Meikle's "Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx" (Book Note)

 

Meikle's book Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx serves a dual purpose: to argue that Marx holds an essentialist viewpoint and to defend this essentialism. According to Meikle, Marx, like Aristotle, sees entities such as plants, humans, or capitalist societies as organic wholes with an inherent essence. This essence drives the entity towards its telos or final state, which for Marx is the achievement of a free communist society. Historical development, in Marx's theory, is propelled by human labor activity, with class structures forming around this activity and either promoting or impeding further development.

 

While Meikle acknowledges Marx's belief that historical development is influenced by accidents, he argues that this does not negate the teleological aspect of Marx's theory. However, Meikle's attempt to portray Marx as an essentialist encounters difficulties. Marx's explanation of historical development involves a complex interplay of necessary and accidental factors, which is not entirely consistent with essentialism. Meikle's insistence on essentialism requires showing that each society's future form is inherent in its preceding form, but he struggles to demonstrate this in Marx's work.

 

Moreover, Marx's explanation of the capitalist wage-labor relationship does not solely rely on the essential nature of preceding societies. Instead, Marx considers various factors, many unrelated to pre-capitalist commodity relations. Therefore, Meikle's effort to present Marx as an essentialist results in an account of historical development that lacks essentialist coherence.

In his analysis of Marx's essentialism, Meikle draws heavily from the early chapters of "Capital, Vol. 1." Marx's discussion traces the development of the finished value-form, which presupposes capitalism and the capital wage-labor relationship, from its genesis in the elementary commodity form. However, Meikle's interpretation is somewhat misguided. Marx isn't detailing the historical process of capitalism's emergence from the first commodity form; rather, he's elucidating the structure of the existing capitalist system. He begins with the simple commodity form, devoid of the capitalist wage-labor relationship, to explicate its structure more clearly. Marx demonstrates how this simple commodity form inherently contains the money-form, or how money arises from the commodity form. He then progresses to illustrate capitalism's primary concern with money-making, depicted as M-C-M'. Only after this initial analysis does Marx incorporate the capitalist-labor relationship and continue his examination of the capitalist structure.

 

Meikle's interpretation is somewhat misled by the Hegelian form of Marx's presentation, evident in his use of terms like "genesis." Similarly, Meikle misinterprets Marx's critiques of Ricardo in "Theories of Surplus Value." Marx doesn't fault Ricardo for failing to provide a historical account but for misunderstanding capitalism's structure. For instance, Ricardo's inability to grasp money stems from his failure to comprehend its intricate connection with the commodity form. Meikle is correct, however, in noting Marx's belief that once capitalism is established, its development is determined by its essential form and will, barring accidents, lead to communism. Yet whether Marx effectively demonstrates this is debatable. Meikle's portrayal of Marx's views on capitalist development, which are his own, is somewhat cursory, especially regarding economic crises.

 

Meikle contends that Marx's labor theory of value logically follows from his view of human history. He argues that since human labor and labor time are fundamental to all historical forms, all historical categories, including value, derive their essence from human labor. However, this assertion is problematic. While it's true that all societies have concrete, useful labor and a method for measuring labor time, it doesn't necessarily imply that the value of commodities in capitalist society is solely determined by the quantity of socially necessary labor embodied in them. Many economists, including Marxists, have criticized the labor theory of value. Cohen, in his "Marx's Theory of History," demonstrates that a Marxist theory of history, emphasizing laboring activities, isn't contingent on the value theory. However, Meikle is compelled to defend the value theory because his account of Marx's essentialism heavily relies on it (albeit based on a misinterpretation of Marx's discussion of the value form).

Meikle offers a basic discussion of the differences between essentialism and atomism, mainly in Chapter 7 of his work. He characterizes atomists as those who seek to reduce everything to simple building blocks lacking complexity, often manifesting as methodological individualism in the social sciences. However, Meikle's portrayal is somewhat simplistic, suggesting that one must either be an essentialist or an atomist. This dichotomy is flawed, as one can acknowledge the essential structure of capitalism without subscribing to a teleological view of its development.

 

Essentialists, according to Meikle, believe in the existence of organic wholes or entities with inherent essences that cannot be reduced to their constituent parts. In the context of social sciences, this essentialist perspective sees society as an organic whole with its own internal logic and development. However, Meikle's argument overlooks the possibility of alternative perspectives that acknowledge the structural integrity of capitalism without attributing a predetermined telos to its development.

 

Meikle's attempt to demonstrate Marx's essentialism ultimately falls short. Marx's discussions of historical development cannot be neatly fitted into an essentialist framework. While there are instances in Marx's writings that may seem to reflect essentialist tendencies, such as in the early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and later in the Grundrisse, Marx explicitly rejects essentialism in works like The German Ideology and The Holy Family. These inconsistencies in Marx's writings pose a challenge to Meikle's argument for Marx's essentialism.

 

Furthermore, Meikle's assertion that Marx's major work, Capital, can be interpreted in ways other than essentialist underscores the complexity of Marx's thought. While there may be elements in Marx's writings that appear to align with essentialism, such as his emphasis on the internal logic of capitalism, there are also countervailing arguments against a strictly essentialist interpretation. For instance, Marx's analysis of historical materialism emphasizes the role of contingent historical factors in shaping social development, complicating any straightforward essentialist reading.

 

The question of whether these apparent elements of essentialism in Marx's writings can be reconciled with his broader theoretical framework remains unresolved. Meikle acknowledges the challenge of reconciling these inconsistencies, particularly regarding Marx's early writings, but does not provide a definitive resolution. It may be prudent to recognize the presence of inconsistent elements in Marx's thought and approach his work with a critical and nuanced perspective.

 

Meikle's attempt to demonstrate Marx's essentialism is not entirely convincing. While there are elements in Marx's writings that may suggest an essentialist problematic, there are also significant counterarguments against such a reading. The complexity of Marx's thought and the inconsistencies in his writings pose challenges to any straightforward interpretation, highlighting the need for a nuanced and critical approach to understanding his theoretical framework.