Zizek's "How did Marx Invent Symptom?" (Summary)

 

How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?

Lacan's statement that Karl Marx invented the notion of the symptom may seem like a provocative statement, but it's not merely a witty remark. Lacan suggests a pertinent theoretical foundation underlying this claim, particularly in how both Marx and Freud analyze phenomena such as commodities and dreams, respectively.

 

Marx's analysis of commodities aims to understand why labor assumes the form of value in a commodity. Similarly, Freud's analysis of dreams seeks to comprehend why latent thoughts take on the form of dreams. In both cases, the focus isn't on uncovering a hidden content behind the form but on understanding the inherent nature of the form itself.

 

Freud's interpretation of dreams has often been criticized for its supposed pansexualism, especially when the latent content of dreams doesn't seem overtly sexual. However, this criticism arises from a misunderstanding of Freud's approach. The latent content of a dream isn't necessarily sexual; it's a normal, preconscious thought that undergoes transformation into the dream's manifest content through mechanisms like displacement and condensation.

 

Freud's distinction between manifest content and latent dream thoughts is crucial here. The unconscious desire, which is the true subject matter of the dream, doesn't lie hidden behind the latent content but articulates itself through the dream's form. Thus, the dream's form, not its latent content, reveals the unconscious desire.

 

Freud's observations indicate that the form of a dream frequently serves to represent its concealed subject matter. This paradox underscores the notion that the unconscious desire expresses itself through the dream's disguise of its latent content.

Freud and Marx both undertake a dual approach in their analyses, emphasizing the importance of understanding both the form and the content of phenomena such as dreams and commodities.

 

Freud first challenges the idea that dreams are mere chaotic products of physiological processes, asserting that they carry meaning that needs interpretation. He then directs attention away from the hidden meaning of dreams to focus on the process of dream formation itself, which he terms the dream-work.

 

Similarly, Marx challenges the notion that the value of commodities is purely arbitrary, instead arguing that it is determined by labor time. He then criticizes classical political economy for fixating on the hidden meaning behind commodities, such as labor as the source of wealth, without considering why commodities assume their particular form.

 

In both cases, the focus shifts from uncovering hidden meanings to understanding the processes that give rise to these meanings. Marx, like Freud, emphasizes the importance of analyzing not only the essence concealed within the form but also the genesis of the form itself. This dual approach is essential for a comprehensive understanding of phenomena like dreams and commodities.

 

The unconscious of the commodity form

 

The Marxian analysis of the commodity-form, despite its economic origins, has had a profound impact across various disciplines because it provides a framework for understanding a wide range of phenomena beyond economics. It offers insights into what can be termed as the "fetishistic inversion" in society, which extends to areas like law, religion, and more.

 

Alfred Sohn-Rethel, influenced by the Frankfurt School, argues that the structure of the commodity-form reveals not only the workings of political economy but also sheds light on the historical development of abstract thinking and the division of intellectual and manual labor. He suggests that within the commodity-form lies a sort of blueprint for the Kantian transcendental subject, which consists of transcendental categories that underpin objective scientific knowledge.

 

Sohn-Rethel identifies a concept called "real abstraction," which operates within the social process of commodity exchange. This abstraction involves the separation of a commodity's exchange value from its physical properties and its reduction to a purely quantitative entity, facilitated by money. This concept anticipates the abstract thinking required for modern science and philosophy, showing how social practices like commodity exchange shape our cognitive frameworks.

 

Moreover, the idea of "real abstraction" challenges the traditional understanding of abstraction as a purely mental process. Instead, it suggests that abstraction is external to individual thought and is shaped by social practices and symbolic systems. This notion aligns with the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, which encompasses forms of thought that operate beyond conscious awareness.

 

Sohn-Rethel's philosophical endeavor presents a challenge to traditional philosophical reflection by revealing an external place where philosophical truths are already enacted. This confrontation exposes philosophy's inherent blindness to this external place, which it cannot acknowledge without undermining its own coherence.

 

Everyday consciousness, particularly during acts of exchange, also exhibits a form of blindness. Individuals engaged in exchange behave as "practical solipsists," overlooking the social dimension of their actions and reducing them to individual transactions. This blindness is necessary for the act of exchange to occur smoothly; if individuals were aware of the true nature of their actions, exchange itself would cease.

