Bertell Ollman's "Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society" (Book Note)

 

Bertell Ollman's book "Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society" presents itself as a philosophical exploration of Marx's theory of alienation within the broader context of Marxist philosophy. Despite the ambitious scope suggested by its title and thematic focus, the book falls short of delivering a comprehensive analysis of Marx's ideas on alienation. Ollman's treatment of Marx's theory is criticized for its brevity and lack of depth, particularly in its discussion of the various forms of alienation in capitalist society.

 

The book is divided into three parts: a philosophical introduction, an exploration of Marx's conception of human nature, and a section dedicated to the theory of alienation. While Ollman's intention to contribute to the understanding of Marxism as a philosophy is evident, the actual discussion of Marx's theory of alienation is disappointingly brief. Out of the 250 pages of text, only 27 pages are dedicated to Marx's discussion of alienation, with the majority of the remaining content focused on preliminary discussions and presentations of Marx's views on human nature and labor theory of value.

 

One of the significant criticisms of Ollman's treatment of Marx's theory is his neglect of crucial aspects such as self-alienation and the relationship between different forms of alienation and the act of surrender or relinquishment associated with labor under capitalism. Ollman's characterization of alienation as the splintering of human nature into misbegotten parts is criticized for being misleading and not fully capturing Marx's nuanced understanding of the concept. Additionally, Ollman's decision to translate certain key terms in Marx's writings, such as "Entfremdung" and "Entausserung," as "alienation" and "estrangement," respectively, is questioned for its potential to obscure important nuances in Marx's arguments.

 

Moreover, Ollman's discussion of alienation lacks depth in its exploration of Marx's views on the relationship between alienation and the capitalist mode of production. He fails to adequately address Marx's conception of alienation as rooted in the capitalist system's exploitation of labor and the consequent loss of control over one's life-activity and self-realization. By glossing over these critical aspects of Marx's theory, Ollman's analysis falls short of providing a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of alienation in capitalist society.

Ollman argues convincingly against the simplistic criticisms often leveled at Marx's philosophy, demonstrating that Marx was working within a sophisticated rationalist tradition. He emphasizes Marx's relational conception of reality, wherein the nature and significance of things are understood in relation to each other, rather than in isolation. This perspective sheds light on Marx's nuanced understanding of human nature and society, which Ollman explores in detail.

 

One of Ollman's strengths is his analysis of Marx's labor theory of value and its application to understanding capitalist society. He highlights the continuity in Marx's thinking across his early and later writings, particularly in his analysis of capitalist dynamics and the alienation experienced by workers. Ollman also offers thoughtful suggestions for modifications to Marx's framework, such as incorporating the idea of character structure, although some of these proposals may not be entirely novel.

 

However, Ollman's treatment of Marx's theory of alienation is criticized for its brevity and lack of depth. Despite claiming that his discussion of alienation is the culmination of his work, Ollman allocates only a small portion of the text to this crucial topic, leaving many aspects unexplored. His characterization of alienation as the splintering of human nature is seen as misleading and oversimplified, failing to capture the complexity of Marx's concept.

 

Furthermore, Ollman's interpretation of Marx's views on private property is questioned for its oversimplification. While Ollman suggests that Marx viewed private property as inherently incompatible with human self-realization, Marx's writings indicate a more nuanced perspective. Marx acknowledges the positive functions of private property, such as providing individuals with the means of development and expression, alongside its potential for exploitation and alienation.

Bertell Ollman's exploration of Marx's philosophy, particularly concerning the concepts of reification and the fetishism of commodities, is marked by a misinterpretation of Marx's views on internal relations. Ollman suggests that Marx adheres to the principle that "what applies to any of its parts applies to the whole" and vice versa, as part of Marx's relational conception. However, there is no evidence to support this claim, and it risks distorting Marx's actual arguments. Ollman's insistence on emphasizing Marx's relational orientation, while necessary to guard against misunderstanding, sometimes leads to oversimplification and mystification of Marx's ideas rather than clarification.

 

Furthermore, Ollman's heavy reliance on the doctrine of internal relations obscures rather than elucidates Marx's philosophy. While it is important to acknowledge Marx's relational perspective, Ollman's treatment of it tends to overshadow other aspects of Marx's thought and presents Marx's philosophy as more mysterious than it needs to be. Instead of helping readers understand Marx, Ollman's approach may hinder comprehension by making his ideas seem more esoteric than they actually are.

 

Additionally, Ollman's neglect of Hegel's influence on Marx's thinking is a significant oversight. Hegel's discussions of man's nature, civil society, and alienation in works such as the Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right profoundly influenced Marx's intellectual development. Marx's early writings, produced during a period of intense engagement with Hegel's ideas, reflect a deep engagement with Hegelian philosophy. Understanding Marx's relationship with Hegel is crucial for comprehending Marx's philosophy, yet Ollman fails to adequately address this aspect of Marx's intellectual background.

Ollman's neglect of Hegel is particularly problematic because it prevents a full understanding of why Marx adopts certain positions. Without acknowledging Hegel's influence, one cannot grasp the philosophical underpinnings of Marx's arguments. For instance, when Marx emphasizes the importance of self-directed productive activity for human self-realization, he is implicitly drawing from Hegel's argument in the Philosophy of Right, which posits that personality necessitates such activity for its realization.

 

Similarly, Marx's concept of labor alienation, wherein one relinquishes control of their productive activity to another individual, aligns with Hegel's notions of Entfremdung and Entäusserung in the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's analysis suggests that relinquishing control over labor is central to alienation, a concept Marx extends to the capitalist-worker relationship in capitalist society.

 

Moreover, Marx's assertion that capitalists are also "self-alienated" echoes Hegel's examination of the Master-Servant relation in the Phenomenology. Hegel argues that both parties in this relationship experience a form of alienation that inhibits their personal self-realization.

 

By neglecting Hegel, Ollman fails to provide the necessary context for understanding Marx's ideas. While Ollman presents Marx's views, he does not delve into the philosophical rationale behind them, which Marx himself believed existed. Ollman's oversight is akin to discussing Aristotle's theories of Forms without referencing Plato or Kant's ideas on causality without considering Hume's influence.