S. Benhabib's, "Situating the Self:Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics" (Book Note)

 

"Situating the Self" tackles the question of what remains relevant in moral and political theories amidst critiques from communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists. While sympathetic to these criticisms, Seyla Benhabib argues for rethinking rather than abandoning universalism. She proposes an interactive universalism grounded in discourse ethics, aiming to show that universalism can accommodate a culturally embedded, socially constituted self, include issues of the good life in moral theory, address women's and other oppressed groups' concerns in the public sphere, and embrace a fallibilistic view of rationality.

 

Benhabib's approach builds upon Jürgen Habermas's idea that norms must be capable of gaining agreement from all involved in practical discourse governed by principles of respect and egalitarian reciprocity. Practical discourse ensures that all participants have equal opportunities to express themselves and address power dynamics that might otherwise limit discourse.

 

While Benhabib defends discourse ethics and the discourse model of legitimacy, she diverges from Habermas in several key aspects. While Habermas prioritizes consent in securing normative validity, Benhabib shifts the focus to the process of practical discourse itself. Instead of aiming for consensus, she emphasizes dialogue, conversation, and mutual understanding. This shift allows her to achieve several goals simultaneously.

 

Benhabib's departure from Habermas enables her to broaden the scope of practical discourse beyond issues of justice to include values, needs, and conceptions of the good life. By emphasizing the process of discourse rather than consensus, she opens up space for diverse perspectives and acknowledges the complexity of moral and political deliberation. This approach acknowledges that achieving consensus may not always be feasible or desirable, but the process of engaging in discourse can still be valuable for fostering understanding and mutual respect.

Benhabib's reimagining of universalism through discourse ethics offers several advantages over theories that prioritize consensus and unity. First, it acknowledges and embraces plurality, conflict, and ambiguity as inherent aspects of argumentative debate. Unlike approaches that emphasize consensus, Benhabib's framework recognizes that diverse perspectives can coexist and that disagreement is a natural part of discourse.

 

Second, Benhabib argues that values, needs, and conceptions of the good life should not be excluded from practical discourse. While achieving consensus on these matters may not be the goal, engaging in intersubjective debate and reflection can lead to transformations in our understanding of the good life. This approach fosters critical reflexivity and allows for the exploration of different evaluative conceptions.

 

Although Benhabib's framework prioritizes the right over the good, meaning that rights are defined independently of particular conceptions of the good, it still allows for debate and contestation over normative values. This stance aligns with modernity's emphasis on critical reflection and the postconventional stage of moral development.

 

Third, by expanding the scope of practical discourse beyond justice issues, Benhabib's approach avoids preconceived notions about what constitutes a public or private matter. Instead, it allows for the boundary between justice and the good life, norms and values, and the public and private spheres to be open to discursive contestation and reformulation. This flexibility enables issues previously considered private to be redefined as matters of public concern, paving the way for struggles against oppression.

 

Finally, Benhabib advocates for a more democratic form of liberalism that prioritizes active participation over passive consent. Drawing on the republican tradition of civic virtue, she argues for a thicker conception of public space where radically democratic argumentative debate can take place.

 

Benhabib contrasts her interactive universalism with "monological" and "legalistic" conceptions of universalism. She critiques Kant's approach, which relies on silent thought experiments and a first-person perspective, for its lack of emphasis on public debate and intersubjective validity. While Kantians may disagree with Benhabib's characterization, she argues that her framework offers a more inclusive and dynamic approach to universalism that fosters genuine dialogue and engagement.

 

Benhabib critiques Rawlsian proceduralism, particularly the concept of the veil of ignorance, where individuals imagine themselves in different social positions to determine fair principles. She argues that this approach fails to truly consider plurality and difference because it assumes that individuals are "definitionally identical" behind the veil, which prevents genuine reversibility of perspective between self and other. Furthermore, everyday beliefs and prejudices are "deactivated," which may lead to indifference towards differences or the reintroduction of biases. Benhabib contends that moral standpoint should be based on actual dialogue and understanding of concrete others' perspectives.

 

Throughout "Situating the Self," Benhabib expresses optimism in Enlightenment ideals, believing that vigorous public debate can lead to insight, enlarged thinking, and reduced conflict. However, some critics worry that public debate might generate oppressively majoritarian outcomes. Benhabib argues that universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, along with the protection of civil liberties, are essential for maintaining democratic public debate. Yet, this optimism overlooks the risk of marginalized voices being excluded from discourse and the potential for majoritarian dominance in shaping agendas and language.

 

A major concern with Benhabib's view is that actual discourse and debate may not challenge entrenched power structures effectively, especially if critical social theorists lack privileged voices in moral discourse. While Benhabib emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue, the reality of inegalitarian social structures may limit the effectiveness of discourse in promoting insight and social change. Additionally, her confidence in the enlightening potential of discourse overlooks historical instances of excluding marginalized groups and infantilizing or pathologizing "others."

 

Moreover, Benhabib's reliance on modernity's formal equation of the moral community with those capable of speech and action may overlook the historical marginalization of women, minorities, and the poor. Her a prioristic approach to determining who is entitled to participate in discourse contradicts her emphasis on discursively validating substantive claims. Therefore, while Benhabib's discourse model of legitimacy offers promise, it must contend with the challenges of power imbalances and historical injustices that persist in democratic discourse.