not inclined towards seeking a singular, all-encompassing form. Instead, he focuses on understanding various ensembles of discourse, characterizing them, and delineating the rules, transformations, thresholds, and remnants within them. His approach is pluralistic, as he aims to add to the plurality of distinguishable systems.

 

Foucault’s emphasis on discontinuity is crucial, particularly in today's historical and linguistic analyses. However, he does not view this discontinuity in a singular sense. Foucault is concerned with substituting the abstract concept of 'change' with an analysis of specific transformations.

 

This involves two main aspects: Firstly, within a particular discursive formation, identifying changes affecting its objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options. For instance, in general grammar, changes may occur through deduction or implication, generalization, limitation, shifts between complementary objectives, transitions between alternative terms, permutations of dependencies, and exclusion or inclusion. These diverse types of changes collectively constitute the characteristic derivations of a discursive formation.

 

Second: Identifying changes that impact the discursive formations themselves involves:

(a) The shifting boundaries that delineate the scope of possible objects. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, the medical object ceased to be confined to a classification surface and instead was mapped out in the three-dimensional space of the body.

 

(b) The subject's new position and role within discourse. For example, in the discourse of eighteenth-century naturalists, the subject transitioned to solely observing and noting according to a grid of perceptions and codes, no longer interpreting or deciphering.

 

(c) A new function of language concerning objects. Starting with Tournefort, naturalists' discourse shifted from delving into the essence of things to providing a surface for transcription, translating elements like form, number, size, and disposition in a straightforward manner.

 

(d) A different mode of localization and dissemination of discourse within society. Clinical discourse, for instance, does not originate, undergo inscription, diffuse, accumulate, preserve, or undergo contention in the same manner as eighteenth-century medical discourse.

 

These changes, of a higher order than previous ones, define the mutations that impact the discursive realms themselves.

 

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Lastly, there are changes that simultaneously impact several discursive formations:

 

(a) The reversal of hierarchical diagrams. For example, during the classical period, language analysis held a prominent position, which shifted in the early nineteenth century to biology.

 

(b) Alteration in the nature of the guiding principle. Classical grammar, serving as a general theory of signs, provided an analytical tool applicable across various domains. In the nineteenth century, certain biological concepts, such as organism, function, and life, were metaphorically imported into other fields, generating ideas like social organization and the life of words.

 

(c) Functional displacements. For instance, the theory of the continuity of beings, previously part of philosophical discourse in the eighteenth century, was adopted by scientific discourse in the nineteenth century.

 

These transformations, operating at a higher level than the previous groups, represent changes specific to the episteme itself and its redistributions.

 

The crucial aspect for me is to give substance to the concept of 'change' by focusing on specified modifications. Rather than merely listing innovations, the history of ideas or sciences should involve descriptive analysis of the diverse transformations that occur.

 

It's essential to avoid conflating this analysis with psychological diagnosis. While it's valid to inquire about the experiences and attributes of individuals whose work displays certain modifications, my aim is to describe the field of possibilities, operational forms, and types of transformation characterizing their discursive practice.

 

I emphasize that discoursing subjects are integral to the discursive field—they occupy specific positions and functions within it. Discourse isn't a space where subjectivity intrudes; rather, it's a realm of differentiated subject-positions and functions.

 

Above all, I aim to define the interplay of dependencies between these transformations:

 

(a) Intradiscursive dependencies within a single formation.

(b) Interdiscursive dependencies between different formations, such as correlations studied in previous works.

(c) Extradiscursive dependencies between discursive transformations and changes outside of discourse, like those studied in previous works regarding medical discourse and broader socio-political changes.

 

Rather than assigning causality, I seek to explore the complex web of correlations and dependencies. Discontinuity isn't an empty void to be filled with simplistic causal explanations; it's a dynamic interplay of specific transformations, each with its own conditions, rules, and impacts. History is the descriptive analysis and theory of these transformations.

 

Regarding the term "history of the mind," my focus is more on a history of discourse. I'm not analyzing language systems or formal rules but rather the conditions and events that make statements possible. This involves understanding the singular emergence of statements, their correlation with other events, and their conditions of existence, without attributing them to the consciousness or intention of speaking subjects.

What Foucault is engaged in is not formalization or exegesis, but rather an archaeology—specifically, the description of an archive. By "archive," I'm not referring to a collection of texts from a past epoch but rather to the set of rules defining:

 

The boundaries and forms of what can be said, the domain of discourse, and the type of discourse assigned to various domains.

The boundaries and forms of conservation, including which utterances disappear or enter human memory through various means.

The boundaries and forms of memory as manifested in different discursive formations, including which utterances are recognized as valid or abandoned.

The boundaries and forms of reactivation, such as which discourses are retained, valued, or transformed.

The boundaries and forms of appropriation, including who has access to certain discourses and how discourse is institutionalized and controlled.

This context defines the identity and direction of the analyses I undertake. I'm not writing a history of the mind in terms of its forms or meanings, but rather analyzing discourses in their manifest appearance, transformations, and conditions of existence.

 

Three consequences follow from this approach:

 

Treating discourse as a monument to be described in its intrinsic configuration rather than a theme for commentary.

Investigating the conditions of existence of discourse rather than its structural laws.

Relating discourse to the practical field in which it operates rather than to the thoughts or intentions of its authors.

Now, regarding the request to speak of my work as introducing "the diversity of systems and the play of discontinuities into the history of discourses," I propose this terminology to emphasize the complex interplay of diverse systems and discontinuities. This clarification was necessary before addressing your question about the relationship between my work and political practice.

