Hellenistic Philosophy

Hellenistic philosophy, which spanned from Alexander's death in 323, to the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, was traditionally divided into three fields: physics, logic, and ethics. Epicurus and his school were often mistakenly considered purely hedonistic, but they were actually hedonists, focusing on pleasure without restricting it to bodily pleasures. Epicurus' school, the Garden, was primarily friendly and non-hierarchical.

Epicurus and his followers were thoroughgoing materialists, believing that everything except the void, even the human soul, is composed of material bodies. They believed that there is nothing but atoms and void, with atoms always in motion and varying in shape. Epicurus' view of atomic motion provides an important point of departure from Democritean atomism, as he believed that atoms sometimes swerve or venture away from their typical course due to chance, allowing room for free will. This allows Epicureans to apply this assumption to their physics, suggesting that there seems to be free will.

Ethics in Hellenistic thought is largely derived from Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus, preserved in Diogenes Laertius' Lives. The goal of the good life is tranquility (ataraxia), and one achieves this by seeking pleasure (hedone). However, Epicurus also recommends a plain life, arguing that the most enjoyment of luxury comes to those who need luxury least. He explicitly denies that sensual pleasures constitute the best life and argues that the life of reason, which includes the removal of erroneous beliefs that cause us pain, will bring us peace and tranquility.

The two main beliefs that produce pain and anxiety for us are a mistaken conception of the gods and a misconception of death. Epicurus encourages us not to anthropomorphize the gods and think only what is fitting for the most blessed and eternal beings. He suggests that it is unreasonable to believe that gods, the best of beings, feel pain at all, and that it is not befitting of them to become angry or involved in our personal affairs.

In conclusion, Hellenistic philosophy is characterized by a focus on physics, logic, and ethics, with Epicurus and his followers being a significant figure in the philosophical landscape.

Epicurus argues that death is nothing to us, as good and evil only apply to sentient beings. The human body is nothing without the mind and soul, and when the body dies, so too does the mind and soul, and so too does sentience. This means that death is literally nothing to us. The terror we feel about death now will vanish once we die. Thus, it is better to be free from the fear of death now. When we rid ourselves of the fear of death and the hope of immortality that accompanies that fear, we can enjoy the preciousness of our mortality (DL X.124-125).

The Cynics were not properly a philosophical school, but they had no central doctrine or tenets. They were a disparate movement with varying interpretations on what constituted a Cynic. This interpretative freedom accords well with one of the characteristics that typified ancient Cynicism—a radical freedom from societal and cultural standards. The Cynics favored a life lived according to nature.

The term "Cynic" comes from the Greek word kunikos, meaning "dog-like." The first of the Dogs, Antisthenes (c.445-366 B.C.E.), was supposedly close with Socrates and was present at his death, according to Plato’s Phaedo. However, Diogenes of Sinope (c.404-323 B.C.E.), often called simply, "Diogenes the Cynic," was and is the most famous of the Dogs. Most information we have comes from Diogenes Laertius’ Lives, which is historically problematic. It provides an imaginative description of Diogenes the Cynic’s life, which was apparently unusual and outstanding.

The Cynics seem to have taken certain aspects of Socrates’ life and thought and pushed it to the extreme. One might wonder what drives the ascetic practice for any sort of luck. Is it that moving from one superficial pleasure to the next is ultimately unfulfilling? Or is the practice itself driven by a sort of fear, an emotion that the Cynic means to quell? That is, one might read the asceticism of the Cynic as a futile attempt to deny the truth of human fragility; for example, at any moment the things I enjoy can vanish, so I should avoid enjoying those things. On the other hand, perhaps the asceticism of the Cynic is an affirmation of this fragility. By living the ascetic life of poverty, the Cynic is constantly recognizing and affirming his/her finitude and fragility by choosing never to ignore it.

The Stoics, as described by Pierre Hadot, studied physics to better understand their own lives and live better ones. They believed that things depend on external causes and are linked in a necessary, rational manner. Like the Cynics, the Stoics strove to live in accordance with nature, and a rigorous study of nature allowed them to do so more effectively.

