Realism (John Anderson)

 

John Anderson's philosophy, known as Andersonian Realism, was a systematic approach in a century dominated by Anglo-Saxon philosophy. This approach was frowned upon by analytic philosophers, but continental philosophers were more at ease with systematic philosophy. Anderson described his systematic philosophy as a unified theory of the'sciences' of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, which he maintained until the 1930s. He believed that to assert that logic, ethics, or aesthetics were sciences was to assert that they were definite subjects that could be studied and that their method of study was as objective as any other science.

Realism, the most common term used to characterize Anderson's philosophy, was not merely an epistemological doctrine but a systematic enterprise that treated the subjects of logic, ethics, and aesthetics in a Realist manner. Anderson's understanding of the term 'logic' was not restricted to its contemporary usage of formal logic but was more of the traditional sense of metaphysics as including epistemology, ontology, and formal logic as distinct disciplines within that subject.

In his early article, "Realism and Some of its Critics," Anderson outlined the logic he believed his general metaphysical system followed. He argued that Realism appeared firstly as an epistemology based on the doctrine of external relations, secondly as an ontology (Empiricist), but more properly described as a theory of situations or spatio-temporal existence, and finally as a logic (Positivist), meaning that logic is a positive and not a relativistic subject.

Realism was based on the doctrine of external relations, which he believed was the basis for the direct knowledge of the object. In any relationship of knowledge, there are three distinct parts: a subject of knowledge or 'knower' (the -er), an object of knowledge or 'known' (the -ed), and the relation of knowing itself, the knowing (the -ing). On a Realist analysis, such a relationship had the logical form 'S/r/O', and each part of the relationship – the S, r, O, or -er, -ing, -ed – was distinct from the other and could not be reduced to any other part.

Anderson's Realist epistemology implied that an object, or its qualities, cannot be constituted by the relations it has. This conclusion had several interesting implications for Anderson's philosophy of mind, including the idea that 'consciousness', understood as both a quality of mind and a relation that mind has, cannot exist. Instead, the only possible quality of mind that could be aware or conscious of the things around it was emotion, feeling, or affect.

While Anderson's theory of'mind as feeling' appears suggestive as a Realist theory of mind, it is unfortunate that he never developed a detailed theory of which emotions constitute mind and how they operate.

Anderson's ontological theory of existence, Empiricism, is characterized by situations or occurrences in Space-Time and is characterized by various categories of existence. He argued that there are three important associated doctrines associated with Empiricism: pluralism, determinism, and objectivism.

Anderson's pluralism is the view that any thing is both a particular and a universal, which is the foundation of his theory of infinite complexity. This is the foundation of his theory of infinite complexity, where there is no indivisible 'atom' from which all things are made, and no unrelatable totality – no 'universe' – which has nothing outside of it. Anderson distinguished his position from the theories of monism and atomism understood as theories of logical totalities and logical simples.

Anderson's determinism is the view that every thing or occurrence is caused, and he opposed any theory of indeterminism and rejected the notion of a 'free will' as something outside the universe of spatiotemporal causality. Anderson's objectivism is the view that any subject must also be an object, rejecting the doctrine of subjectivism, which states that there are things that are 'irreducibly' subjective. In terms of mind, the alleged'subjectivity' of the mind is as objective as any other thing, that is, the mind as a subject, as a knower, is an existing thing with all the categorical features that other things possess.

In his logical position, Anderson described it as Positivism, which is not to be confused with Logical Positivism. He believed that experimentation was an inadequate test for the truth or falsity of propositions. Positivism was simply a theory of the positive truth and falsity of propositions and opposed to any theory which postulates that the context of a proposition or judgment determines its truth or falsity.

Anderson accepted the traditional Aristotelian analysis of the proposition, which is comprised of a subject, a predicate, a copula, and the quantifiers. The most general form of the proposition is 'S is P', where S is the subject function and P is the predicate function. The copula 'is' incorporates both the positive and negative formulations, 'is' and 'is not'. When the universal and particular quantifiers, 'All' and 'Some', are introduced, this yields the classical four forms of the proposition: All S are P (SaP), Some S are P (SiP), All S are not P (SeP), and Some S are not P (SoP).

Another term used to describe Anderson's Positivism was 'Propositional Realism', which is the view that any occurrence or situation is identical any proposition asserted about it. Anderson rejected the view that the 'proposition' could be a tertium quid, which committed him to the view that there must be some sense of an identity between propositions and situations.

In conclusion, Anderson's ontological theory of existence, Empiricism, and Positivism offers a unique perspective on the nature of reality and propositions.

In his Realist ethical theory, Anderson distinguished between ethics and morality, arguing that good and bad are naturally occurring qualities of social and psychological activities. He rejected the relativist view that relations determine the quality of good, and instead conceived ethics as a science of goodness and badness.

Anderson's classification of goods and bads was heavily influenced by Sorel's producer and consumer ethic theories. The producer ethic is creative, inquiring, and productive, while the consumer ethic is imitative, obscurantist, and consumptive. He later included love as the good and hate as the bad within the domestic sphere.

Socrates' view that goods support one another but oppose bads, while bads oppose both goods and other bads, was used to assist in his classification process. Goods are essentially supportive, while bads are competitive and uncommunicative. In this sense, goods are co-operative and communicative, while bads are competitive and uncommunicative.

Anderson's social and political theory during the 1930s was described as a proletarian theory, with a general Marxist and specifically Communist orientation. He rejected Marx's historical theory of dialectic and believed that the proletariat needed to work with artists and intellectuals to achieve social and political revolution. His analysis of this social conflict was more pluralistic than Marx's, as he believed that the proletariat needed to work with artists and intellectuals to achieve social and political revolution.

During his active political engagement, Anderson was actively involved in the Communist Party of Australia from 1927 to 1932. He believed Russian Communism was the pre-eminent model for Communist parties everywhere, although he supported the independent operation of local parties. However, he came to see that the Russian party was beset by bureaucracy, censorship, and ideology, which led him into conflict with local members who were more prone to following the Moscow line.

In 1933, he helped form the Trotskyist Workers Party of Australia and remained actively involved for the next four years. His break with Communism in 1933 was occasioned more by his recognition of the corrupt nature of Stalinism, rather than any belief that Communism was inconsistent with his philosophic doctrines. During this period, he retained the belief that Communist theory, untainted by Stalinist practice, was deterministic, pluralistic, and objective, and accepted that Trotskyism provided a viable theoretical and practical alternative to Stalinism.

In his Realist aesthetic theory, Anderson often criticized aesthetic theories on the basis of either their relativism or subjectivism. He argued that if beauty is simply a question of what the subject believes or prefers, then there is nothing that is beautiful in itself. Conversely, he argued that if beauty resides merely in the political context of the aesthetic judgment or the active willing of the aesthetic judgment, then there can be no objective aesthetic theory.

Apart from these formal features of his aesthetic theory, there is some indication that Anderson was also developing a more substantive theory of aesthetic damnation and redemption. He quoted Joyce's expression that "history is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake," and suggested that release from this servitude is the affirmation of the human spirit through artistic creation and aesthetic criticism. However, he did not develop these views in detail.