C. Battersby's "The Phenomenal Woman:Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity" (Book Note)

 

 

In "The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Pattern of Identity," Battersby explores different philosophical traditions to develop a metaphysical framework centered on the female perspective. She critiques Kant's philosophy for relying too heavily on the concept of "the other" in forming the self, which marginalizes female subjectivity. Battersby draws on thinkers like Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, Theodor Adorno, and Søren Kierkegaard to propose a fluid understanding of identity rooted in the female experience.

 

The first chapters of the book highlight key aspects of the female subject position, emphasizing experiences such as childbirth, care, and the exclusion of women from conventional norms of personhood and autonomy. Battersby challenges traditional metaphysical views, particularly Aristotle's notion of substance, Locke's nominalism, and Kripke's natural kinds theory, arguing that they fail to account for the unique perspective of women.

 

In Chapter Four, Battersby delves into Kantian metaphysics, critiquing its hierarchical view of identity where the mind imposes form onto inert matter, thus creating a separation between active form and passive substance. She points out Kant's reliance on Newtonian physics and the exclusion of women from the moral realm, positioning them ambiguously between personhood and animality.

 

Battersby suggests that Kant's philosophy struggles to integrate with advancements in biology and fails to address sexual difference adequately. She looks to contemporary research in fields like topology and quantum physics to challenge Kantian metaphysics and develop a new understanding of identity that embraces diversity and acknowledges the complexities of human existence.

 

In the second section of her work, Battersby critiques deconstruction and postmodern feminism, arguing that some thinkers remain trapped in the dualism of subject and object, while others treat the entire history of philosophy as uniform. She examines Jacques Lacan's perspective, asserting that he continues to operate within Kantian notions of subject-object conflict, particularly evident in his portrayal of women as "the other" – an elusive and threatening object of desire that must be subjugated by paternal authority. Battersby illustrates this critique through Lacan's analysis of infant development, where the mother represents boundless "otherness" that must be negated for the formation of the self.

 

Similarly, Battersby finds fault with Jacques Derrida's approach, which can be interpreted either as dismantling Martin Heidegger's philosophy of presence or as reinforcing identity on the basis of the self/other binary, where the exclusion of the feminine constructs a masculinized self. She accuses Derrida of avoiding metaphysical engagement and instead destabilizing all metaphysics, leading to an epistemology fraught with instability. Battersby dismisses feminist theories influenced by Derrida's ideas.

 

Battersby devotes more attention to Lacanian followers, particularly Luce Irigaray, whom she views as reimagining identity from a female perspective. Unlike approaches that define the self by separating it from the other, Irigaray incorporates the other into the self and emphasizes the importance of care and interdependence.

Battersby emphasizes the necessity of addressing Judith Butler's ideas before considering a new metaphysics of identity seriously. She criticizes Butler for being confined either to a Hegelian framework or to an epistemological perspective, which prevents her from exploring alternative metaphysical approaches. While Battersby acknowledges Butler's critique of the traditional metaphysics of substance and her recognition of the sentimentality in Luce Irigaray's portrayal of women as mothers and birthers, she ultimately dismisses Butler as an "anarchist" advocating for perpetual revolution within societal structures.

 

In the final three chapters of her work, Battersby introduces several thinkers whom she finds valuable for challenging Kantian philosophy and constructing a new descriptive metaphysics with the female perspective as the norm. She finds Theodor Adorno's critique of modernity insightful, particularly his acknowledgment of material differences in shaping the Kantian subject/object dichotomy. However, she criticizes Adorno for failing to adequately address sexual difference.

 

Søren Kierkegaard emerges as a central figure for Battersby's project of developing a new metaphysics of identity. She focuses on Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings, particularly his exploration of temporality and fluidity in the "Either" section of "Either/Or" and "Stages on Life's Way." Battersby highlights Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms to illustrate the fragmented nature of the self and his conception of identity as a constantly evolving project within various relational contexts.

 

Battersby's analysis of Kierkegaard's works emphasizes his incorporation of the female perspective in rethinking self and identity construction. She underscores Kierkegaard's departure from traditional master/slave narratives in favor of the seducer/seduced dynamic, which allows for a more nuanced understanding of the self in relation to others. While Kierkegaard's philosophy lacks a comprehensive account of the embodied self, Battersby sees his ideas as a promising foundation for developing a feminist metaphysics that prioritizes fluidity, care, and dependency over Kantian notions of personhood and autonomy.