Bertell Ollman's book "Alienation: Marx's Conception of
Man in Capitalist Society" presents itself as a philosophical exploration
of Marx's theory of alienation within the broader context of Marxist
philosophy. Despite the ambitious scope suggested by its title and thematic
focus, the book falls short of delivering a comprehensive analysis of Marx's
ideas on alienation. Ollman's treatment of Marx's theory is criticized for its
brevity and lack of depth, particularly in its discussion of the various forms
of alienation in capitalist society.
The book is divided into three parts: a philosophical
introduction, an exploration of Marx's conception of human nature, and a
section dedicated to the theory of alienation. While Ollman's intention to
contribute to the understanding of Marxism as a philosophy is evident, the
actual discussion of Marx's theory of alienation is disappointingly brief. Out
of the 250 pages of text, only 27 pages are dedicated to Marx's discussion of
alienation, with the majority of the remaining content focused on preliminary
discussions and presentations of Marx's views on human nature and labor theory
of value.
One of the significant criticisms of Ollman's treatment of
Marx's theory is his neglect of crucial aspects such as self-alienation and the
relationship between different forms of alienation and the act of surrender or
relinquishment associated with labor under capitalism. Ollman's
characterization of alienation as the splintering of human nature into
misbegotten parts is criticized for being misleading and not fully capturing
Marx's nuanced understanding of the concept. Additionally, Ollman's decision to
translate certain key terms in Marx's writings, such as "Entfremdung"
and "Entausserung," as "alienation" and "estrangement,"
respectively, is questioned for its potential to obscure important nuances in
Marx's arguments.
Moreover, Ollman's discussion of alienation lacks depth in
its exploration of Marx's views on the relationship between alienation and the
capitalist mode of production. He fails to adequately address Marx's conception
of alienation as rooted in the capitalist system's exploitation of labor and
the consequent loss of control over one's life-activity and self-realization.
By glossing over these critical aspects of Marx's theory, Ollman's analysis
falls short of providing a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of
alienation in capitalist society.
Ollman argues convincingly against the simplistic criticisms
often leveled at Marx's philosophy, demonstrating that Marx was working within
a sophisticated rationalist tradition. He emphasizes Marx's relational
conception of reality, wherein the nature and significance of things are
understood in relation to each other, rather than in isolation. This
perspective sheds light on Marx's nuanced understanding of human nature and
society, which Ollman explores in detail.
One of Ollman's strengths is his analysis of Marx's labor
theory of value and its application to understanding capitalist society. He
highlights the continuity in Marx's thinking across his early and later
writings, particularly in his analysis of capitalist dynamics and the
alienation experienced by workers. Ollman also offers thoughtful suggestions
for modifications to Marx's framework, such as incorporating the idea of character
structure, although some of these proposals may not be entirely novel.
However, Ollman's treatment of Marx's theory of alienation
is criticized for its brevity and lack of depth. Despite claiming that his
discussion of alienation is the culmination of his work, Ollman allocates only
a small portion of the text to this crucial topic, leaving many aspects
unexplored. His characterization of alienation as the splintering of human
nature is seen as misleading and oversimplified, failing to capture the complexity
of Marx's concept.
Furthermore, Ollman's interpretation of Marx's views on
private property is questioned for its oversimplification. While Ollman
suggests that Marx viewed private property as inherently incompatible with
human self-realization, Marx's writings indicate a more nuanced perspective.
Marx acknowledges the positive functions of private property, such as providing
individuals with the means of development and expression, alongside its
potential for exploitation and alienation.
Bertell Ollman's exploration of Marx's philosophy,
particularly concerning the concepts of reification and the fetishism of
commodities, is marked by a misinterpretation of Marx's views on internal
relations. Ollman suggests that Marx adheres to the principle that "what
applies to any of its parts applies to the whole" and vice versa, as part
of Marx's relational conception. However, there is no evidence to support this
claim, and it risks distorting Marx's actual arguments. Ollman's insistence on
emphasizing Marx's relational orientation, while necessary to guard against
misunderstanding, sometimes leads to oversimplification and mystification of
Marx's ideas rather than clarification.
Furthermore, Ollman's heavy reliance on the doctrine of
internal relations obscures rather than elucidates Marx's philosophy. While it
is important to acknowledge Marx's relational perspective, Ollman's treatment
of it tends to overshadow other aspects of Marx's thought and presents Marx's
philosophy as more mysterious than it needs to be. Instead of helping readers
understand Marx, Ollman's approach may hinder comprehension by making his ideas
seem more esoteric than they actually are.
Additionally, Ollman's neglect of Hegel's influence on
Marx's thinking is a significant oversight. Hegel's discussions of man's
nature, civil society, and alienation in works such as the Phenomenology of
Spirit and Philosophy of Right profoundly influenced Marx's intellectual
development. Marx's early writings, produced during a period of intense engagement
with Hegel's ideas, reflect a deep engagement with Hegelian philosophy.
Understanding Marx's relationship with Hegel is crucial for comprehending
Marx's philosophy, yet Ollman fails to adequately address this aspect of Marx's
intellectual background.
Ollman's neglect of Hegel is particularly problematic
because it prevents a full understanding of why Marx adopts certain positions.
Without acknowledging Hegel's influence, one cannot grasp the philosophical
underpinnings of Marx's arguments. For instance, when Marx emphasizes the
importance of self-directed productive activity for human self-realization, he
is implicitly drawing from Hegel's argument in the Philosophy of Right, which
posits that personality necessitates such activity for its realization.
Similarly, Marx's concept of labor alienation, wherein one
relinquishes control of their productive activity to another individual, aligns
with Hegel's notions of Entfremdung and Entäusserung in the Phenomenology and
the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's analysis suggests that relinquishing control
over labor is central to alienation, a concept Marx extends to the
capitalist-worker relationship in capitalist society.
Moreover, Marx's assertion that capitalists are also
"self-alienated" echoes Hegel's examination of the Master-Servant
relation in the Phenomenology. Hegel argues that both parties in this
relationship experience a form of alienation that inhibits their personal
self-realization.
By neglecting Hegel, Ollman fails to provide the necessary
context for understanding Marx's ideas. While Ollman presents Marx's views, he
does not delve into the philosophical rationale behind them, which Marx himself
believed existed. Ollman's oversight is akin to discussing Aristotle's theories
of Forms without referencing Plato or Kant's ideas on causality without
considering Hume's influence.
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