Raymond Williams, 10. Hegemony (Marxism and Literature)

The traditional definition of 'hegemony' is political rule or domination, especially in relations between states. Marxism extended this definition to relations between social classes and definitions of a ruling class. Antonio Gramsci's work on the concept of 'hegemony' gained significant meaning in his work, which distinguishes between 'rule' (dominia) and 'hegemony'. He differentiates between 'rule' as directly political forms and 'hegemony' as the complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural forces.

The concept of 'hegemony' goes beyond 'culture' in its insistence on relating the 'whole social process' to specific distributions of power and influence. In any actual society, there are specific inequalities in means and capacity to realize this process, primarily between classes. Gramsci introduced the necessary recognition of dominance and subordination in what has still to be recognized as a whole process.

The concept of 'hegemony' goes beyond 'ideology', as it is decisive not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs but also the whole lived social process as practically organized by specific and dominant meanings and values. Ideology, in its normal senses, is a relatively formal and articulated system of meanings, values, and beliefs that can be abstracted as a 'worldview' or a 'class outlook'. This explains its popularity as a concept in retrospective analysis (in base-superstructure models or homology), since a system of ideas can be abstracted from that once living social process and represented as the decisive form in which consciousness was at once expressed and controlled.

Ideology is recognizable as fully articulate and systematic forms, and there is a tendency in the analysis of art to look only for similarly fully articulated and systematic expressions of this ideology in the content (base-superstructure) or form (homology) of actual works. In less selective procedures, less dependent on the inherent classicism of the definition of form as fully articulate and systematic, the tendency is to consider works as variants of, or as variably affected by, the decisive abstracted ideology.

The concept of 'hegemony' often resembles these definitions but is distinct in its refusal to equate consciousness with the articulate formal system which can be and ordinarily be abstracted as 'ideology'. It does not exclude the articulate and formal meanings, values, and beliefs that a dominant class develops and propagates but does not equate them with consciousness. Instead, it sees the relations of domination and subordination as a saturation of the whole process of living, not only of political and economic activity but also of the whole substance of lived identities and relationships.

Hegemony is not only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as'manipulation' or 'indoctrination'. It is a whole body of practices and expectations over the whole of living, including our senses, assignments of energy, shaping perceptions of ourselves and the world. It constitutes a sense of reality for most people in society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of society to move in most areas of their lives.

The concept of hegemony offers two immediate advantages: first, its forms of domination and subordination correspond more closely to the normal processes of social organization and control in developed societies than the more familiar projections from the idea of a ruling class. This can speak to the realities of electoral democracy, leisure, and private life more specifically and actively than older ideas of domination. If the pressures and limits of a given form of domination are experienced and internalized, the whole question of class rule and opposition to it is transformed. Gramsci's emphasis on the creation of an alternative hegemony leads to a much more profound and active sense of revolutionary activity in a highly developed society than the persistently abstract models derived from very different historical situations.

Second, there is a whole different way of seeing cultural activity, both as tradition and practice. Cultural work and activity are not in any ordinary sense a superstructure but are seen as more than superstructural expressions of a formed social and economic structure. They are among the basic processes of the formation itself and related to a much wider area of reality than the abstractions of'social' and 'economic' experience. People see themselves and each other in directly personal relationships, seeing the natural world and themselves in it, and using their physical and material resources for what one kind of society specializes to 'leisure', 'entertainment', and 'art'.

Many difficulties arise, both theoretically and practically, but it is important to recognize how many blind alleys we may now be saved from entering. If any lived culture is necessarily so extensive, the problems of domination and subordination on the one hand and the extraordinary complexity of any actual cultural tradition and practice on the other can at last be directly approached. However, there is a closely related problem within the concept of 'hegemony' itself. In some uses, the totalizing tendency of the concept is converted into an abstract totalization, which is readily compatible with sophisticated senses of 'the superstructure' or even 'ideology'. The hegemony can be seen as more uniform, more static, and more abstract than in practice, if it is really understood.

The concept of hegemony is a complex and dynamic concept that encompasses both the active and passive aspects of political and cultural processes. It is not just a form of dominance, but a system or structure with specific and changing pressures and limits. Hegemony is not just passively existing as a form of dominance, but it is continually renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also constantly resisted by pressures not at all its own.

One way to express the distinction between practical and abstract senses within the concept is to speak of 'the hegemonic' rather than 'hegemony' and 'the dominant' rather than simple 'domination'. The reality of any hegemony is that it is never either total or exclusive. At any time, forms of alternative or directly oppositional politics and culture exist as significant elements in society. Their active presence is decisive, not only because they have to be included in any historical analysis but as forms which have had significant effect on the hegemonic process itself.

A static hegemony, indicated by abstract totalizing definitions of a dominant ideology or world-view, can ignore or isolate such alternatives and opposition. However, the decisive hegemonic function is to control, transform, or even incorporate them. In this active process, the hegemonic has to be seen as more than the simple transmission of an (unchanging) dominance. Any hegemonic process must be especially alert and responsive to the alternatives and opposition which question or threaten its dominance.

Works of art, by their substantial and general character, are often especially important as sources of this complex evidence. The major theoretical problem with immediate effect on methods of analysis is to distinguish between alternative and oppositional initiatives and contributions made within or against a specific hegemony (which then sets certain limits to them or can succeed in neutralizing, changing, or actually incorporating them) and other kinds of initiative and contribution which are irreducible to the terms of the original or adaptive hegemony and are in that sense independent.

Cultural process must not be assumed to be merely adaptive, extensive, and incorporative. Authentic breaks within and beyond it, in specific social conditions, have often occurred. By developing modes of analysis that can discern the finite but significant openness of many actual initiatives and contributions, we can better understand the persistent pressures and limits of the hegemonic.