 

This split between practical and theoretical consciousness leads to a paradox: the non-knowledge of the reality of exchange is integral to its functioning. Social reality relies on participants' ignorance of its true logic. This dynamic illustrates the fundamental nature of ideology: it is not merely false consciousness but rather the reality itself that relies on a certain level of ignorance among its participants. In other words, ideology is the social reality whose existence depends on individuals not fully understanding it.

 

This concept resonates with the notion of the symptom, which can be understood as a phenomenon whose very existence implies a certain level of ignorance on the part of the subject. The subject can only "enjoy" or maintain the symptom as long as its logic remains elusive. The success of interpreting the symptom lies in its dissolution, revealing the underlying truth obscured by ignorance.

Marx's notion of the symptom emerges from his critique of bourgeois ideology, revealing inherent contradictions within its universal principles. Rather than mere imperfections to be overcome, these contradictions are constitutive of the ideology itself.

 

For instance, consider the concept of freedom. While it encompasses various freedoms such as speech and commerce, it also includes a paradoxical form: the worker's "freedom" to sell their labor. However, this act of selling labor actually leads to the worker's enslavement to capital, undermining the true essence of freedom.

 

Similarly, the idea of fair exchange in the market is challenged by the emergence of wage labor. While pre-capitalist societies may have achieved equivalent exchange, the universalization of commodity production brings about a new form of exchange: the labor force itself becomes a commodity. Despite the apparent equivalence in this exchange, the surplus value generated by labor is appropriated by capitalists, revealing exploitation within the system.

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Marx's critique extends to Hegelian philosophy, which conceives of society as a rational totality. Marx argues that any attempt to view society as rational must acknowledge its inherent irrationality, represented by the proletariat. The presence of this irrational element within the rational framework of society exposes the contradiction at its core.

 

 

Lacan attributes the discovery of the symptom not to Hippocrates, as traditionally thought, but to Marx. He suggests that Marx's understanding of the transition from feudalism to capitalism is where the concept of the symptom emerges. To grasp this transition, we need to understand Marx's idea of commodity fetishism.

 

Commodity fetishism refers to the way social relations among people take on the appearance of relations between things. For example, the value of a commodity seems to be an inherent property of the commodity itself, rather than a result of social relations between producers. This misrecognition occurs because people see the world through the lens of commodities and their exchange.

 

Marx's analogy between commodity fetishism and social relations between people sheds light on this phenomenon. Just as commodities seem to have inherent value, people's identities are shaped by their relations with others. Marx compares this to how a person's identity is formed through comparison with others, similar to Lacan's concept of the mirror stage.

 

In capitalist societies, commodity fetishism is prevalent, but social relations between people are supposedly free and equal. However, this appearance of equality masks underlying relations of domination and servitude. This discrepancy between appearance and reality is the symptom of capitalism.

 

In feudal societies, social relations between people were more transparent, while commodity fetishism was less developed because production was primarily for personal use, not for the market. But in capitalism, social relations are disguised as relations between commodities, revealing the underlying truth of exploitation and inequality. This discrepancy between appearance and reality is the symptom of capitalism.

 

Marx offers a more radical critique than many of his contemporaries who dismiss the concept of commodity fetishism as outdated. This concept remains relevant in understanding phenomena like totalitarianism. To illustrate this point, let's examine Umberto Eco's novel "The Name of the Rose," which presents a flawed thesis: that totalitarianism arises from a dogmatic adherence to official doctrine, lacking laughter or ironic detachment.

 

This thesis reflects an enlightened religious belief: an excessive focus on goodness can lead to evil, especially when enforced fanatically. But it overlooks a more unsettling reality: the possibility of an obsessive attachment to evil becoming an ethical stance, as seen in Mozart's "Don Giovanni," who chooses damnation over renouncing his evil deeds.

 

What's truly concerning about Eco's novel is its belief in the liberating power of laughter and irony against totalitarianism. However, in contemporary societies, both democratic and totalitarian, cynicism, laughter, and irony are integrated into the system. The ruling ideology isn't meant to be taken seriously; those who do are often marginalized figures. This challenges the notion of living in a post-ideological society and prompts us to define ideology more precisely.