The Stoics were materialists, but not thoroughgoing materialists like the Epicureans. They saw matter as passive and logos (god) as active, with god running through all of the matter as its organizing principle. This divinity is most apparent in us via our ability to reason. The universe is a unity, and it is divine.

Epistemology is another aspect of Stoic ethics. Knowledge comes to us directly through our senses and impresses itself upon the blank slate of our minds. Our judgments of those objects can lead us into error, as our inner discourse enunciates and describes their content, and we either give or withhold our consent from this enunciation. However, there might be a problem lurking here regarding the standard of truth, which for the Stoics is simply the correspondence of one's idea of the object with the actual object. If it is not the bare sense impression that brings knowledge, there seems to be no standard by which we can ever be sure that our descriptions are correct.

Stoic ethics urges us to be rid of our desires and aversions, especially where these desires and aversions are not in accord with nature. For example, death is natural, and being averse to death will bring misery. Epictetus' Handbook summarizes this concept:

Some things are up to us and some are not up to us. Possessions come and go, reputations are determined by others, and it is reasonable to believe that even the best people will be hated by some, and even the worst people will be loved by some. Wealth, public office, and reputation are up to others to determine.

However, living as Epictetus recommends, one might still feel pain. Physical pain is not harm for a Stoic, as the only real harm is when one harms oneself by doing evil, just as the only real good is living excellently and in accordance with reason. Stoic ethics risks removing our humanity from us in favor of its own notion of divinity.

In conclusion, the Stoics' philosophy of physics, epistemology, and ethics emphasize the importance of understanding and avoiding desires and aversions that are not in accord with nature. By embracing Stoic ethics, individuals can live a more fulfilling and fulfilling life, recognizing the importance of balancing personal desires with the greater good.

Skepticism in the Hellenistic era was divided into two strands: Academic Skepticism and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Each major Skeptic had their own take on Skepticism, but they all shared a common goal of tranquility and freedom from judgments, opinions, or absolute claims to knowledge. Skepticism, broadly speaking, challenged the possibility and nature of knowledge.

Academic Skepticism was initiated by Arcesilaus, who argued both for and against any given position, ultimately showing that neither side of the argument can be trusted. Arcesilaus' argument against stoic empiricism is not clear, but it suggests that we can never be sure that the way we perceive an object via the senses is true or false. He concludes that we should always suspend our judgment.

Carneades, the tenth scholarch of Plato’s Academy, responded to a typical objection raised against Skepticism by recognizing that even the claim “nothing can be known” should be called into doubt. Carneades relied upon the typical skeptic tactic of presenting arguments both for and against the same thing and claiming that we cannot therefore claim that either side is correct.

Pyrrhonian Skepticism, on the other hand, is characterized by the profound indifference that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is meant to generate. It refutes all dogmas and opinions and vehemently clings to indeterminacy, even the idea that “nothing can be known.” Aenesidemus, the Pyrrhonian Skeptic, advanced the “Ten Modes,” arguments that address typical difficulties in appearances and judgment. Each mode aimed toward the conclusion that we ought to suspend judgment if we are to be at peace.

The Skeptics used “philosophical discourse…to eliminate philosophical discourse.” They did not adhere to any philosophical position, but used the tools of philosophy to gain a sense of simplicity and tranquility in life, thereby ridding themselves of the need for philosophy. By using dialectic and opposing one argument to another, the Skeptic suspends judgment and is not committed to any particular position.

One example of a practical approach to life for the Skeptics is the example of antibiotics, which can help cure diseases born from certain bacteria. The Skeptic could reply in several ways, but the most effective reply might be that medicine does not bring us knowledge if knowledge is certainty. Medicine, and what it claims to know, has changed significantly, and the practice of medicine is just another way of describing the way certain bodies interact with other bodies in a given time and place.

The Skeptic would go further, arguing that the curing of a disease is neither good nor bad. If death is a matter of indifference, then the cure for illnesses must be, too. This raises questions about how one is ever spurred to action in this case.