G.A. Cohen's "Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence" (Book Note)

 

G.A. Cohen's book "Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence" is considered a foundational work on historical materialism and Marxism. Published in 1978, it is renowned for two main reasons: firstly, it represents the first significant encounter between Anglo-American analytic philosophy and Marx, establishing the basis for analytical Marxism. Secondly, it presents a traditional interpretation of historical materialism, where history is primarily viewed as the development of human productive power, and societal forms evolve based on their ability to facilitate or hinder this growth.

Cohen emphasizes the distinction between the forces and relations of production, highlighting the primacy of productive forces over production relations. According to him, the forces of production (technological basis of society) determine the relations of production (economic structure), driving history forward. This perspective draws inspiration from Marx's 1859 Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" and follows a base-superstructure model rather than focusing on concepts like "need" or "class struggle."

In the introduction to the 2000 edition, Cohen asserts the superiority of analytical Marxism over other approaches, particularly criticizing "so-called dialectical thinking." He argues that analytical philosophy offers clarity, precision, and rigor, contrasting it with what he perceives as the ambiguity of Marx's writings. Cohen firmly commits to analytical Marxism, claiming it embodies a dedication to reason and dismissing alternative Marxist methodologies as inadequate or nonsensical.

In Chapter 1, Cohen briefly compares Hegel's and Marx's views on history before delving into his main methodological approach in Chapters 2 and 3. Here, he defines various terms related to labor and production, aiming to clarify the distinction between "productive forces" (like technology and resources) and "economic structure" (the overall system of production relations in society). Cohen's writing style is meticulous and precise, sometimes resembling a legal document more than an academic text.

 

Chapter 4, titled "Material and Social Properties of Society," introduces the core idea of separating society into two distinct realms: the material (related to productive forces) and the social (related to production relations). Cohen argues that while productive forces exist independently of social relations, they take on social significance when incorporated into production relations. He asserts the "primacy thesis," which suggests that the nature of production relations is determined by the level of development of the productive forces. Although Cohen doesn't explicitly state a similar thesis for the material-social relationship, it's implied in his argument. He highlights Marx's frequent use of terms like "material" versus "social" and argues that society's content is essentially nature, while its form is social. Cohen suggests that Marx's materialism explains social history as serving the development of material conditions.

 

 

 

Marx's materialism isn't solely based on a clear division between the material (like nature and human activity) and the social (like history and economics) as Cohen suggests. According to Marx, these aspects are interconnected expressions of human activity, particularly labor. In simpler terms, Marx doesn't see a strict boundary between what's material and what's social. Instead, he views them as different aspects of the same thing: human activity. This means that 'material' and 'social' are not opposed in Marx's thinking; they're both rooted in human actions, particularly labor. Therefore, the material aspect doesn't exclusively explain or determine the social aspect in Marx's view. Instead, they're intertwined expressions of human activity. So, Cohen's idea of a systematic opposition between material and social in Marx's materialism is not accurate.

Marx's exploration of materialism starts with his 1845 Theses on Feuerbach, where he criticizes traditional materialism for being outdated and lacking a proper understanding of the subject. He argues that existing materialism, often associated with Feuerbach, fails to grasp the active role of human beings in shaping reality. Marx rejects the passive nature of Kant's subjective understanding of objectivity, which Feuerbach adopts. Instead, Marx proposes a new approach, emphasizing the practical and active involvement of human beings in creating knowledge and understanding the world. He suggests that objectivity, sensibility, and reality are not solely understood subjectively, as Kant proposes. Rather, they are rooted in human activity, particularly practical engagement. In simpler terms, Marx believes that human activity, or practice, is the true essence of the subject, challenging traditional notions of subjectivity and materialism.

From Marx's practical materialism, two important ideas emerge. Firstly, in his critique of traditional epistemology, Marx challenges the idea of a fixed boundary between the knower and the known. He argues that human activity disrupts this boundary, shaping both the subject and the object within the process. This viewpoint suggests that subject and object aren't predetermined before action but rather emerge through it.

Secondly, Marx's redefinition of the subject as practice emphasizes the fundamental role of human activity. He proposes that both subject and object are manifestations of this practice, blurring the lines between epistemology (how we know things) and ontology (the nature of being). Marx's concept of 'practice' becomes central to understanding the relationship between the knower and the known, moving beyond traditional epistemological frameworks.

In Marx's view, the essence of his new materialism lies in practice itself, not in the traditional notion of inert matter. This contrasts with the outdated materialism that Marx criticizes. Cohen's interpretation of Marx as adhering to this outdated materialism is mistaken.

In Marx's exploration of materialism, he initially focuses on the concept of sensuous human activity without directly addressing the idea of 'the human'. However, in a particular thesis, Marx delves into the notion of 'human essence' in a manner that distinguishes his materialism as 'new'. This distinction arises from Marx's emphasis on actual social conditions.

 

Marx's concept of the human isn't entirely novel because it's actual; rather, it's groundbreaking because it emphasizes the inherently social nature of humanity. Marx defines human essence as the entirety of social relations, employing the term 'ensemble' to convey a fluid and open unity, differentiating it from Hegel's more hierarchical notions of totality and wholeness. Instead of viewing humans as discrete individuals with inherent traits, Marx argues that their essential characteristics are determined by the social production and distribution of attributes.

 

In Marx's materialism, the material is inherently social, and humanity is fundamentally social as well. Marx's later work, particularly in The German Ideology, replaces the concept of 'sensuous human practice' with 'labour', as it encapsulates the historical dimension. Labour, as the material of historical materialism, not only creates time but also shapes history itself.

 

This philosophical exploration forms the foundation for questioning the central claims of Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History (KMTH), particularly the 'primacy thesis'. Cohen suggests that production relations are economic, while productive forces are not. However, this overlooks the irony that the prime mover of history is deemed outside of history itself, as the historical status of productive forces is only realized through their impact on production relations.

 

One notable irony of KMTH is its detailed analysis of certain concepts while accepting others, like technology, without critical examination. Despite its importance to Cohen's argument, technology isn't rigorously analyzed. This raises questions about whether Cohen's analytical Marxism adheres consistently to its own standards or if it faces deeper conceptual challenges.

Cohen's interpretation of historical materialism follows a traditional view, emphasizing the mechanical growth of productive forces driving historical progress. According to this perspective, history advances through revolutions that create new and improved productive forces and relations. History moves forward in a linear fashion, divided into distinct stages.

 

This approach can be seen as deterministic, as it suggests a predetermined future based on the development of productive forces. It overlooks the inherent unpredictability and contingency of history, particularly in political matters. For instance, Cohen's view that the Russian Revolution was premature due to Russia's incomplete development of productive forces implies a predetermined outcome, akin to suggesting that the events of 1989 were inevitable after 1917.

 

However, Cohen's approach also neglects the violence inherent in capitalist systems, such as colonialism, racism, and misogyny. These forms of violence are often treated as secondary to the broader processes of capitalism. Cohen's claims that systems like slavery are fundamentally opposed to capitalist production ignore the historical realities of capitalism's reliance on enslaved labor for economic expansion.