 

At its core, ideology involves a fundamental naivete, as Marx noted with the phrase "they do not know it, but they are doing it." It signifies a misrecognition of social reality and its underlying conditions. The aim of ideological critique is to make this naivete conscious and dissolve it. However, contemporary society presents a challenge with the rise of cynical reason, as described by Peter Sloterdijk. In cynicism, individuals are fully aware of the gap between ideological masks and reality but still uphold the mask. This differs from classical cynicism, which challenges official culture through irony and sarcasm.

 

Cynical reason represents a kind of moral perversion where integrity is seen as dishonesty and morality as profligacy. It acknowledges the deception behind ideological universality but finds reasons to maintain it. Traditional ideological critique is ineffective against cynical reason because it already accounts for its own gaps and inconsistencies.

 

This shift to cynical reason might suggest a post-ideological world, as Adorno proposed. Totalitarian ideologies no longer claim truth but rely on manipulation and violence. However, this overlooks the enduring influence of ideological fantasy, which structures social reality itself. Cynical reason, despite its detachment, does not challenge this fundamental level of ideological construction.

 

To understand the role of fantasy in ideology, we need to reconsider Marx's idea that people "do not know it, but they are doing it." Traditionally, ideology was seen as a misrecognition of social reality, where individuals' actions didn't align with their understanding of the world. For instance, in commodity fetishism, people attribute inherent value to money, unaware that its value comes from social relations.

 

However, there's another layer to this illusion: individuals are aware of the social reality behind money but still act as if it possesses inherent value. They don't recognize that their actions are guided by an illusion, a fetishistic inversion. This unconscious illusion, which structures our relationship with reality, is what we call ideological fantasy.

 

In today's society, cynicism prevails, leading some to believe we're post-ideological because people no longer take ideologies seriously. However, ideological fantasy still shapes our social reality. Even if individuals distance themselves ironically from ideologies, they still act in accordance with them.

 

Sloterdijk's formula of cynical reason, "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it," reflects this. It suggests that individuals recognize the illusion in their actions but continue to follow it nonetheless. For example, they might acknowledge that their concept of freedom masks exploitation but still adhere to it.

Revisiting Marx's concept of commodity fetishism reveals its subversive power in highlighting the relationship between persons and things. Traditionally criticized by Althusserians as naive, Marx's idea suggests that in capitalist societies, individuals interact with commodities as if they have inherent value, despite knowing otherwise. This inversion, where things believe in their place instead of the subjects, is akin to a Lacanian proposition.

 

According to Lacan, belief is not solely an internal phenomenon but is embodied in practical actions. This externalization of belief can be seen in various cultural practices, such as Tibetan prayer wheels or canned laughter in television shows. In both cases, individuals delegate their emotional responses to external entities, fulfilling social duties through them.

 

The objective status of belief becomes evident in these examples, emphasizing the role of external factors in shaping our perceptions and behaviors. Ignoring this objective dimension of belief can lead to misunderstandings, as illustrated in the anecdote of the man who believed he was a grain of corn. Thus, acknowledging the externalization of belief is crucial for understanding how individuals engage with ideology.

The key takeaway here is that belief is not merely an internal state but is manifested in our social activities, supporting the fantasy that governs social reality. Using Kafka's work as an example, we can see that what appears as an exaggeration or distortion of reality is actually an expression of the underlying fantasy shaping social interactions.

 

In our society, certain beliefs, such as the power of bureaucracy or the authority of political figures, influence our behavior even though we may consciously acknowledge their limitations. This differs from the traditional approach to ideology, which focuses on analyzing the ideological form of society based on its social relations. Instead, an analytical approach should prioritize understanding the ideological fantasy operating within social reality itself.

 

Social reality is constructed ethically, based on a collective "as if" belief in certain ideas or institutions. Pascal's concept of Ideological State Apparatuses highlights this, suggesting that our internal reasoning is influenced by external symbolic networks, leading us to obey authority not because it is just, but because it is accepted. This underscores the external nature of belief, which is embodied in our social functioning.

 

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For Pascal, obedience to the law is not based on rational argumentation but on ideological ritual. This mirrors the Marxist notion of ideological conversion, where individuals, unable to believe in the historical mission of the working class due to bourgeois prejudices, must immerse themselves in revolutionary activities to foster belief. This process of external obedience ultimately leads to internal conviction.

 

The significance of Pascal's concept lies in the paradoxical nature of belief: individuals believe without consciously knowing it, and their final conversion is merely a formal acknowledgment of what they have already believed. This underscores the role of external customs as material supports for the unconscious. Films like "Another Country" sensitively depict this process of "believing without knowing it," particularly in the context of conversion to Communism.