 

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Foucault provides two types of answers:

 

Critically evaluating the operations foucaults discourse undertakes within its domain, particularly whether what it challenges was essential to progressive politics.

Exploring how the ideas presented in my discourse can be connected with effective progressive political practice.

 

To eliminate certain problematic oppositions, Foucault proposes the following changes, listed in increasing order of significance:

 

Instead of framing history in terms of traditions versus innovations, or the living versus the dead in knowledge, Foucault suggests analyzing a field of simultaneous and successive differences. This approach focuses on the perpetual differences that define knowledge at a given time and the transformations it undergoes over time.

 

It's essential to end the negation of discourse in its specific existence. This involves challenging the notion that discourse is merely a surface for translating mute objects or expressing individual thoughts. Discourse is not a passive medium but a dynamic entity with its own intrinsic consistency and laws. It is constituted by the difference between what could be said under the rules of grammar and logic and what is actually said. Discourse involves regulated practices that go beyond mere representation or expression.

 

These changes aim to shift the focus from abstract oppositions to the concrete analysis of discursive formations and their historical transformations.

To address the uncertainties surrounding disciplines such as the history of ideas, sciences, thought, and knowledge, I propose the following changes:

 

Instead of struggling to demarcate boundaries between different historical domains, such as the history of sciences and the history of opinions, we should focus on analyzing discourse itself. By examining discourse in its conditions of formation, serial modification, and dependencies, we can understand its relationship with other practices more clearly.

 

Rather than treating the history of thought as a reflection of extrinsic conditions or as a symbolic expression of total forms, we should view it as a history of discursive practices within specific relationships to other practices. This approach avoids the need for a global history centered around one principle or form and instead allows for the description of the singularity of practices and the dynamics of their relations.

 

These critical operations aim to question traditional methods of historical analysis and to align progressive politics with a more rigorous interrogation of meaning, origin, and historical change. Rather than clinging to metaphors that obscure the complexities of historical processes or devaluing discursive practices as mere transient phenomena, progressive politics should engage in a thorough examination of discourse and its role in shaping social, political, and cultural realities.

It appears to me that the political implications of the discourse you discuss would find dangerous comfort in assuming the guarantee provided by a primitive foundation or a transcendental teleology. If politics were to habitually exploit metaphors of life or models of movement, and abandon the rigorous analysis of practices, relations, and transformations, it would be taking refuge in a global history of totalities and symbolic values. Such a stance would obscure the complexities of historical change and undermine the critical task of understanding discourse in its specific relationships with other practices.

 

You might rightly ask: why should delving into the origins of philology, economics, or pathological anatomy concern politics or matter in today's context? My response would be as follows:

 

Currently, the status, conditions of exercise, functioning, and institutionalization of scientific discourses pose an important problem for political practice. This is precisely what I have chosen to analyze historically, focusing on discourses with dense and complex fields of positivity, such as medicine, economics, and the human sciences.

 

Let's take the example of clinical discourse formation in medicine from the early nineteenth century to the present. This historical fact cannot be backdated to a remote origin, nor dismissed as a 'pseudo-science.' It intuitively relates to a certain number of precise political events, notably those associated with the French Revolution. The challenge lies in giving this relationship analytical content.

 

One hypothesis suggests that changes in consciousness regarding disease were influenced by broader economic, social, and political changes. However, while these changes may be true, they do not fully account for the emergence of a scientific discourse in medicine.

 

Another hypothesis suggests that fundamental notions in clinical medicine can be derived from political practices or their theoretical reflections. However, such analyses fail to address the essential question: what must be the mode of existence and function of medical discourse amidst other discourses and practices for such correspondences to occur?

 

Therefore, I propose shifting the investigative focus. The link between political practice and medical discourse is more direct: political practice transformed the conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning of medical discourse. This transformation occurred through various operations, including new criteria for

 

The transformations brought about by political practice do not merely "reflect," "transpose," or "express" themselves in the concepts, methods, and utterances of medicine. Instead, they alter the rules of formation of medical discourse. Political practice does not change medical 'objects' themselves, but rather the system that allows for the emergence of medical discourse. For example, political practice transforms the conditions under which medical discourse is formed, its methods of analysis, and the formation of its concepts. These changes occur within a domain with its own configuration and limitations, not offering unlimited possibilities for modification.

 

From such an analysis, several insights can be gleaned:

 

Description of Relations: It becomes possible to describe the relations between scientific discourse and political practice in precise terms, understanding their forms of subordination.

 

Role of Political Practice: Political practice does not have a creative role in generating sciences but transforms the conditions and systems of functioning of discourse. It does not reduce the consistency of the discursive field nor universally dictate its content.

 

Articulation of Relations: Relations between political practice and discursive fields can be articulated on another level, understanding how various practices intersect and influence each other.

 

Historical Conditions of Possibility: Phenomena like influence and communication of models find their historical conditions of possibility in prior modifications, emphasizing the importance of understanding the historical context of discursive practices.

 

In conclusion, the endeavor to analyze discourses, particularly scientific discourses, as regulated practices with specific conditions, dependencies, and transformations is not merely a theoretical exercise. It has significant implications for political practice. It challenges the notion of discourse as a transparent expression of consciousness and highlights the importance of understanding discourses within their historical and analytical context.

 

It's understandable that some may find discomfort in recognizing that discourse operates according to anonymous rules rather than as a direct expression of consciousness. However, this recognition allows for a deeper understanding of discourse and its role in shaping our understanding of the world. Ultimately, discourse is not life itself, nor does it reconcile us with death. It operates according to its own laws, indifferent to individual consciousness.