 

The film "Another Country" explores the relationship between two Cambridge students, one being the Communist Judd (based on John Cornford) and the other, the wealthy Guy Bennett, who later becomes a Russian spy (based on Guy Burgess). Despite no sexual relationship between them, Guy's charm doesn't affect Judd, making him the focus of Guy's transference.

 

Set in the 1930s public school environment, the film exposes the facade of patriotism and the underlying atmosphere of enjoyment, particularly through a network of homosexual relationships. This atmosphere, filled with tension and enjoyment, attracted KGB recruiters, offering an escape from the pressure through renunciation.

 

Guy's conversion is depicted delicately in the film, leaving out the formal act but indicating its elements. His tension leads him to recognize the key to his situation lies in his relationship with Judd. Despite Guy's reproaches to Judd's inconsistencies and revealing the mechanism of transference, he remains trapped in it, as his accusations gain meaning only in the context of their relationship.

 

The tension reaches its peak as Guy realizes the gap between the mask and the truth, leading to his escape into belief in Communism and espionage, creating a radical gap between appearance and reality. The film ends with Guy already a believer, though unaware, as he muses on the possibility of Communism's truth.

 

Drawing on Kafka's work, the film highlights the gap between the bureaucratic "machine" and its internalization. Kafka's irrational bureaucracy represents the ideological state apparatus confronting subjects before identification occurs, emphasizing the role of ideological fantasy in shaping reality.

 

In Lacanian terms, reality is constructed to avoid confronting the Real of desire. The dream in the film serves to prolong sleep, but the encounter with the Real of desire is too terrifying, leading to awakening. This underscores the function of reality as a fantasy construction to mask the Real.

 

In essence, ideology isn't merely a dreamlike illusion we create to escape harsh reality. Instead, it's a fantasy construction that forms the basis of our perception of reality itself. It serves as a support for our understanding of social relations, masking some uncomfortable truths or contradictions within society.

 

Lacan's interpretation of Zhuang Zi's dream of being a butterfly highlights this idea. While awake, Zhuang Zi could question whether he was truly himself or the butterfly, but in the dream, this reflection wasn't possible. This asymmetry illustrates how the dream state, where our desires are expressed, offers a closer glimpse of reality than our waking state.

 

Similarly, ideology functions to shape our understanding of reality, even when faced with contradictory evidence. For example, in anti-Semitism, even if factual evidence contradicts the stereotype of Jews, the ideology may twist this contradiction to reinforce itself.

 

Contrary to Marxism, which emphasizes historical and class-based analysis of ideology, Lacanian theory focuses on the internal contradictions within ideology itself. It suggests that attempts to historicize or universalize certain phenomena, like the patriarchal family or concentration camps, can obscure the underlying truth that resurfaces across different historical contexts.

 

Marx's concept of surplus-value aligns with Lacan's idea of surplus-enjoyment, highlighting how capitalism's inherent contradictions lead to its own limits. This notion suggests that ideology, like capitalism, contains its own internal contradictions that shape our perception of reality.

The formula "the limit of capital is capital itself" can be interpreted in two ways. The traditional historicist-evolutionist interpretation views it as the dialectics between productive forces and relations of production. According to this view, capitalism develops productive forces until they outgrow existing social relations, leading to the need for revolutionary change.

 

However, Marx's analysis goes beyond this simplistic view. He distinguishes between formal and real subsumption of production under capitalism, showing that capitalism initially adapts existing production processes before reshaping them to fit its needs. Thus, it's not merely the relations of production constraining further development but the internal contradiction inherent in capitalism itself.

 

Unlike previous modes of production, capitalism is marked by a perpetual contradiction between social production and private appropriation, driving it towards constant development. This contradiction fuels capitalism's need for continuous revolutionizing of its conditions of existence. Surplus-enjoyment, akin to surplus-value in Marx's theory, emerges from this inherent imbalance, constituting the excess that sustains capitalism's dynamism.

 

Despite Marx's insights, his formulation in the Critique of Political Economy often lapses into a vulgar evolutionist dialectic, portraying socialism as the solution to capitalism's contradictions. However, history's irony lies in the emergence of "real socialism," which reproduces this evolutionary logic and fails to address the paradoxes of surplus-enjoyment.